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Abstract
Key exchange protocols allow two parties to agree on a shared secret over an untrusted
channel. A huge number of scientific works on key exchange have been published since
the discovery of the first key exchange protocol, designed in 1976 by Diffie and Hell-
man [DH76]. The most prominent of these works is the game-based security model
by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], published in 1993 and, today, known as the “golden
standard” for the security of key exchange protocols.
The main purpose of key exchange protocols is to establish keys for a symmetric-key
protocol such as a secure channel. Ideally, if both, the key exchange protocol and the
channel protocol, are secure, then we would hope that they can be securely composed.
While this is true for simulation-based security models [Can01, KT11, BPW03], game-
based models usually lack composition theorems altogether. That is unfortunate, as
they are often more suitable for real-life protocols such as TLS.
Our first two composition theorems address the composition of BR-secure key ex-
change protocols with arbitrary symmetric-key protocols. We formally establish that
an additional condition is necessary, namely, the key exchange requires a public session
matching algorithm.
Maybe surprisingly, many important key agreement protocols are not BR-secure due
to the popular technique of explicit key confirmation. We devise a more flexible yet
sufficiently strong model for this class of protocols and prove that it is closed under
reductions. Overall, we devellop a tool for the modular analysis of real-life protocols and
exemplify the use of our framwork on a profile of the TLS protocol.
As in the case of most practical cryptography, information-theoretic security for key
exchange protocols is out of reach, i.e., impossible in a formal sense. Therefore, protocols
such as TLS rely on computational assumptions, e.g., the Diffie-Hellmann assumption
or the hardness of factoring numbers. As the security of protocols is tightly related
to the underlying complexity assumptions, researchers have been striving for simpler
and weaker assumptions. The holy grail in this area is to base key agreement, one-way
functions or simply any type of cryptography on the mere assumptions that NP does
not equal P [FF93, BT03, AGGM06]. While positive results in this area remain elusive,
there has been some recent progress on negative results [HMX10, PTV11], showing
that cryptographic primitives such as hash functions cannot be based on NP-hardness
unless coAM ⊆ NP. In this thesis, we provide two oracle results that show that, via
relativizing techniques, these negative results do not carry over to key agreement and
regular one-way functions. In particular, we give an oracle relative to which NP∩coNP
is easy while infinitely many often secure key agreement exists; and we give an oracle
relative to which AM ∩ coAM is easy while regular function families exists that are
infinitely many often one-way.
Zusammenfassung
Ein Schlu¨sselaustausch ermo¨glicht zwei Parteien, sich u¨ber einen unsicheren Kanal auf
einen gemeinsamen, geheimen Schlu¨ssel zu einigen. Diffie und Hellman [DH76] en-
twickelten 1976 das erste Schlu¨sselaustauschprotokoll und legten damit den Grund-
stein fu¨r ein fruchtbares Forschungsgebiet. Eine der wichtigsten Arbeiten auf diesem
Gebiet ist das spielebasierte Sicherheitsmodell von Bellare und Rogaway [BR93] aus
dem Jahre 1993, welches heutzutage als “goldener Standard” fu¨r die Sicherheit von
Schlu¨sselaustauschprotokollen gilt.
Ein Schlu¨sselaustausch wird gemeinsam mit einem anderen Protokoll ausgefu¨hrt,
welches die abgeleiteten Schlu¨ssel verwendet. Idealerweise hoffte man, daß ein BR-
sicherer Schlu¨sselaustausch und ein sicheres Anwendungsprotokoll auch bei gemeinsamer
Ausfu¨hrung sicher bleiben. Diese Aussage ist fu¨r simulationsbasierte Sicherheitsmodelle
bekannt [Can01, KT11, BPW03], fu¨r spielebasierte Modelle verfu¨gen wir allerdings oft
u¨ber kein einziges Kompositionstheorem. Das ist insofern ungu¨nstig, als daß spiele-
basierte Modelle fu¨r praktische Protokolle wie TLS besser geeignet sind.
Unsere ersten zwei Kompositionstheoreme befassen sich mit der Komposition von
BR-sicheren Protokollen mit Anwendungsprotokollen, die auf symmetrischen Schlu¨sseln
basieren. Wir stellen dabei durch einen formalen Beweis fest, daß es notwendig ist, daß
der Schlu¨sselaustausch einen Public Session Matching Algorithmus besitzt.
U¨berraschenderweise sind einige bedeutende Schlu¨sselaustauschverfahren nicht BR-
sicher, da sie sogenannte Key Confirmation verwenden. Wir entwickeln daher ein zu-
gleich flexibleres und starkes Modell fu¨r diese Klasse von Protokollen und zeigen, daß
das Modell unter Reduktionen abgeschlossen ist. Insgesamt bieten unsere Komposition-
sresultate eine Technik zur modularen Analyse praktischer Protokolle, was wir anhand
einer abstrahierten Version von TLS aufzeigen.
Da praktische Kryptographie und Schlu¨sselaustausch insbesondere keine information-
stheoretische Sicherheit bieten kann, basieren Protokolle wie TLS auf komplexita¨tstheore-
tischen Annahmen wie z.B. der Diffie-Hellman Annahme. Da die Sicherheit eines Pro-
tokolls auf dem Schwierigkeitsgrad des zugrundeliegenden Problems beruht, ist die Studie
schwa¨cherer, einfacher Annahmen eine wichtige Forschungsrichtung. Das gro¨ßte offene
Problem auf diesem Gebiet ist es, Schlu¨sselaustausch, One-Way-Funktionen oder an-
dere Primitive auf NP 6= P zu reduzieren [FF93, BT03, AGGM06]. Ku¨rzlich kon-
nten Unmo¨glichkeitsresultate zeigen, dass z.B. Primitive wie Hash-Funktionen nicht
auf NP-schwierige Probleme reduziert werden ko¨nnen, sofern coAM nicht in NP
liegt [HMX10, PTV11].
In dieser Arbeit zeigen wir mittels zweier Orakelseparierungen, dass es nicht mo¨glich
ist, die vorgenannten Unmo¨glichkeitsresultate mithilfe von relativierenden Reduktionen
auf Schlu¨sselaustausch und regula¨re One-Way-Funktionen zu u¨bertragen. Relativ zu
unserem ersten Orakel ist NP ∩ coNP einfach, wa¨hrend unendlich ha¨ufig sicherer
Schlu¨sselaustausch existiert. Unser zweites Orakel erreicht, dass AM ∩ coAM ⊆ P,
wa¨hrend zugleich eine Familie regula¨rer Funktionen unendlich oft one-way ist.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Key exchange protocols are a widely deployed mechanism that allows two parties to
agree on a shared secret over an untrusted channel. Since the discovery of the first key
exchange protocol almost 40 years ago, a huge number of key agreement schemes has been
proposed with varying security guarantees based on different assumptions (See [BM03]
for a survey). Since Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] presented their security definition for
key exchange in the early 90th, this game-based notion of key indistinguishability has
become a widely accepted standard for the security of key agreement.
In this thesis, we complement the foundations that justify the popularity of the
Bellare-Rogaway (BR) model. Moreover, we analyze a profile of the TLS protocol,
a popular protocol that escapes the Bellare-Rogaway model while not suffering from
obvious attacks. Towards this goal we will introduce a weaker, yet, as we argue, sufficient
notion of security to prove the security of TLS. Finally, we will discuss the complexity-
theoretic assumptions that underly the security of key exchange protocols, and we will
argue that, indeed, there is reason to strive for weaker assumptions that the ones we
rely on right now.
1.1 Composition of BR Secure Key Exchange Protocols
Typically, keys derived through a key exchange protocol are used for secure channels, e.g.,
TLS [DA06], the security protocol used HTTPS connections, in PACE/EAC [BDFK12,
DF10], the protocol used with the New German Identity Card or EMV, the protocol
for payment with EC-cards, Master Card or Visa Card. If the key exchange protocol is
secure on its own and if the subsequent channel protocol is secure on its own, then we
would like to conclude that their composition is secure, too.
The Bellare-Rogaway model stipulates that a key exchange protocol is secure if the
resulting keys are indinstinguishable from random. Intuitively, one might expect that,
indeed, a Bellare-Rogaway secure key exchange protocol can be securely composed with
any secure symmetric-key protocol. However, as we exhibit, this theorem holds if and
only if the protocol admits a so-called session-matching algorithm, i.e., one should be
able to match two sessions just given the information that was transmitted over the
1
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network and is thus considered public information. Note that, while it is a sufficient
condition, we only prove a weak form of the converse. A more detailed explanation
can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. Note that [GR13] show that it is equivalent of
whether one adds a session matching algorithm into the security model or not. However,
they consider a weaker model for key exchange, so their results might not be immediately
applicable to our setting. Indeed, it would be interesting to explore the exact relation
between their result and ours.
Our first composition theorem considers the setting of forward-secure key exchange
protocols showing that if they are BR-secure, then they compose with arbitrary secure
symmetric-key protocols. We then show a similar composition theorem for key exchange
protocols that are not forward secure. Indeed, they are generally composable with
any single session reducible protocol, a large class of symmetric-key protocols that we
introduce and that includes most primitives such as message authentication schemes,
signatures and encryption.
1.2 Compositional Framework for Games
Game-based models are pre-destined for the analysis of practical protocols, because
they seem to capture a notion of security that is strong enough, yet as weak as possible.
In turn, game-based models usually do not enjoy powerful theoretical properties such
as composability. And thus, composition results in the game-based setting are rather
scarce. In comparison, simulation-based security models capture a much stronger notion
of security; and indeed, almost all composition results have been achieved in simulation-
based security models only.
Thus, our results unite the best from both worlds, as we can prove composition results
in the setting of game-based security, thus allowing for a modular security analysis in a
model that is as weak as possible and yet as strong as necessary (at least, that is, what
research suggests so far).
It is interesting to note that, although there is a long plethora of works dealing with
game-based security of key exchange as a standalone application, e.g. [BR95, BWJM97,
BPR00, CK01, LLM06], their composability has never been formally proven or even been
defined. This is striking, as key exchange per se is executed in order to use the derived
keys in a subsequent task. This thesis intiates the study of composability of game-based
key exchange protocols.
One important contribution towards this goal is a framework for general game-based
composition that we put forth in Chapter 3. As standard in cryptographic games,
we provide an interface to the adversary that allows him to ask queries to the game
and thus retrieve information about the cryptographic algorithms in use. The goal of
the adversary is to achieve a certain winning condition that is defined by the game.
Moreover, the network model allows the adversary to entirely control the network, i.e.,
enabling active attacks such as message dropping, re-ordering or replacement. The basic
framework is applicable to any type of network protocol composition and is not tailored
towards key exchange.
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We then specialise our model to recover the original definition of Bellare and Ro-
gaway [BR93]. Note that we can strengthen the mode of corruption to capture, for
example, the eCK [LLM06] version of the BR model. We implement one modification to
the Bellare Rogaway model in order to cover a more general class of protocols. Namely,
we do not pair sessions via matching conversations but instead use session identifiers,
as put forward in the work by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [BPR00]. Unlike for
matching conversations, one then has to prove that at most two sessions agree on the
same session identifier and that two sessions with the same session identifier derive the
same key. A third important requirement is regarding authentication, i.e., if two ses-
sions accept with the same session identifier, then they really communicated with their
intended partner.
1.3 Composability of General Key Exchange Protocols
Implementing key agreement protocols with key-indistinguishability is highly efficient—
additionally, even before our work, key indistinguishability was believed to entail com-
posability. Therefore, one might presume that key indistinguishability is one of the most
important criteria in the design of key exchange protocols.
However, as it turns out, designers of real-life protocols such as TLS often desire
to implement explicit key confirmation, i.e., they use the derived key to encrypt and
authenticate messages already during the key exchange phase. Now, an adversary that
shall distinguish whether it holds a real key or a random string can use its key for de-
cryption and/or verification of the message authentication code and thus notice that his
string is (not) the real key. Hence, using the session key in the key exchange phase de-
stroys the property of key indistinguishability so that protocols that exhibit this popular
type of key confirmation method cannot be proven secure under the Bellare-Rogaway
paradigm.
Theoretically, one could implement both, key-indistinguishability and explicit key
confirmation simultaneously by using a so-called key refresh step where one hashes the
key to derive one or several “fresh” keys [BR93, BPR00], and it turns our that, if we
add a key refresh step to TLS, then this modified version of TLS is BR-secure in the
random oracle model [MSW10]. However, the key refreshment step looks like an artifact
of theory. Indeed, there is little hope to successfully integrate a key refreshment step
into a standard merely based on the inability to prove security. On the other hand,
without including the key refreshment into the actual protocol, [MSW10] only analyze
a modified version of TLS which is unsatisfactory.
Another approach to make practical key exchange protocols fit into the theoretical
framework is to hope that the protocol would be secure without the key confirmation
messages, so that one can prove a truncated protocol secure. Unfortunately, this is often
not the case.
Now, intutively, if a key is intended to be used for encryption, what harm is done
if it is used for encryption (even if this happened in the key exchange phase)? We
would hope that the protocol is still secure. Our approach aims at giving a foundation
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to this intuition and follows definitional ideas by [DDMW06, Sho99a, BBP04]. More
concretely, our security model does not demand for the indistinguishability of the session
keys anymore. Instead, we define what it means for a key exchange protocol to be “good”
for an application primitive/protocol. Namely, a key exchange protocol is suitable for
a primtive/protocol, if an adversary cannot break the primitive/protocol that later uses
the session keys derived in the key exchange phase.
Interestingly, our model still exhibits composability. Namely, we prove that our
notion is closed under reductions, i.e., if the key exchange is suitable for a building
primitive, and if a protocol can be reduced to this simpler primitive, then the protocol
can be safely used together with the key exchange protocol.
However, there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch, so we slightly strengthen the no-
tion of reduction to what we call a key-independent reduction. Here, the reduction from
the protocol, e.g., an authenticated channel, to the primitive, e.g., a message authenti-
cation code, has to be independent of the key distribution that is used by the message
authentication code. Maybe, at a first look, this sounds impossible to achieve, as the
key distribution could be always the all zero string. In this case, it is trivial to break the
authenticated channel—but in this case, it is also trivial to break the message authenti-
cation code. Recall that a reduction transforms an adversary against the protocol into
an adversary against the primitive. A key-independent reduction sais that similarly, if
the key distribution makes the authenticated channel insecure then it should also make
the message authentication code secure.
Using the notion of key-independent reduction, our composition theorem shows that
if a key exchange protocol is suitable for a primitive and if the protocol reduces to this
primitive via a key-independent reduction, then the key exchange protocol is suitable for
the protocol.
1.4 On the Security of TLS
Just as EMV and PACE/EAC, the TLS protocol consists of two phases, a key exchange
phase, known as the TLS handshake, and a secure channel phase, called the TLS record
layer protocol.
Our definitional composition framework captures, in many ways, a sufficient and
neccessary condition for the security of a key agreement protocol whose keys are used
in an application protocol. Indeed, we can show that a profile of the TLS protocol
satisfies our notion thus confirming the intuition that key confirmation does not harm
the security of the overall protocol.
The TLS record layer implements a length-hiding authenticated encryption scheme
(LHAE), and Paterson, Risternpart and Shrimpton [PRS11] prove that the encryption
scheme in the TLS record layer is indeed LHAE-secure. Their analysis was preceeded by a
number of works that analyze abstracted versions of the channel implementation [BN00,
Kra01, MT10].
The analysis of the channel will be a modular ingredient for our analysis of TLS,
namely, whenever the encryption scheme is LHAE-secure, then our analysis applies—
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even if at a later time, the current encryption scheme might be replaced by another
LHAE-secure encryption scheme.
Recently, Jager et al. [JKSS12] also performed a monolithic analysis of TLS-DH,
i.e., TLS using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange as the underlying key agreement method.
Besides our work, they are the first to analyze an unmodified version of TLS in contrast
to [MSW10], for example. They analyse TLS in a new model for so-called authenticated
and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols that they put forward. Besides
small technical differences, their model for ACCE is indeed an instance of our framework.
Namely, their ACCE model considers the combined security of a key agreement protocol
and (a stateful version of) lenth-hiding authenticated encryption LHAE, which in our
words, means that they prove that the TLS key agreement protocol is suitable for LHAE.
We use TLS to exemplify the use of our composition theorem, while Jager et al.
focused on the analysis of TLS. In particular, we developed a composition framework
allowing for a modular approach while their model only allows for a monolithical anal-
ysis. In turn, the presentation of their model is much shorter. However, devising a
general framework allowed us to avoid certain caveats. In particular, they used match-
ing conversations as a partnering mechanism so that their model was initially too strong
for TLS and indeed, their was a small gap in the first version of their proof; they then
restricted the reveal queries of the adversary and obtained a proof in that model. How-
ever, now, some real-life attacks are not reflected in their model anymore. Moving to
session-identifier-based partnering, as in our model, should be able to overcome this
problem.
They are the first to provide an analysis of TLS in the standard model. As a draw-
back, their analysis is based on a non-standard assumption. It should be interesting to
see whether the latter can be ultimatively eliminated. In turn, their standard model
analysis could also be carried out in our framwork.
Hence, in a nutshell, each approach has its advantages, in particular, we analyse TLS
in the random oracle model, while they present a standard-model analysis. In turn, we
provide a framework that allows for the modular analysis of key exchange protocols,
while their model is tailored towards TLS.
1.5 Complexity-Theoretic Assumptions
The TLS protocol is designed based on several building blocks. One building block is a
passively secure key exchange protocol such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
or an RSA-based key transport protocol. Other building blocks are secure signature
schemes, symmetric authenticated encryption and secure hash functions. To assess the
security of protocols such as TLS, we assume that these building blocks are secure
and then prove that—under this assumption—the way in which TLS combines them, is
secure, too.
Thus, the security of TLS need both, an analysis like ours as well as a proof of security
for its underlying building blocks. Indeed, the security of these building blocks usually
reduces to a complexity theoretic assumption, i.e., the hardnessness of a complexity-
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theoretic problem. In this thesis, we elaborate on the weakest possible assumptions
to build passively secure key agreement, a building block for TLS and other TLS-like
protocols.
A weak assumption for key agreement would be, for example, that the set of problems
solvable in non-deterministic polynomial-timeNP is not contained in the set of problems
that are solvable in polynomial-time P. However, usually, we make much stronger,
probabilistic assumptions, as, for example, the existence of one-way functions; functions
that are easy to compute, but hard to invert on the average. It turns out that this is
inherent as the existence of passively secure key agreement already implies the existence
of one-way functions [IL89].
When considering specific assumption for key agreement such as the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, it turns out that not only they imply one-way functions, but also,
they imply hard problems in NP ∩ coNP. Whether this is inherent, is not known,
and we prove that there is no relativizing reduction that could establish such as result,
namely, we prove that there is an oracle Π such that relative to Π:
(i) secure key agreement exists.
(ii) NP ∩ coNP is contained in P.
Our result can be seen as a strengthening of the result by Chang et al. [CHL02] who
prove that there exists and oracle Π relative to which
(i) secure key agreement exists.
(ii) one-way permutations do not exist.
Note that our result implies their result as a special case, asNP∩coNP ⊆ P implies that
one-way permutations do not exist. Note that our result also implies a family of oracle
separations, namely, whenever a cryptographic primitive P implies hard problems in
NP∩coNP (through a relativizing reduction), then using our result, one yields an oracle
relative to which secure key agreement exists while the cryptographic primitive P does
not. Note that Haitner et al. [HMX10] recently showed that a family of cryptographic
primitives such as collision-resistent hash functions implies hard problems in AM ∩
coAM, a slightly bigger class than NP ∩ coNP. If our results can be extended to
AM∩coAM, then automatically, we yield an oracle separation between key agreement
and all of these primitives, e.g., that the existence of passively secure key agreement
does not imply collision-resistent hash functions.
One-way functions are a necessary condition for all of modern cryptography, and
they turn out to be a sufficient condition for many cryptographic primitives such as
message authentication codes and symmetric encryption schemes. The latter two imply
symmetric authenticated encryption and are thus an important building block for the
TLS protocol. A slightly stronger assumption are so-called regular one-way functions. It
was suspected that regular one-way functions are actually a much stronger assumption
than one-way functions alone [AGGM06], namely, that one-way functions already imply
hard problems in AM∩coAM (which we do not believe to be true for standard one-way
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functions). However, our second oracle separation shows that a relativizing reduction
cannot establish that regular one-way functions imply hard problems in AM∩ coAM.
Namely, we give an oracle Π such that relative to Π,
(i) regular one-way functions exist.
(ii) AM∩ coAM is containted in P.
This might explain the difficulty that Akavia et al. [AGGM06] had in establishing a
reduction that turns regular one-way functions into hard problems in AM ∩ coAM.
Their goal was to prove that any regular one-way function can be broken by an adversary
that has complexity less than AM∩coAM. They argue that, under the assumption that
NP is not contained in coAM, this means that regular one-way functions cannot be
based on the mere assumption that that NP is not contained in P: assume that given
access to a good inverter for a one-way function, a polynomial-time reduction R can
decide any problem in NP. And assume that a good inverter for the one-way function
can be implemented in complexity AM ∩ coAM. Then the reduction together with
the inverter has complexity AM∩ coAM and decides an NP-hard problem, implying
NP ⊆ coAM.
Akavia et al. [AGGM10] exhibit a gap in their proof that relates regular one-way
functions to hard problems in AM ∩ coAM, and our oracle result can be seen as an
explanation of why the gap is hard to bridge. Besides presenting the results, Chapter 7
will also introduce the two tools that we borrow from complexity-theory, namely, generic
oracles which have previously been used by Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87] to separate
classical complexity classes, and the relation between certificate complexity and block
sensitivity that was discovered by Nisan [Nis91]. We will now elaborate on existing
works and known techniques that are relevant to this thesis, and we will explain how
our results relate to those.
1.6 Related Work
Definitions of Key Exchange. There has been a plethora of work on the security
of network protocols, and this line of research is particularly long in the area of key
agreement. We now first give a high-level overview and then consider in detail the
works that are most relevant to us. Security of network protocols or protocols and
primitives in general usually either follows the game-based approach or is based on a
simulation-based notion such as the universal composition (UC) framework and similar
frameworks [Can01, BPW07, Ku¨s06].
Simulation-based security models are endowed with powerful theoretical properties
such as composability. Unfortunately, this additional structure comes at the price of
strengthening the model to the point that implementing primitives is less efficient, or,
in some cases even impossible [CF01].
It is thus an important goal in the area of modelling to devise models that are as
weak as possible (to allow for efficient implementation) but still as strong as neces-
sary (to capture all real-life attacks). For key exchange, whenever the simulation-based
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model [CK02] is too strong for the protocol in question, one might instead opt for a
version of the Bellare-Rogaway model [BR93]. All models allow for active attacks on the
network, some form of corruption, and they consider leakage of session keys. The Bellare-
Rogaway model then demands that the session keys of uncorrupted, unrevealed sessions
remain indistinguishable from random. We will present their definition in Chapter 3
and use it throughout Chapter 4. Note that instead of matching sessions via match-
ing conversations as [BR93], we match sessions through session identifiers as introduced
in [BPR00].
Composition theorems in the game-based setting are rare, and interestingly, one of
the few results in this area indeed also deals with key exchange and has a goal that is quite
similar to what we prove in Chapter 4. Namely, Canetti and Krawczyk [CK01, CK02]
show that if a protocol is secure according to the game-based notion of SK-security, a BR-
variant, then it is securely composable with arbitrary secure protocols. Albeit pursuing
a similar goal, their result is not entirely in the game-based setting. They proceed by
showing that their (game-based notion) of SK-security is equivalent to some version of
the (simulation-based) UC-security and then apply the UC composition theorem, i.e.,
their composition theorem can combine a game-based notion of key exchange with a
simulation-based secure application protocol.
Besides broader applicability (as game-based notions tend to be weaker), we can
also avoid subtleties in the UC-framework such as pre-established session identifiers. It
may be noted that this frequently criticized artifact of the UC framework can be easily
circumvented by establishing session-identifiers beforehand, as done in [BLR]. However,
UC-security requires these identifiers to be used in the run of the protocol, and that is
not the case for practical protocols. As we target practical protocols in their due form,
we thus prefer to avoid the restrictive syntax of UC.
Recently, Ku¨sters and Thurgenthal [KT11] develop a UC-like framework that is able
to reflect matching via session identifiers as common in practical protocols. An interest-
ing question for future work is to try to analyze TLS in their framework.
Another note on the composition theorem by Canetti and Krawczyk [CK01, CK02]
is that SK-security cannot be proven to imply UC-security straight away. Either one
needs to weaken UC-security by adding non-standard oracles, or one boosts the security
of the protocol via secure erasure, usually considered a strong assumption. It would be
interesting to see to what extend this also applies to [KT11].
We thus work with a game-based model and show in Chapter 4 that key indistin-
guishability is a sufficient condition for general composability. In a specific context,
however, it might not be a necessary condition, which is precisely the topic of Chap-
ter 5. While we consider general applications, specific use cases have been explored by
others before. For example, Bellare et al. [BBP04] consider an encapsulated key as se-
cure if it can be safely used for a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). Also, Datta et
al. [DDM+05] explore the idea of context-specific security in the are of Protocol Com-
positional Logic. Similarly to our notion, they call a key “good” if information learned
about it before do not harm the security of the encryption scheme that the key is used
for. In the same context, the work by Datta et al. [DDMW06] targets to translate prop-
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erties of game-based security into their logical framework. As common in the area of
formal methods, their theorems only apply to protocols that are specified in a specific
syntax, so that incorporating an additional primitive entails proving a new theorem for
the the extended language. In turn, our theorem holds generally for all primitives and
protocols.
A notion of security that might sound similar to ours is the security definition by
Shoup [Sho99b]. He generalizes key indistinguishability to key indistinguishability when
additionally, other protocols make use of the session key. This allows him to model
information loss through key confirmation messages. However, this is different from our
setting where we desire to argue that a composed protocol is secure (as it is not sufficient
that the key is indistinguishable).
Assumptions for Key Agreement. In the area of lattice-based cryptography, there
is a long line of research that deals with sufficient assumptions for key agreement. Note
that most of these papers discuss public-key encryption, which is existentially equivalent
to two-move key agreement. Potentially, key agreement protocols with more messages
could be based on strictly weaker assumptions [Rud92]. Yet, to date, the power of
interaction has never been exploited towards weaker assumptions.
The most promising lattice-based constructions for public-key encryption/two-move
key agreement are those that admit a worst-case to average-case reduction with an NP-
hard worst-case problem [Ajt96, Reg03, MR04, Reg05]. Unfortunately, parameter choice
is a crucial issue in the area of lattice problems. For example, the parameters γ, for which
γ-GapSVP (Gap version of the Shortest Vector Problem in lattices) is NP-hard, are not
known to yield crypto-systems. In turn, known cryptosystems based on γ-GapSVP use
parameters γ such that the corresponding problem γ-GapSVP is already in NP∩coNP
and thus unlikely to be NP-hard [GG98, AR05].
Our oracle result might indicate which features of the schemes could be exploited to
yield, indeed, schemes from NP-hardness.
Impossibility Results. Two main techniques to establish separations in cryptogra-
phy are oracle separations and meta-reductions. To prove an oracle separation between
two primitives Q and P , one constructs an oracle relative to which the primitive P
exists, while Q does not exist. In this way, one rules out a relativizing construction
from Q out of P . The most famous oracle separation is the seminal paper by Impagli-
azzo and Rudich [IR90] who prove that, relative to a PSPACE oracle and a random
oracle, key agreement does not exist, while one-way functions do. Impagliazzo and
Rudich introduced oracle separations into the area of cryptography and thereby ini-
tiated a long line of research dealing with oracle separations between cryptographic
primitives, e.g., [DOP05, HHRS07, HH09, KP09, BCFW09, FLR+10, MP12, LOZ12,
BH13, HOZ13]. Concurrently to the result that separates key agreement from one-way
functions, Rudich proved in his thesis [Rud88] that there is an oracle relative to which
one-way functions exist, while one-way permutations do not. We will study this result
in more detail in Chapter 7.
The second important technique for separation results are so-called meta-reductions.
These results are usually conditional, i.e., they rely on some complexity assumption
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such as NP 6= coNP or the existence of one-way functions, and they show that, if
we can build Q out of P , then the assumption does not hold. For example, several
meta-reductions rule out certain types of reductions from one-way function to NP-
hardness [FF93, BT03, AGGM06]. All three works assume that NP is not contained
in coNP (or in coAM) and then prove that if there is a reduction of a certain type
from a one-way function to an NP-hard problem, then NP is contained in coNP (or
coAM). Meta-reductions were first used by by Boneh and Venkatenesan [BV98] and, as
for oracle separations, by now, there is a long line of works that prove separation results
via meta-reductions, e.g., [Cor02, PV06, HRS09, FS10, Pas11, GW11, DHT12, KK12,
Seu12, FF13].
We often call a separation result an impossibility result, namely, because a separation
result shows that it is impossible to establish a reduction of a certain type. In partic-
ular, that means that separation results can possibly be circumvented using black-box
techniques, as for example in the ingenious work by Barak [Bar01]. It is thus crucial
to identify the class of techniques/reductions that are ruled out in order to point out
the leverages to bypass them. [RTV04] and [BBF13] both give a framework to classify
reductions. In both taxonomies, our results rule out relativizing reductions, which, ac-
cording to [BBF13], is a strong separation that even rules out constructions that treat
the primitive in a non-black-box and also allows the reduction to treat the primitive and
the adversary in a non-black-box way, which are called NNN-reductions in the taxonomy
of [BBF13]. Moreover, as key exchange with non-perfect correctness as well as regular
one-way functions allow for embedding according to [RTV04], our results actually also
rule out semi-black-box reductions, that is, reductions that only need to work for efficient
adversaries, NNNa-reduction in the notation of [BBF13].
Interestingly, the results in Chapter 7 can also be interpreted as negative results for
negative results—or as oracle separations that show that a certain meta-reduction is
unlikely to exist. Namely, Akavia et al. [AGGM06] aim at proving a meta-reduction;
our oracle result indicates that the gap in their proof might be difficult to bridge, at
least via this form of meta-reduction.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
We introduce the security definitions for basic cryptographic primitives such as symmet-
ric encryption and message authentication codes as well as standard complexity classes.
For an integral introduction to cryptography, we recommend [Gol04, Gol01], and for an
integral introduction to complexity theory, we recommend [Gol08, AB09].
Throughout this thesis, the notion of an efficient algorithm denotes an interactive
Turing machine that runs in probabilistic polynomial-time, unless explicitly stated oth-
erwise.
2.1 Cryptography
A cryptographic primitive is a building block that can be used to build more complex
cryptographic protocols or different/more complex cryptographic primitives. While there
is no formal distinction between cryptgraphic primitives and cryptographic protocols, we
usually think of primitives as implementing some non-interactive task such as encrypting
or signing a message. In turn, protocols are an exchange of messages between two or
more parties and usually interactive, such as, for example, in a key exchange protocol,
or a secure channel.
Security of both, cryptographic primitives and protocols, is usually modelled through
a probabilistic experiment. As discussed in the introduction, the main two approaches
are game-based and simulation-based. In this thesis, we are exclusively concerned with
game-based security. Here, security is described through an adversary playing a game.
The game gives challenges to the adversary that the adversary has to “break”, and
the adversary can usually request some additional information from the game through
queries, and he tries to “win” the game. The game is modelled in such a way such
that, if the adversary breaks the challenges, then the he also wins the game. In the
next chapter, we will study typical properties of cryptographic games. We preceed these
rather abstract considerations with more concrete examples in this chapter that are
standard in cryptography.
One-Way Functions and Pseudo-Random-Generators. The most basic version
of game-based security are non-interactive games. Here, the adversary gets a challenge
11
12 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
and has to solve it. He does not get access to any queries. For example, a one-way
function f is a function that is easy to compute, but hard to invert, on the average. Here,
the game draws a random input x, computes y := f(x) and gives y to the adversary
A. The adversary A then tries to find a pre-image x′ of y and “wins” if f(x′) = y.
A function f is called one-way, if all efficient adversary A fail to compute a pre-image
almost all the time, formally:
Definition 1 (One-Way Functions and Negligible Functions). An efficiently computable
function f is one-way, if for all efficient adversaries A, one has that
Probx←{0,1}n
[A(1n, f(x))→ x′ ∈ f−1(y)]
is negligible. A function (n) is negligible if it tends to 0 faster than the inverse of any
positive polynomial when n tends to infinity.
One-way functions are the most prominent representatives of the class of search
problems in cryptography. Roughly, a search problem is a problem where the adversary
tries to find a long string that satisfies some property such as f(x′) = y.
The second important class of problems in cryptography are decision problems where
the adversary wins the game, if he successfully guesses a secret bit. A prominent example
of a (non-interactive) decision problem are pseudo-random generators. A pseudo-random
generator G is an efficiently computable function that turns a small number of truly
random bits into a bigger number of pseudo-random bits. Pseudo-random means that
for any efficient adversary A, it is is hard to distinguish the output G(x) of the pseudo-
random generator from a random string of the same length. Here, the game flips a
random bit b. If the bit is 0, the game gives G(x) to the adversary. If the bit is 1, the
game gives a random string of the same length to the adversary. The adversary then
returns a bit d and wins if d = b. The pseudo-random generator is considered secure,
if all efficient adversary fail to determine b better than with guessing probability, that
is, the probability that A returns 1 on input G(x) is the same as the probability hat A
returns 1 on input a random string of length |G(x)|, up to negligible differences, formally:
Definition 2 (Pseudo-Random Generator). An efficiently computable function G with
stretch 0 < s : N→ N is a pseudo-random-generator, if G({0, 1}n) ⊆ {0, 1}n+s(n) for all
n ∈ N and for all efficient adversaries A, one has that
|Probx←{0,1}n [A(1n, G(x) = 1)]− Proby←{0,1}n+s(n) [A(1n, y) = 1] |
is negligible.
Note that without the stretch condition, construction a pseudo-random generator is
trivial, as the identity function would be a valid candidate.
Symmetric encryption. An encryption of a message should hide all possible infor-
mation of the encrypted message, even if the attacker has partial information about
the message. The security game that captures this goes back to Goldwasser and Mi-
cali [GM82]. Security models for encryption ask that, even if the adversary knows
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(chooses) two messages m0 and m1, then their respective ciphertexts should be indistin-
guishable from each other. At a first sight, this security requirement might sound too
strong, but imagining that we only encrypt a single bit, then, if the encryptions of 0 and
1 are not indistinguishable, then basically, the ciphertext leaks all the information about
the encrypted message. Thus, for most applications, it is not recommended to use en-
cryption schemes that are insecure according to the well-established notion of IND-CPA
security that we define next—in some cases, it is even advisable to opt for a stronger
notion, called IND-CCA security.
The security game for encryption is a decision game with a secret bit b, that allows
the adversary to ask for encryptions of messages and also to ask challenge queries, where
the adversary sends two messages m0 and m1 and gets back an encryption of the message
mb, depending on the secret bit b. Encryption queries are called chosen message attacks,
and the corresponding security game is known as IND-CPA, indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attacks. If additionally, the adversary can make decryption queries, then
the game is called IND-CCA (or IND-CCA2), namely indistinguishable under chosen-
ciphertext attacks.
Formally, we define an encryption scheme E as a triple of algorithms E = (KeyGen,Enc,
Dec), where KeyGen is the key generation algorithm. To generate a key, we execute
k ← KeyGen(1η). We have c← Enck(m), for a message m taken from the message space
(M) of E and m′ ← Deck(c′), with m′ ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. The correctness requirement of
encryption is that for all messages m, it holds with overwhelming probability over key
generation and encryption that if k ← KeyGen(1η) and c← Enck(m), then m = Deck(c).
An encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be indistinguishable under chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that the
experiment CCA2EncA evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to
1





Where on input of m0, m1, the Enc oracle returns the output of Enck(mb)
The oracle Dec on input of c returns ⊥, if c has been an output of oracle Enc,
Otherwise it returns Deck(c).
Return 1 iff b = d.
A symmetric encryption scheme is secure according to the weaker notion of indis-
tinguishability under the chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), if the adversary is not
given decryption oracle. An encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be indis-
tinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), if for any efficient algorithm A
the probability that the experiment CPAEncA evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to
1
2 (as a
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d← AEnck(·,·)(1n),
Where on input of m0, m1, the Enc oracle returns the output of Enck(mb)
Return 1 iff b = d.
Asymmetric Encryption. We define an encryption scheme E as a triple of algorithms
E = (KeyGen,Enc, Dec), where KeyGen is the key generation algorithm. To generate
a key pair we execute the randomized algorithm (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1η). Encryption
works via the randomized algorithm c ← Enc(pk,m), for a message m taken from the
message space (M) of E . To decryption, we run m′ ← Dec(sk, c′), with m′ ∈ M ∪ {⊥}.
The correctness requirement of encryption is that with overwhelming probability over
key generation and encryption that if (sk, pk)← KeyGen(1η) and c← Enc(pk,m), then
m = Dec(sk, c).
An encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be indistinguishable under chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that the
experiment CCA2EncA evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to
1





where the Enc oracle on input of m0, m1 returns the output of Enc(pk,mb).
The oracle Dec on input of c returns ⊥, if c has been an output of oracle Enc.
Otherwise it returns Deck(c).
Return 1 iff b = d.
We say that an encryption scheme satisfies the weaker notion of indistinguishability
under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), if for all efficient adversary the probabil-
ity that the experiment CPAEncA evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to
1
2 . Note that the
difference between CPAEncA and CCA2
Enc





where the Enc oracle on input of m0, m1 returns the output of Enc(pk,mb).
Return 1 iff b = d.
Authentication. Authentication is typically a search problem, namely, the adversary
tries to fake (a string of) information that makes the receiver believe that a certain mes-
sage was sent by another sender than himself. Usually, we also allow the adversary to
see messages that have been authenticated by the sender. The symmetric-key authen-
tication primitive is called a message-authentication codes (MAC), the asymmetric-key
authentication primitive is called a signature scheme, and authenticated protocols, both
symmetric-key and asymmetric-key, are called authenticated channels.
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A MAC scheme MAC is a triple of algorithms MAC = (KeyGen, Mac, Verify), where
keys for the scheme a generated by k ← KeyGen(1η). We let σ ← Mack(m) with m ∈
{0, 1}∗ and define v ← Verifyk(m′, σ′) where v ∈ {true, false}. Further, we require that
Verifyk(m,Mack(m)) = true for all m with overwhelming probability over key generation
and Mac generation.
A message authentication code (KeyGen,Mac,Verify) is called unforgeable under cho-
sen message attacks if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that the experiment




Return 1 iff Verifyk(m
∗, σ∗) = 1 and A has never queried Mack(·) about m∗.
A signature scheme SIG is a triple of algorithms SIG = (KeyGen, Sig, Verify), where
keys for the scheme a generated by (sk, pk)← KeyGen(1η). We let σ ← Sig(sk,m) with
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and define v ← Verify(m′, σ′, pk) where v ∈ {true, false}. Further, we require
that genuinely generates signature are accepted with overwhelming probability.
As signature scheme (KeyGen,Sig,Verify) is called unforgeable under chosen message
attacks if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that the experiment ForgeSIGA
evaluates to 1 is negligible (as a function of n), where
Experiment ForgeSigA (n)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1n)
(m∗, σ∗)← ASig(sk,·)(pk, 1n)
Return 1 iff Verify(m∗, σ∗, pk) = 1 and A has never queried Sig(sk, ·) about m∗.
In both, the symmetric and the asymmetric setting, we sometimes need the notion
of strong unforgeability. A signature scheme/message authentication code is strongly
unforgeable under chosen message attacks, if no efficient adversary can generate a valid
fresh pair of a message and a tag/signature. Note that in the standard notion of unforge-
ability, the message has to be fresh, while for strong unforgeability, only the pair needs
to be new. Thereby, we assure that an adversary cannot generate a second tag/signature
for a message, for which it already received a tag/signature from the Mac/Sig oracle.
Computational Diffie–Hellman Assumption. A common assumption in cryptog-
raphy are the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH) that is a search problem
and its decisional variant, the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH).
We here state the computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH), which we will
use in the discussion of TLS in Chapter 5. CDH is widely believed to hold in various
groups, e.g., in certain elliptic curves. Here, we consider the assumption over prime
order groups Zp. The algorithm Params returns a prime p, a generating group element
g and a range parameter q for the exponents.
Definition 3 (CDH). The CDH problem is hard with respect to an instance generation
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algorithm Params, if for all efficient algorithms A the following probability is negligible:
Pr [(p, q, g) ← Params(1n); a, b← Zq :
A(p, q, g, ga, gb, 1n) = gab
]
,
where all group elements g, ga, gb, gab are reduced modulo p.
Decisional Diffie–Hellman Assumption. A stronger version of the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption is its decisional counterpart whose properties we will discuss
in detail in Chapter 7. In particular, we will show, that both, the computational and
the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption imply hard problems in the complexity class
NP ∩ coNP that we define in the following section.
Definition 4 (DDH). The DDH problem is hard with respect to an instance generation








(p, q, g)← Params(1n); a, b, c← Zq : A(p, q, g, ga, gb, gc, 1n) = 1
]
,
where all group elements g, ga, gb, gc, gab are reduced modulo p.
2.2 Complexity Theory
While crpytography inherently requires probabilistic average-case definitions, this is not
so for classical complexity theory, often called worst-case complexity theory to differen-
tiate it from average-case complexity theory. A problem in complexity theory is usually
a language L, a set of strings; and an algorithm solves the problem, if it decides the
language, i.e., it computes the characteristic function χL that returns 1 on inputs from
the language L and 0 on all other strings. A relaxation of this notion is called a promise
problem and splits the set of all strings into three sets, Yes-instances, No-instances and
a third set that we call Nocare. An algorithm solves a promise problem, if it returns 1
on Yes-instances and 0 on No-instances. We do not care about the algorithm’s behavior
on Nocare-instances.
Definition 5. A language L is a set of strings L ⊆ {0, 1}∗. An algorithm M is said to
decide L, if it computes χL correctly. A promise problem consists of a partition of {0, 1}
into three sets Yes, No and Nocare, where an algorithm decides this promise problem,
if it returns 1 on inputs x ∈ Yes, 0 on inputs x ∈ No and has arbitrary behaviour on
inputs from Nocare.
Although debatable from a real-life implementation perspective, cryptographers and
complexity theorists usually consider algorithms as efficient, if they run in time that is
2.2. COMPLEXITY THEORY 17
polynomial in the length of their input. Cryptographers here usually consider proba-
bilistic algorithms whose time is strictly bounded by a polynomial on all input instances,
while complexity theorists often consider deterministic algorithms with this property.
Definition 6. A language L is decidable in deterministic polynomial-time, denoted L ∈
P, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time Turing-Machine M such that M(x) = 1 if
and only if x ∈ L.
While classical complexity theory often deals with the aforementioned deterministic
algorithms, probabilism is a crucial element of cryptography. For example, it is well-
known that secure encryption requires randomness. For most of this thesis, we thus use
probabilistic-polynomial-time algorithms that run in strict polynomial-time.
Definition 7. An (interactive) randomized algorithm M is a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm (PPT), if for all its random strings and all possible interactions, its
overall running time is strictly bounded by a polynomial in its (first) input. The run-
ning time of an interactive algorithm is defined as the sum over the running times the
algorithm has each time it is invoked.
Non-deterministic polynomial-time is the set of languages that can be easily decided
by an algorithm that, for each input, may get an additional string that helps certifying
that a string in the language. Consider the language of theorem statements that are
provable (by a proof of fixed polynomial length). Given a theorem statement, a certificate
for this theorem statement to be in the language would be a proof that the theorem is
true. Also the image of a pseudorandom generator G forms an NP-languages, as one
can prove that a string y is in the image of G by giving a pre-image x as a witness, i.e.,
G(x) = y.
Definition 8. We say that L is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial-time or L ∈
NP, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time machine M and a polynomial q such
that
L = {x|∃z : |z| ≤ q(|x|) and M(x; z) = 1}.
There are inherent relations between cryptography and complexity that we will anal-
yse in detail in Chapter 7. One example is, that the aforementioned language defined
by the image of a pseudo-random generator has to be a hard language in NP, i.e., is
not solvable in polynomial-time, if the pseudo-random generator is secure.
We considered deterministic algorithms, non-deterministic algorithms and probabilis-
tic algorithms. An interesting class of problems emerges when we combine probabilism
and non-determinism. For example, we can consider what type of problems a PPT al-
gorithm can solve when given additional witnesses. This type of problems is known als
Arthur-Merlin AM and is a generalization of NP, as each deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm is also a PPT algorithm.
Definition 9. We say that a language L is in Arthur-Merlin AM, if there is a deter-
ministic polynomial-time machine M and fixed polynomials q and R such that for all
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x ∈ L, it holds that
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|) [∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), M(x, r; zr) = 1] ≥ 1− 2−|x|
and for all x /∈ L, one has
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|) [∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), M(x, r; zr) = 1] ≤ 2−|x|.
We say that a function is co-range-verifiable if the complement of its range is in AM.
Polynomial Hierarchy and Relativized Complexity Classes. A relativized
complexity class is defined as its unrelativized version, except that the machines are en-
hanced via an oracle. Querying this oracle is considered as only one step of computation.
Definition 10. An oracle (Turing) machine M is said to run in time t, if for all inputs
x and all oracles O, its running time is upper bounded by t(|x|).
Relative to an oracle O, the complexity class of polynomial-time algorithms P, writ-
ten as PO, is defined as follows.
Definition 11. We say that L is decidable in deterministic polynomial-time relative to
O, or that L ∈ PO, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine M and a
polynomial q such that
L = {MO(x) = 1}.
We write non-deterministic polynomial-time relative to O as NPO and use the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 12. We say that L is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial-time relative
to O, or that L ∈ NPO, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine M
and a polynomial p such that
L = {x|∃z : |z| ≤ q(|x|) and MO(x; z) = 1}.
Likewise, the relativied complexity class coNPO is defined as the set of all languages
whose complement is in NPO.
Definition 13. We say that L is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial-time relative
to O, or that L ∈ NPO, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine M
and a polynomial q such that
L = {x|∃z : |z| ≤ q(|x|) and MO(x; z) = 1}.
Similarly, we can define relativied Arthur-Merlin.
Definition 14. We say that a language L is in Arthur-Merlin relative to O, written
AMO, if there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine M and fixed polyno-
mials q and R such that for all x ∈ L, it holds that
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|)
[∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), MO(x, r; zr) = 1] ≥ 1− 2−|x|
and for all x /∈ L, one has
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|)
[∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), MO(x, r; zr) = 1] ≤ 2−|x|.
2.2. COMPLEXITY THEORY 19
We can now define the polynomial hierarchy. The polynomial hierarchy is defined
inductively by Σ0 := Π0 := ∆0 := P and then, for all i ≥ 0, Σi+1 is defined as NP
where the oracle is defined by the level below, that is
Σi+1 := NPΣi .
Similarly, Πi+1 is relativized coNP, that is
Πi+1 := coNPΣi .
And ∆i+1 is relativized P:
∆i+1 := PΣi .
Note that for all definitions, it is equivalent whether we choose Σi or Πi as the oracle.
It also holds that for all i ≥ 0, ∆i is contained in Πi and Σi, and that Πi and Σi are
contained in ∆i+1.
We believe that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse, i.e., that all levels of
the polynomial hierarchy are different, in particular, that NP is not contained in P.
If, at any level, it holds that ∆i = Σi, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to that
level, i.e., for all j > i, it holds that Σj = Πj = ∆j = ∆i. Note that we know that ∆i
is contained in Πi ∩ Σi, but we do not know whether this containment is strict. If it
turns out that ∆i = Πi ∩Σi, then it is unknown wether this would cause the polynomial
hierarchy to collapse. In particular, at the lowest level of the hierarchy, if NP ∩ coNP
were contained in P, then we do not know whether this causes the polynomial hierarchy
to collapse or not. However, as well-studied problems such as factoring are contained
in NP ∩ coNP and underly the security of the famous RSA encryption scheme, we all
hope that indeed, NP ∩ coNP is not contained in P.




Games are a standard modelling approach for security of schemes. In such a game,
an arbitrary adversary interacts with the algorithms that define the protocol, via a set
of queries that capture the use of the protocol in a real system. The adversary sends
queries to the game, which computes responses using the algorithms under attack. The
adversary tries to trigger an event which the game deems bad. In the previous chapter, we
have seen examples of well-known games that capture security of message authentication
codes (MAC), encryption as well as the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman assumption. In
this chapter, we give a general abstract definition for cryptographic games and specialise
it in two ways, namely for protocols and for primitives. Both formalisms reflect the same
basic idea but differ in some aspects (e.g. protocols need explicit notions of users and
sessions).
We then show how to cast the standard security definitions for primitives such as
MACs and encryption in our framework as well as a security definition for a proto-
col implementing authenticated channels. Finally, we explain how the well-established
Bellare-Rogaway (BR) security game for key exchange is an instance of our abstract
framework.
This framework has been developed in joint work with Marc Fischlin, Nigel Smart,
Bogdan Warinschi and Stephen Williams. Its ideas have been reflected in [BFWW11,
BFS+13, Wil11b], although sometimes in a different syntax. We here give a unified
presentation with minimal syntax.
Before going into the details of the definition, let us have a look at the big picture.
Ultimatively, we desire to define a game that reflects that first, a key exchange protocol
ke is run to derive symmetric keys and then, a symmetric key protocol pi is run that
uses the symmetric keys. Now, given a game Gke that defines the attack model of
the key exchange protocol, ke, and given the game Gpi that captures the security of the
symmetric key protocol, pi, we generically define the execution of the composed protocol,
and a game Gke;pi, modelling its security. In the composed protocol, each session first
runs an instance of the key exchange protocol and then uses the derived key to execute
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the symmetric key protocol while not using any other information from the key exchange
stage—in turn, the adversary can access information from both stages. Note that, as
common for key exchange, the game Gke;pi allows the adversary to interact with ke and
pi concurrently and simultaneously: at any given point some sessions may be in the
key exchange stage, while others are in the symmetric key protocol stage. The security
requirement on the composition is inherited from Gpi: the adversary wins against the
composition if it breaks the symmetric key protocol. The game Gke;pi does not place any
explicit security requirement on the key exchange protocol as would be the case in the
Bellare-Rogaway model.
Hence, the ultimate goal of this section is to define a model for composed protocols of
a key exchange and an application protocol. However, along the way, we will introduce
a useful framework for games that might be of independent interest hence the more
general sytax that we introduce next.
3.1 Cryptographic Games
We do not enforce a particular syntax for primitives/protocols and take a general ap-
proach where we only explicitly identify a key-generation algorithm. A primitive ζ /
protocol pi is then given by a pair of algorithms (kgζ ,Pζ)/(kgpi,Ppi), where kgζ/pi is a ran-
domized key generation algorithm taking as input the security parameter and outputting
keys from some key space. The algorithm Pζ is the algorithm that defines the primitive
such as a particular encryption and decryption algorithm. Similarly, the algorithm Ppi
is executed locally by a party that executes the protocol, for example to compute the
next message. Note that definining primitives/protocols via a single algorithm is with-
out loss of generality since several algorithms can be emulated by a single one, as long
as the inputs are tagged to indicate for which of the underlying algorithms the input is
intended.
We now first introduce those aspects of games that are identical for primitives and
protocols, and then specialize our notions for primitives and protocols. For the remainder
of this section, the term primitive refers to both, primitives and protocols.
The security of a primitive is captured by one (or more) games; where a game Gζ
for the primitive ζ is an interactive probabilistic Turing machine. The machine has
input tapes Ginζ and G
k-in
ζ to receive queries and keys, respectively, and one output
tape Goutζ . The game takes as input a security parameter 1
η and allows the adversary
access to various queries. The adversary drives the execution by writing queries (from
some finite set) on Gζ ’s standard input tape G
in
ζ . The game calculates a response and
updates its internal state; the response is returned to the adversary. Notice that these
calculations may involve the algorithm Pζ , but we do not explicitly say how this is
done. The execution is randomized as both the adversary and game may use random
coins. Keys for the game are written on the input tape Gk-inζ . Keys may come from the
key generation of the primitive, but can also come from somewhere else, such as a key
exchange protocol. See later for how this tape is used.
We require that when the execution of the adversary terminates, there is a single bit
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written on Goutζ , which is the outcome of the game, where 1 indicates that the adver-
sary has succeeded in his goals. We write Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) for the random variable that
describes the output of the game when interacting with adversary A for security param-
eter 1η. Naturally, Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) also depends on the distribution of keys provided to
Gk-inζ . If not specified, we assume that A provides those. We go into detail later.
3.2 Games for Cryptographic Primitives
We now refine the above general definition of games. First, we add a mechanism to
explicitly maintain keys and related information (e.g. whether a key is corrupt). The
game Gζ maintains an internal list LG consisting of tuples (kid, k, stkid); where kid is
an administrative key identifier, k is the key corresponding to this identifier and stkid ∈
{honest, corrupted}. We describe two queries that make use of the list LG; the NewKey
and Corrupt queries which the game answers as follows:
• NewKey(): Prior to making this query, A writes some value on the Gk-inζ input tape
of Gζ ; possibly the output of the primitive’s key generation algorithm kgζ . The call
NewKey() makes the game Gζ obtain a new key k by reading its G
k-in
ζ input tape. The
game checks whether k has been seen previously by searching for an existing tuple
(kid′, k, stkid) containing the key k. If such a tuple exists then the value kid′ is returned
to the adversary. Otherwise it instantiates a new “session” of the primitive, keyed
with k, by generating a new key identifier kid and adding the tuple (kid, k, honest) to
the list LG. The value kid is returned to the adversary.
• Corrupt(kid): If there is a tuple (kid, k, stkid) on the list LG then stkid is set to corrupted
and k is returned to the adversary. The adversary may not interact with a session
once it is corrupt. If no such tuple exists then the query is ignored.
Definition 15 (Primitive Game). A primitive game Gζ for the primitive ζ is a cryp-
tographic game with a set of queries that includes the two special queries NewKey and
Corrupt, and maintains a list LG as defined above.
See Section 3.4 for examples of games related to IND-CCA encryption and MAC security.
In the above definition the adversary is allowed to set keys for the game so secu-
rity is impossible to guarantee (and indeed, we do not attempt to do so). We recover
standard notions of security by restricting the adversary in certain ways. We present
three (increasingly) stronger restrictions, the last yielding standard notions of security.
We explicitly delineate the two intermediate classes since they are useful for technical
reasons.
Definition 16 (Split Adversary). An adversary A against a cryptographic game G is
a split adversary if it consists of two subadversaries A = (A1,A2), such that A1 makes
only certain types of queries to G, and A2 makes other types of queries of queries to G.
The algorithms A1 and A2 may communicate as they wish. By convention we assume
that A2 is in charge of scheduling the execution.
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Since there are no restrictions on how the two subadversaries communicate splitting
an adversary does not change its overall functionality. Next, we restrict the flow of
information between the two subadversaries and the queries that each adversary makes
to obtain standard security requirements. A query-respecting adversary and a key-benign
adversary. The query-respecting adversary is a split adversary where only the first part
of the adversary is allowed to create keys.
Definition 17 (Query-Respecting Adversary for Primitives). A split adversary A =
(A1,A2) against a primitive game Gζ is query-respecting if it satisfies the following
restrictions:
• The query NewKey() is only made by A1.
• Only A1 writes keys to the key input tape of Gζ .
• Both parts A1 and A2 are allowed to make Corrupt queries.
• A2 makes all other queries.
Finally, a key-benign adversary is additionally restricted to only initialize instances
of primitives with keys honestly produced via their associated key generation algorithm.
In addition the adversary “forgets” the values of these keys (but not maintaining state
across invocations). Specifically, we consider the class of split adversaries A = (A1,A2),
where we restrict the information passed from A1 to A2.
Definition 18 (Key-Benign Adversary for Primitives). For a game Gζ of a primitive
ζ = (kgζ ,Pζ) and a split adversary A = (A1,A2), we say that A is key-benign with
respect to kgζ if it behaves as follows:
• Adversary A is query-respecting.
• Subadversary A2 only sends the message NewKey() to A1.
• Each time A1 is activated by receiving a message NewKey() from A2, it runs the key
generation algorithm kgζ once, writes the output of this algorithm on the input tape
Gk-in of G and makes a NewKey() query to the primitive game. The game then returns
a key identifier kid that A1 passes to A2.
• No other information is passed from A1 to A2.
We stress that per our convention in Defintion 16 adversary A2 drives the execution:
either it queries the game directly and is given the answer, or creates a new key via A1.
The control is always returned toA2. The behaviour ofA1 is fully specified and thus does
not allow for constructing covert channels between A1 and A2. Standard security notions
are obtained by restricting to adversaries which are key-benign. A security notion for a
protocol is a pair (Gζ , δ) with Gζ a game as described above and δ an error probability (a
probability with which the adversary can certainly win the game). A protocol is secure
if no key-benign adversary can win the game with probability significantly better than
δ (typically δ = 12 or δ = 0).
Definition 19 ((Gζ , δ)-Secure Primitive). We say that a primitive ζ = (kgζ ,Pζ) is
(Gζ , δ)-secure, or equivalently that it satisfies (Gζ , δ), if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm A that is key-benign with respect to the key generation algorithm kgζ it
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holds that
Pr [Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) = 1]− δ
is a negligible function in the security parameter.
For clarity, sometimes we write Exec(Gζ ,A : kgζ)(1η) for the execution of the game
with a key-benign adversary with respect to kgζ .
3.3 Games for (Two-Party) Cryptographic Protocols
In this section we extend the above framework to games for two-party protocols. The
main difference is that we introduce users and protocol sessions into the formalism.
Recall, we make no assumptions on the syntax of protocols and assume that a protocol
pi is given by two algorithms, pi = (kgpi,Ppi), where again the first algorithm is for
generating keys, and the latter defines the execution of the protocol itself. We give
general games for the security of protocols, but specialize them for the case when the
protocols are based on long-term symmetric keys; in Subsection 3.5.1, we describe the
alterations needed when dealing with long-term public keys.
Identities. We fix an integer ni of size polynomial in the security parameter to restrict
the size of the set of all users U . Identities, used to model the users of a system, are
then identified by an element U in set U .
Sessions. Local sessions of a protocol are identified by labels label in a set LABELS.
We can think of LABELS as U × U × Z, where the label label = (U, V, k) refers to the
k-th local session of the identity U , where the intended partner identity is V . In this
way, identifiers are assured to be globally unique. These labels are only for bookkeeping
in the communication between the game and the adversary. In particular, they allow
the adversary to uniquely identify each session within the game and are not used by the
protocol.
As part of its internal state, the game maintains a list LG of tuples of the form
(label, kid, U, V ), that can be augmented with additional variables when needed. Each
such tuple corresponds to a local session of a user U with intended partner V . The entry
kid is the key identifier for the key used by the owner of the session label. Both label
and kid are only administrative identifiers which are not used within the protocol. The
key corresponding to kid could be a shared password, a long-term key, or a key derived
through a key exchange protocol. We use the notation label.kid to denote, for example,
the key identifier stored in the list entry starting with label. As label is globally unique,
label.kid is well-defined. We also use the notation label ∈ LG to denote that there is a
list entry in LG with label.
The game keeps track of the actual values for the keys, as well as the identities
associated to these keys; recall that we work here in the symmetric key setting where
such keys are shared by parties. This is done via a list LkeysG whose entries are of the form
(kid, U, V, k, stkid), where kid is a (globally unique) key identifier, k is the actual value for
the key, U and V are the identities associated to this key and stkid ∈ {honest, corrupted}.
As before, keys are passed to the game by the adversary via the input tape Gk-inpi .
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The behaviour of the game Gpi is determined by the function that defines the protocol
Ppi and, as for primitives, we do not fully specify this dependency. It is worth noting
however that a typical game maintains the state of the various local sessions, directs the
queries to the appropriate sessions, updates the local state, and returns an answer to
the adversary.
We now detail the particular mechanism that our games use to start sessions and
provide keys to such sessions. We informally discuss the queries that implement the
mechanism and their use, and then give a more formal description.
A query NewKey(U, V ) allows the adversary to “register” the key written on the input
key tape with the game (a key identifier kid is returned). As this is a local process, via
query SameKey(V,U, kid), the same key can be registered for user V . A new session of the
protocol run by U , with intended partner V , is started via a query NewSession(U, V, kid):
the key used by U in this session is the one indexed by kid. We may then start a session
of V with the same key. Note that keys tie two sessions of two users together; this is
a security property that we will require from any key exchange protocol used to derive
keys for pi.
Formally, we require protocol games to allow the following special queries:
• NewKey(U, V ): The game Gpi reads a new key k off the Gk-inpi tape, generates a new
identifier kid and creates a new tuple (kid, U, V, k, honest) on the list LkeysG . The key
identifier kid is returned to the adversary.
• SameKey(U, V, kid): If there is a tuple (kid, V, U, k, stkid) on the list LkeysG , the tuple
(kid, U, V, k, stkid) is added to LkeysG and kid is returned to the adversary. Else, the
game returns ⊥.
• NewSession(U, V, kid): The game searches the list LkeysG for a tuple (kid, U, V, k, stkid)
and aborts if no such tuple exists. Else, it generates a new identifier label, creates the
tuple (label, kid, U, V ) on the list LG and returns label to the adversary.
• Corrupt(kid): The game searches the list LkeysG for all entries of the form (kid, U, V, k, stkid)
and does nothing if no such entry exists. Otherwise, for all such entries, it sets
stkid = corrupted and returns k to the adversary. No further queries are allowed to
a corrupted session.
By slightly modifying the above definitions one can easily model public-key protocols,
this is detailed in Section 3.5.1.
Definition 20 (Protocol Game). A protocol game Gpi for pi = (kgpi,Ppi) is a cryp-
tographic game with a set of queries that includes the special queries NewKey(U, V ),
SameKey(U, V, kid), NewSession(U, V, kid) and Corrupt(kid). The game Gpi maintains a
list LG and a list LkeysG as defined above.
As before, we write Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) for the random variable that describes the output
of the game when interacting with adversary B for security parameter 1η. We adapt the
notions of query-respecting and key-benign adversaries from primitives to the case of
protocols.
Definition 21 (Query-Respecting Adversary for Protocols). A split adversary B =
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(B1,B2) against a protocol game Gpi is query-respecting if it satisfies the following re-
strictions:
• The query NewKey is only made by B1 who has written some value to the tape Gk-inpi .
• The query SameKey(U, V, kid) is only made by B1. Moreover if a query NewKey(U, V )
previously returned some kid then B1 is allowed at most one SameKey(V,U, kid) query
and no SameKey(U, V, kid) query.
• The query NewSession(U, V, kid) is only made by B2.
• Both, B1 and B2 are allowed the query Corrupt(kid).
• All other queries are made by B2.
The second requirement in the above definition ensures that for adversaries that
write different key values on the key input tape of Gpi at most two protocols sessions of
any pair of users U , V use the same key.
Definition 22 (Key-Benign Adversary for Protocols). For a game Gpi of a protocol
pi = (kgpi,Ppi) and a split adversary B = (B1,B2), we say that B is key-benign with
respect to kgpi if it behaves as follows.
• Adversary B = (B1,B2) is query-respecting.
• The message sent from B2 to B1 is of the form NewKey(U, V ) or of the form SameKey(U, V, kid).
• Each time, B1, receives a message NewKey(U, V ) from B2, it runs the key generation
algorithm kg once, writes the output of this algorithm on the input tape Gk-in of G
and makes a NewKey(U, V ) query to the protocol game. The game then returns a key
identifier kid that B1 passes to B2.
• Each time, B1, receives a message SameKey(U, V, kid) from B2, it makes a SameKey(U, V, kid)
query to the protocol game. The game then returns a key identifier kid that B1 passes
to B2.
• No other information is passed from B1 to B2.
A security notion for a protocol is then a pair (Gpi, δ) with Gpi a game as described
above and δ an error probability (a probability with which the adversary can certainly
win the game). A protocol is secure if no key-benign adversary can win the game with
probability significantly better than δ.
Definition 23 ((Gpi, δ)-Secure Protocol). We say that a protocol pi = (kgpi,Ppi) is
(Gpi, δ)-secure, if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B key-benign with re-
spect to the key generation algorithm kgpi, it holds that
Pr [Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) = 1]− δ
is a negligible function in the security parameter.
When the game for the protocol is clear from the context, we may simply say that the
protocol is δ-secure instead of (Gpi, δ)-secure. The same simplification applies for primi-
tives. Below in Section 3.4 we provide an example of a game for security of authenticated
channel protocols.
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3.4 Examples for Primitive and Protocol Games
In this section we examine how our previous formalism for primitive and protocol games
applies to some well known examples.
3.4.1 Primitive Games
The following examples show how the standard games for defining multi-user IND-CCA
security of encryption schemes and multi-user UF-CMA for message authentication codes
can be easily cast as instances of the our framework for primitive games. The only
difference is the addition of the Corrupt query, which is a simple extension, but needed
to be able to cope with security of protocols using this primitive which allow adaptive
session-state corrupts.
Example: IND-CCA encryption. We now describe the game for symmetric key
based IND-CCA encryption in the multi-user setting [BBM00] using this language. We
assume the scheme is given by the algorithms KeyGen(1η), Enck(m), Deck(c)), so that
kgζ = KeyGen(1
η). Execution begins with the game selecting a random bit b ← {0, 1}.
The key-benign adversary can now make the following queries, in addition to the NewKey
and Corrupt queries, as follows:
• Enc(kid,m) – The game computes the encryption c ← Enck(m), where k is the key
in the tuple in LG corresponding to kid. The ciphertext c is then passed back to the
adversary. If no such tuple exists then this operation does nothing.
• Challenge(m0,m1, kid) – The game computes the challenge ciphertext c† ← Enck(mb)
as above and returns c† back to the adversary. Note that it is required |m0| = |m1|.
• Dec(kid, c) – The game computes the decryption m ← Deck(c), where again k is the
key in the tuple in LG corresponding to kid. The value of m is passed back to the
adversary.
• Guess(b′) – The game outputs 1 if b′ = b, otherwise 0 is output. Execution of the game
terminates.
We make the following two restrictions on the queries, so as to make sure that the game
cannot be trivially won:
• On calling Dec(kid, c) if c was the output of some call to Challenge for this value of kid
then the game aborts outputting zero.
• The adversary may not make a Corrupt(kid) query if it has made a Challenge(·, ·, kid)
query for the same value of kid, and vice-versa.
Note that the query Enc(kid,m) can be simulated via a call to Challenge(m,m, kid),
however we keep a separate query of Enc(kid,m) so as to make the above restrictions
simpler to define.
Since the adversary can guess the value of b with probability 1/2, we require that
this game is key benign secure for δ = 1/2. Notice that security clearly depends on
what key generation algorithm is allowed to write to the Gk-inζ tape. For example if kgζ
consisted of sampling from the set of l-bit strings uniformly at random then we would
obtain the standard security notion for IND-CCA encryption with a cipher of l-bit keys.
On the other hand kgζ could consist of simply outputting the same l-bit string, since
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the adversary is assumed to know the code of kgζ , such an algorithm would always be
insecure. We see therefore that the definition of a kgζ is always implicit in any security
notion, we have simply brought it more to the fore.
Example: EF-CMA MAC. Now suppose that the primitive we wish to model is a
MAC, given by a triple of algorithms (KeyGen(1η),Mack(m),Verifyk(m,σ)). We want
to test whether this primitive is secure against a chosen message attack, where the
adversary is trying to create a forgery for any message (ie. existential forgeability). We
now detail how this execution proceeds within our model. When execution of the game
begins, the key benign adversary makes a number of queries to the game. In addition
to NewKey and Corrupt queries he can make the following queries:
• Mac(m, kid) – The game computes σ = Mack(m), where k is the key in the tuple in
LG containing kid. The game returns σ to the adversary.
• Verify(kid,m, σ) – Here the game computes the boolean value τ = Verifyk(m,σ) for k
corresponding to kid in LG. If τ = true and m has never been queried to Mac(m, kid)
and Corrupt(kid) has not been called then the game outputs 1 and terminates. Other-
wise the value τ is returned to the adversary.
If the game does not terminate because of the result of a Verify query, eventually the
adversary terminates and the game writes 0 to its output tape. We say the scheme is
key-benign EF-CMA secure if the above game is δ-secure for δ = 0.
3.4.2 Protocol Games
Here we look at the specific example of a protocol which provides authenticated chan-
nels. In order to model an authenticated channels scheme we must first decide upon
a game based definition to capture the requirements of an authenticated channel. An
authenticated channel has a number of desired properties. The first is that one must
be able to verify messages are sent by someone who possesses the shared secret key.
The second property is that messages are only accepted if they are received in order
and where duplicates are rejected. We now describe a game to formally capture these
notions.
The adversary is able to make call to NewKey, SameKey, NewSession and Corrupt
as previously described, the only difference here is, that for each kid, at most one call
to NewSession(U, V, kid) and NewSession(V,U, kid) is allowed, as authenticated channels
shall preserve communication between two sessions. Thus, the property is trivially bro-
ken, if several sessions may use the same key.
The game maintains two sets of “append only” lists, ι = {ιlabel} and θ = {θlabel},
where each entry corresponds to a separate value of label. The adversary then interacts
with the protocol via the following queries made available via the game:
• m← Init(mplain, label) – The message mplain is appended to the list ιlabel corresponding
to the entry (label, kid, U, V ). The oracle responds with the (authenticated) protocol
message, m, which is intended to be sent to party V with session identifier sid. It
is assumed that m contains the message mplain as a subsequence. The value of m is
appended to the list θlabel.
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• mplain ← Send(m, label′) – The protocol message m is passed to session label′ as though
it was a message received through the authenticated channel. The message m is ap-
pended to the ιlabel′ list. If the protocol message authenticates correctly then the
message mplain is appended to the θlabel′ list.
At some stage the adversary B will terminate its execution with the game. At any point
during execution, the game G checks that, for all parties (U, V ) with (label1, kid, U, V ),
(label2, kid, V, U) ∈ LG, that θlabel2 is a subsequence of ιlabel1 when sid 6=⊥ and the entries
(kid, U, V, k, stkey1), (kid, V, U, k, stkey2) ∈ LkeysG have stkey1 = stkey2 6= corrupted. If there
exists any pair where this condition is not satisfied then the adversary B has won the
game and so the game immediately writes 1 to the output tape of the Turing machine
G. Otherwise, it outputs 0, when the adversary terminates. An instantiation of an
authenticated channel is called secure, if it is δ-secure with δ = 0.
3.5 Games for Key Exchange Protocols
A key exchange protocol allows two local sessions, which use long term keys of identities,
to agree upon a short term session key. The game for key exchange protocols captures
the typical execution model of a key exchange protocol, where an adversary can run
multiple sessions, mediates all communication, and is allowed to corrupt various keys in
the system.
To define the game for key exchange, we specialize the generic two-party protocol
game definition given in Section 3.3. As the generic definition only applies to symmetric
long-term keys, below in Section 3.5.1 we provide a minor extension to allow asymmetric
long-term keys. In order to “partner” two sessions we use the notion of a session identifier
value. This value is computed by the key exchange protocol. Using a session identifier
still allows one to base partnering on notions such as matching conversation as done by
Bellare et al. [BR93]; using the message transcript one can achieve a similar, while not
equivalent notion. Partnered sessions are required to compute the same session key, and
this session key must be indistinguishable from random. Further, as we consider two
party protocols at most two sessions should ever share the same session identifier.
The session identifier is distinct to the local session identifier label. The former is
computed by the key exchange algorithm to determine which sessions are partners, whilst
the latter is simply a unique label for the adversary to address queries to a particular
session.
We assume that when a key exchange protocol session agrees upon or rejects a key,
the adversary knows this has taken place. We require this property explicitly, but one
can see that in the models of [BR93, BWJM97], by sending a ‘Reveal’ query after every
‘Send’ query it is possible for an adversary to learn when sessions accept or reject a key.
To model the above requirements of a key exchange protocol we extend the above
definition and introduce two security games. The first requirement, secrecy, is modelled
using the methods of Bellare-Rogaway security: the adversary chooses a session of the
game and receives either a random key or the real session key agreed. It wins the game
if it determines correctly with which it was provided. We distinguish between protocols
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that are forward secure and those which are not forward secure. Here, forward security
means that if a long term key is corrupted by an adversary, any session keys (including
those computed using the corrupted long term key) already agreed will still be considered
secure, see Section 4.1 and Chapter 4.6 for more details on forward-secure key exchange
protocols.
The second security game places restrictions on the partnered sessions: the adversary
attempts to cause partnered sessions to agree upon different keys, or force at least three
sessions to agree upon the same session identifier.
Both security games have the same execution model, and share many of the same
characteristics in terms of game state. Therefore we first introduce the common elements
and introduce game-specific properties later. In particular, additionally to the standard
queries for protocol games, both games share Send, Corrupt and Reveal queries. The two
games have different winning conditions, and the BR-secrecy game allows the adversary
the additional Test and Guess queries.
Note that instead of pi, we use the notation ke for a key exchange protocol to be able
to distinguish it from the protocol that it will be composed with, i.e., a key exchange
protocol is denoted ke = (kgke,Pke), where kgke generates the symmetric/asymmetric
long term keys for the key exchange protocol. As in Section 3.4, we now give sematics
to this algorithm, namely, Pke is the “next message” algorithm for the key exchange
protocol, i.e., the state sinfo of Pke is initiated to (U, V, k), where k is a long term key
shared between U and V . The algorithm Pke can then be run on sinfo and a message
msg and returns a response message msg′ and an updated state sinfo′. Running Pke on
an empty message makes the algorithm generate the first protocol message.
The game for key exchange is written as Gke. As before, this game has input tapes
Gk-inke for receiving keys and G
in
ke for receiving queries. In addition to its normal out-
put tape, the game has an additional output tape, Gk-outke , where the keys derived from
sessions are written. The adversary does not have access to this tape which we only
use for defining the security of the composition between a key exchange and a proto-
col/primitive. It will play a major role for the composition theorems in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 and it is thus introduced here. For the definition of BR-security, is is yet not
needed.
The internal state of Gke augments the generic list LG as defined in Section 3.3. The
tuples (label, kid, U, V ) in the list LG are extended to tuples of the form (label, kid, U, V ,
sid, stexec, κ, stkey), where the semantics of the additional entries is as follows. Entry sid
is a (global) session identifier set by the protocol at some point during the execution.
Note that sid can have a very different structure than being, for example, the entire
conversations of a session. For example it may be a partial transcript or the result of a
local computation, potentially involving secret information. To analyse a protocol, one
needs to choose the appropriate form of sid. The value sid must be locally computable by
a session and needs to satisfy security requirements specified later. The session identifier
used in the analysis of a protocol does not necessarily need to coincide with values that
are called “session identifiers” in the protocol specification. For instance, TLS uses
administrative session identifiers for technical reasons that do not satisfy the necessary
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security requirements. In contrast to sid, the value label is not locally computed but
merely an administrative game-related value which the local session of a user has no
access to. The value stexec ∈ {running, accepted, rejected} indicates the status of the
session, the entry κ is the key produced by the session, and stkey ∈ {fresh, revealed}
indicates if the session key has been revealed to the adversary. If the value of κ is ⊥
then stexec ∈ {running, rejected}. If stexec is set to accepted for any local session label this
is always the result of some query to the game.
We require the key exchange protocol to set the value κ and the value sid, before
setting stexec to accepted. Furthermore, as soon as stexec is set to accepted for the session
identified by label, the session key κ and the session identifier sid are written onto the
tape Gk-outke and the game signals to the adversary that a session has accepted by sending
the message (accepted, label, U, V ), for U and V corresponding to identifier label. This
message is in addition to the normal response of the query that caused a session to
accept. We can also think of the session state sinfo as beeing part of the list LG, as the
session state is always associated with a label label. Therefore, we sometimes use the
notation label.sinfo.
The adversary can interact with the game via queries for setting long-term keys
(NewKey and SameKey), starting new sessions (NewSession), corrupting the long-term
key of parties (Corrupt), sending messages to the different sessions (Send), and revealing
the locally output keys (Reveal).
Note that the NewKey query here refers to the setting of long-term keys for the key
exchange protocol, while the NewSession query starts key exchange protocol sessions. For
instance, the (asymmetric) key set via a NewKey query correspond to TLS certificates
while the NewSession query corresponds to a single TLS session. We first detail the
queries appropriate to symmetric long-term keys; these are the specializations of the
queries outlined in Section 3.3. Next we detail the adaptations required to model long-
term asymmetric keys.
Queries for long-term symmetric keys.
• NewKey(U, V ): The game Gke checks whether there is a tuple (∗, U, V, ∗, ∗) or a tuple
(∗, V, U, ∗, ∗) on list LkeysG . If so, there is already a long-term key for the pair (U, V ), so
it returns ⊥. Else, it reads a new key k off the Gk-inke tape, generates a new identifier
kid and creates a new tuple (kid, U, V, k, honest) on the list LkeysG . The key identifier kid
is returned to the adversary.
• SameKey(U, V, kid): The game Gke checks if there is a tuple (∗, U, V, ∗, ∗) on list LkeysG .
If so it returns ⊥. Else, it searches list LkeysG for a tuple (kid, V, U, k, stkid) and returns
⊥ if no such tuple exists. Else, it creates a new tuple (kid, U, V, k, stkid) on the list
LkeysG . The key identifier kid is returned to the adversary.
• NewSession(U, V, kid): The game searches the list LkeysG for a tuple (kid, U, V, k, stkid)
and aborts if no such tuple exists. Else, it creates a new identifier label. The tuple
(label, kid, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey) is created on list LG, with sid and κ being undefined,
stexec := running, and stkey := fresh. If stkid = corrupted, then stkey is immediately set
to revealed. The game returns label to the adversary.
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• Corrupt(kid): The game searches the list LkeysG for all entries of the form (kid, U, V, k, stkid)
and does nothing if no such entry exists. Otherwise, for all such entries, it sets stkid =
corrupted and returns k to the adversary. For all tuples (label, kid, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey)
on the list LG, stkey is set to revealed.1 No further queries are allowed to sessions of a
corrupted party.
• Send(label,msg): The game returns ⊥, if label is not in LG or if label.stexec = accepted.
Else, the game delivers message msg to the session labelled label and runs Pke on the
state of this session to compute a response. The response of this algorithm is returned
to the adversary.
• Upon executing Pke, if stexec = rejected then the message rejected is also sent to the
adversary.
• Upon executing Pke, if stexec = accepted then the message accepted is also sent to the
adversary, and κ and sid are written to the output tape Gk-outke of the key exchange
game. Furthermore, the game searches the list LG for a tuple (label′, kid, V, U, sid,
accepted, κ, revealed). If such a tuple exists, stkey is set to revealed. This corresponds
to the case where the partner session of label accepted a session and became revealed
before label accepted the session key.
• Reveal(label): The game searches the list LG for the tuple (label, kid, U, V, sid, stexec,
κ, stkey) and does nothing if no such tuple exists. Else, if a tuple is found but stexec 6=
accepted then the game simply returns ⊥ to the adversary. Otherwise the game sets
stkey to revealed, and returns κ to the adversary. Furthermore, if there is a tuple
(label′, kid, V, U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey′) with stkey′ = honest, then stkey′ is set to revealed.
No further queries are allowed to a revealed session.
Having defined game execution for a key exchange game, we can now introduce
the winning conditions for the BR-security game. For convenience, we will split the
winning condition for the BR-game into two and thereby actually create two different
games. The reason is that the weak requirement of Match security will also be used
in Chapter 5, where key exchange protocols are not compelled to satisfy the BR key-
indstinguiushability requirement. Let us turn to Match-security first.
Match-security. The condition of Match-security assures that session identifiers are
a meaningful concept, namely, the game checks whether two sessions with the same
sid have the same key, whether partnered sessions are partnered with the identity they
expected to talk to and whether there are not more than 2 sessions with the same sid.
Note that this is a very weak requirement that does not imply any security of the keys.
For example, several sessions may still return the same key. The output of GMatchke is
formally given in Figure 3.1.
Definition 24 (Match-secure Key Exchange). We say that a key exchange protocol
ke = (kgke,Pke) is Match-secure ke if it is (G
Match
ke , 0)-secure.
BR-Security. To provide secrecy guarantees of the session key we ask an adversary
to decide whether it received the real session key, or a random value, for a session of its
1In the forward-secure variant, for all tuples (label, kid, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey) with stexec = running
in the list LG, the value stkey is set to revealed.
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For each label ∈ LG do
If label.sid 6=⊥ then for all
label′ ∈ LG with label′.sid = label.sid do
If label.U 6= label′.V or label.V 6= label.U then return 1.
//distinct intended partners
If label.U = label′.V and label.V = label.U , label.stexec = label.stexec = accepted but
label.κ 6= label′.κ then return 1. //distinct keys
If the number of labels label′ ∈ LG with
label′.sid = label.sid is strictly larger than 2,
then return 1. //too many partners
Return 0.
Figure 3.1: Output of the Match-game GMatch.
Test(label):
If btest = 0 then κ
$←− D





Figure 3.2: Test and Guess queries for the BR-secrecy game.
choice. It is assumed any random value is drawn from some key distribution D (often
the uniform distribution for bit strings of length |κ|). We write κ $←− D for the value of κ
drawn randomly from the distribution D. We call this game the BR-secrecy game and
use the game execution model of key exchange protocols as described so far. We now
set out the additional details of the model for the secrecy property.
The state of the BR-secrecy game contains a bit btest ∈ {0, 1}, drawn at random
in the beginning of the game and a bit bguess ∈ {0, 1,⊥} along with a session identifier
labeltested ∈ LABELS ∪ {⊥}. The bit btest determines whether the adversary is given the
real session key, or random value in response to the Test query.2 The bit bguess stores
the adversary’s guess for the value of btest. The session identifier labeltested is the label
of the session for which the adversary made the Test query.
There are two additional queries required to model the BR-security of a key exchange
protocol, namely Test and Guess. The Test query provides the adversary with either the
real session key for a given session, or a random value. The Guess query provides the
game with the adversary’s guess to the value btest. The queries are given in Figure 3.2.
In order to prevent trivial attacks, we place restrictions on the admissibility of the
2 We assume that the adversary only makes a single Test query. Security with respect to many Test queries
then follows by a hybrid argument [BR93].
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If labeltested =⊥ then return 0. //No Test query made
For each label ∈ LG s.t. label.sid = labeltested.sid do
//Test for exposure of partner key or key itself
If label.stkey = revealed then return 0.
If btest 6= bguess then return 0. //Wrong guess
Else return 1.
Figure 3.3: Predicate for the BR-secrecy game.
Test query. An adversary is not allowed to test a session which is corrupt, has not
accepted, or whose partner is corrupt, or to test more than a session. In these cases, the
game returns the error message false. Note that these cases are publicly verifiable.
Moreover, the adversary should not Test a session which is revealed or where the
partner session has been revealed. In these cases though, the game does not return false
but instead lets the adversary continue. This is in order to prevent leakage of partnering
information through the Test query. The adversary may not be aware this has occurred;
however at the end of execution the game checks for this, and causes the experiment
to be lost if such an action has occurred. We also forbid Reveal queries on the tested
session or its partner. Again, the adversary is later declared to lose if such a Reveal
query happens (but again without being informed immediately). Furthermore we only
allow the adversary one Guess query.
To determine whether the adversary has won, the BR-secrecy game checks if the
adversary’s guess for the value of btest is correct. Furthermore, the predicate causes the
adversary to lose the game if the tested session (or its partner) have been revealed. Note
that no checks relating to corruption are required, as the game automatically marks
all session-keys as revealed when the long-term key of a party is corrupted. Interest-
ingly, with our notation, the predicate for BR-security is identical for forward-secure
and non-forward-secure protocols. The reason here is that the corruption model is en-
tirely encoded into the corrupt query. The game’s GBRke response is formally depicted in
Figure 3.3.
We write the BR-secrecy game as GBR,Dke , where D is the key distribution from which
random keys are chosen during the Test query. Furthermore we denote the game GBR,Dke
with the secret bit btest as G
BR,D,btest
ke .
Definition 25 (BR-secure Key Exchange). We say that a key exchange protocol ke =







3.5.1 Modifications for Asymmetric Long-Term Keys
To modify the symmetric key model into an asymmetric key model, the main task is
to deal with the key identifiers and the NewKey query. Instead of having two inputs,
the NewKey query has only one, as keys are now assigned to single users instead of
pairs of users. For the same reason, the SameKey query becomes obsolete. The list of
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sessions, LG, stores tuples (label, kidU , kidV , U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey). The owner of the
session is U . So, U uses its secret key corresponding to kidU , and U uses the public
key corresponding to kidV . The Send and Reveal queries are the same as for symmetric
long-term keys. We now formally define the NewKey, NewSession and Corrupt queries
for asymmetric long-term keys.
• NewKey(U): The game Gpi reads a new key pair (sk, pk) off the Gk-inpi tape, generates
a new identifier kid and creates a new tuple (kid, U, (sk, pk), honest) on the list LkeysG .
The key identifier kid is returned to the adversary together with pk.
• NewSession(U, V, kidU , kidV ): The game searches the tuples (kidU , U, (sk, pk), stkid) and
(kidV , V, (sk
′, pk′), stkid) on the list LkeysG and aborts if either of the tuples does not exist.
Else, it generates a new identifier label and creates the tuple (label, kidU , kidV , U, V, sid,
stexec, κ, stkey) on the list LG and returns label to the adversary. Note that also, instead
of initializing sinfo to (U, V, k), it is initialized to (U, V, pkU , skU , pkV ).
• Corrupt(kid): The game searches the list LkeysG for an entry (kid, U, (sk, pk), stkid) and
does nothing if no such entry exists. Otherwise it sets stkid = corrupted and returns
(sk, pk) to the adversary. No further queries are allowed to sessions of U that use
the secret key corresponding to kid. Note that queries to sessions of V that use the
public key corresponding to kid are still allowed. In the forward-secure case, for all
sessions (label′, kidV , kidU , V, U, sid, running, κ, stkey), label′.stkey is set to revealed. In
the non-forward-secure case, for all sessions (label′, kidV , kidU , V , U, sid, stexec, κ, stkey),
label′.stkey is set to revealed.
3.6 Composition of Key Exchange with Protocols
Keys derived via key exchange protocols can be used in symmetric protocols and primi-
tives, and we aim to determine when such uses are secure. In this section we define what
“secure use” means by giving security games for the composition between key exchange
and primitives and protocols.
The composed game runs the key exchange game and the primitive/protocol game
as subgames. Whenever a session in the key exchange phase accepts a key, then the
composed game passes this key to the protocol/primitive game as a new key. Thus,
the adversary is not given access to the NewKey query, as new keys are passed directly
from the key exchange protocol to the primitive/protocol. Otherwise, the adversary is
given all key exchange queries (to model attacks in the key exchange phase) and all
queries of the primitive/protocol game (to model attacks on the latter). The adversary
is successful when satisfying the winning condition of the primitive/protocol game. The
key exchange game does not have a separated winning condition. The key exchange
protocol is considered suitable for the primitive/protocol if the adversary cannot break
the primitive/protocol when the previously randomly chosen keys are replaced by keys
derived via a key exchange protocol.
We now discuss the formalism in more detail: We have already formally defined
the execution for key exchange protocols via the game Gke. The game Gke writes the
keys output by the sessions of the protocol on its special output tape Gk-outke . We have
3.6. COMPOSITION OF KEY EXCHANGE WITH PROTOCOLS 37
also defined (generic) security notions for protocols and primitives Gpi and Gζ . Both
these games expect to receive keys as input on the special input tapes Gk-inpi and G
k-in
ζ ,
respectively. We now define the game Gke;ζ , which allows an adversary to simultaneously
interact with the key exchange protocol and with the instantiation of the primitive that
uses the keys derived via the key exchange protocol. Roughly speaking, we “fuse” the




ζ . The output
tape of the resulting game is the output tape of Gζ . Since the subgame Gζ writes the
bit onto the tape, this means that the goal of the adversary is to break ζ. The game
Gke;pi reflects the analogous idea for protocols. In Section 3.6.1 we present these ideas in
greater detail, and show how the games internally maintain state, and pass information
from the key exchange sub-game to the protocol/primitive sub-game.
An interesting issue arises when considering corruption. In the composed game,
corruptions need to be treated consistently. For instance, the adversary might reveal
keys in the key exchange phase while not corrupting the key in the primitive/protocol
game. Then, the adversary could trivially win any game. Thus, whenever a key is
revealed in the key exchange phase, the composed game issues a Corrupt query to the
primtive/protocol subgame. For the long-term keys of the key exchange, we need to dis-
tinguish forward security and non-forward security. When a protocol is forward secure,
then corruption of the long-term key used in the key exchange does not affect sessions
which have already terminated. However, in non-forward secure protocols, corruption
of the long-term secrets automatically renders insecure, all session keys which were es-
tablished using this key. Hence, in the non-forward secure case, the composed game
marks all these keys as corrupted in the primitive/protocol game via additional Corrupt
queries. For forward secure protocols, no additional action needs to be undertaken. We
thus distinguish between the forward secure composed game (Gfske;ρ, δρ) and the non-
forward secure composed game (Gnfske;ρ, δρ). Again this is detailed more formally in the
following Subsection.
In Chapter 4, we will see that forward-secure key exchange protocols can even be
composed with protocols that do not support key corruption. We will then conclude that
it is meaningful for those to omit the Reveal query from the composed game, because
the Reveal query in the BR-game models leakage of information through the use of keys
in a primitive/protocol, which is, indeed, already included in the composed game. And
the security game for the primitive/protocol in the composed game considers entire key
loss an unlikely event. For non-forward secure protocols or for protocols that support
corruption, such considerations are not helpful, as in both cases, leakage of the entire key
is considered to be a possible event in a real-life execution. Thus, for the remainder of
this chapter, we assume that the primitive/protocol support key corruption and include
the Reveal query.
3.6.1 Details of the Key-Exchange/Protocol Composition
We first detail how to compose a key exchange protocol with a protocol, then we discuss
the corruption model, and finally we discuss the modifications to compose a key exchange
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protocol with a primitive.
Composition of key exchange with protocols. The game Gke;pi internally runs
a copy of Gke and a copy of Gpi. The key input tape is G
k-in
ke and the tape for the
output bit is Goutpi . The tape G
k-out
ke and the input tape G
k-in
pi are internalized by the
composed game; we explain later how Gke;pi uses these to pass keys from one game to
the other. The query input tapes Ginke and G
in
pi of the two subgames are internalized as
well. Instead the game has a new input tape, on which it accepts any of the following
queries: NewKeyke, SameKeyke, NewSessionke, Corruptke, Sendke and Revealke which are
intended for the subgame Gke and also queries NewSessionpi, Corruptpi and Namepi for the
subgame Gpi. Here Namepi is a generic query for the protocol game. The parameters of
these queries are as before. Notice that the adversary is no longer allowed the queries
NewKeypi, SameKeypi, as keys for the protocol sessions are now obtained from the Gke
game. The composed game internally maintains a list LIdentifiers linking sessions of the
key exchange game to key identifiers of the protocol game. The list LIdentifiers is a list
of tuples (labelke, sid, kidpi) of administrative session identifiers labelke, session identifiers,
sid, of the key exchange game and key identifiers, kidpi, for the underlying protocol game.
For most queries, the composed game simply forwards the queries of the adversary
to the appropriate subgame, and forwards back the response. For example when the
adversary makes a NewKeyke(U, V ), the composed game makes a NewKey(U, V ) query
to Gke and returns kidke obtained from Gke to the adversary. The trickier parts of the
execution deal with passing the keys from one game to the other and with (long-term
and session) key corruption. We explain these difficulties in turn.
Keys are passed from Gke to Gpi when some session in Gke accepts, i.e. , when
Gke writes (κ, sid) on G
k-out
ke . There are two possible situations: if the pair of session
identifier and session key, (sid, κ) had not been output before, then κ is a new key
established between the identities associated to sid. Thus, the game generates a new key
identifier which is returned to the adversary. Otherwise, there already exists a session
of the key exchange with the same values of sid and κ. This session is the partner of the
newly finished key exchange session. Therefore, we initialise the newly finished session
within the protocol subgame via a SameKey query, thus partnering this session with the
previously established protocol session. We now formalize these two situations.
The Sendke Query. When, a query Sendke(labelke,msg) is made, the Gke;pi performs the
following operations:
• Check whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, return failure message false.
• Else, run Gke(Send(labelke,msg)).
• If it returns msg′, return msg′.
• If it returns (msg′, accepted) or accepted, then the key exchange game wrote (sid∗, κ∗)
to its output tape.
• If there is label′ke with label
′
ke.sid = sid
∗ and label′ke.stexec = accepted, then issue the
query SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi.
• Else, write key κ on the input tape of the protocol game Gpi and query NewKeypi(U, V )
to the protocol game Gpi which returns a key identifier kidpi that is returned to the
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adversary, and the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi) is stored in list LIdentifiers. Further, if stkey =
revealed the game sends the query Corruptpi(kidpi) to Gpi.
• Return all answers from the subgames to the adversary.
Corruption Model. We now explain how the composed game deals with corruption.
The problem is that corrupting keys in one of the games influences which keys are corrupt
in the other game. We start with the simpler case of Revealke queries. When such a
query is issued for some session label, the composed game sends Reveal(label) to Gke. If
the answer is ⊥ then nothing else happens. Otherwise (i.e. the answer is some session
key k) then for each entry (label, sid, kidpi) on the list LIdentifiers, the composed game
issues a Corruptpi(kidpi) query to Gpi. These queries essentially mark that the key has
been corrupted. The game then returns k to the adversary.
For corruption of symmetric long-term keys we distinguish two possibilities. In the
forward-secure version of the game, corrupting a long-term key does not affect the secu-
rity of sessions keys already established (using the long-term key). In the non forward-
secure version, all of the sessions keys derived using the long-term key become corrupt.
To distinguish between the two possibilities we often denote the corresponding games
Gfske;pi (Forward Secure) and G
nfs
ke;pi (Non-Forward Secure), respectively. We will omit
these subperscripts when they are clear from context. For example, throughout Chap-
ter 4, we will only treat forward-secure key exchange protocols.
In Gfske;pi the Corruptke queries are just forwarded to the subgame G
fs
ke and its answer it
relayed to the adversary. In the Gnfske;pi version, when a corruption query Corruptke(kidke)
is received, the composed game relays it to the subgame Gnfske which returns a key k, that
is passed back to the adversary. Furthermore, for all sessions (labelke, kidke, ∗, ∗, sid,
accepted, κ, stkey) in LGke , the composed game searches the list LIdentifiers for tuples
(labelke, sid, kidpi) and sends the query Corruptpi(kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi. The
answer of the subgame is also relayed to the adversary. This models the idea that if the
key exchange is not forward secure, corruption of long term keys also compromises the
derived session keys.
For asymmetric long-term keys, the forward-secure model is as described for sym-
metric long-term keys. In the non-forward-secure model (for asymmetric long-term
keys), whenever the composed game receives the query Corruptke(kidU ), for all tuples
(labelke, kidU , ∗, ∗, ∗, sid, accepted, κ, stkey) and (label′ke, ∗, kidU , ∗, ∗, sid′, accepted, κ′, stkey′)
in LGke , the game searches LIdentifiers for triples (labelke, sid, kidpi) and (label′ke, sid′, kid′pi).
It then queries Corruptpi(kidpi) and Corruptpi(kid
′
pi) to the Gpi subgame for all found values.
The answers of the subgame are relayed to the adversary.
3.6.2 Composing Key Exchange with Primitives
Most of the discussion above also applies to the composition of key exchange protocols
with primitives. We therefore give only relevant details of defining Gke;ζ ; highlighting
the differences. As above, we distinguish between the forward secure, Gfske;ζ , and non
forward secure Gnfske;ζ versions of the composed game. The input/output tape configura-
tion is as above. In addition to the queries for the key exchange subgame, which are as
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above, an adversary is allowed to make queries: Corruptζ and Nameζ for the subgame
Gζ (where Nameζ is any generic query). The query NewKeyζ used to instantiate keys
for the Gζ subgame is only used internally by the composed game. The only conceptual
difference between composition of key exchange with protocols and with primitives is
that for primitives, the key agreed by two parties which have obtained the same sid is
instantiated in the subgame for the primitive only once. Specifically, when some session
of the key exchange outputs (sid, κ) on Gk-outke the composed game searches for a triple
(labelke, sid, kidζ) in the LIdentifiers. If such a triple exists, then the game takes no further
action. Otherwise, the composed game writes κ on Gk-inζ and issues a NewKeyζ query
to its Gζ subgame. As for protocols, if the session where the key has been obtained is
revealed, then the composed game issues a Corruptζ(kidζ) query to Gζ .
3.6.3 Suitability for Primitives/Protocols
Above we defined how key exchange protocols can be composed with primitives and
protocols. We now explain what it means for a key exchange protocol to be suitable for
primitive ζ (and analogously for protocol pi). Intuitively, this means that the security of
the primitive does not break down when, instead of using keys generated with the key
generation algorithm for the primitive, one uses the keys established by the key exchange
protocol. Using the machinery developed in the previous section, the requirement simply
means that the game Gke;ζ for the composed protocol (ke; ζ) cannot be won when the
long-term keys of the parties are generated honestly. This intuition, which applies equally
to the case of composing key exchange with protocols, is formalized next. The definition
treats explicitly both the forward-secure and the non-forward secure settings.
Definition 26 (Suitability for Primitives/Protocols). Let ke = (kgke,Pke) be a key ex-
change protocol, ρ = (kgρ,Pρ) be an arbitrary primitive or protocol, and (Gρ, δρ) an
arbitrary security notion for ρ. We say that ke is (Gρ, δρ)-suitable-for-ρ if (kgke, ke; ρ) is
(Gnfske;ρ, δρ)-secure. We say that that ke is (Gρ, δρ)-suitable-for-ρ with forward security if
(kgke, ke; ρ) is (G
fs
ke;ρ, δρ)-secure.
If the security notion for ρ is clear from the context, we may simple say that ke is
suitable-for-ρ. One aspect we wish to stress is that (as per Definition 18 of a key-benign
adversary) the key generation used to initialize the composed game is the key generation
algorithm of the key exchange protocol. In turn this means that the main functionality
of the adversary is covered by the second stage of the adversary that interacts simulta-
neously with the underlying games Gke and Gρ.
The main property desired from a key exchange protocol is to be suitable for the
protocol where the keys derived are then used. In the next section we show that being
suitable for the symmetric primitive on which the protocol relies together with the
authentication property we define next, suffice to ensure this. The intuition of why we
need an authentication property is the following. In the composition of key exchange with
primitives, for every two partnered sessions (i.e. that have the same sid), the adversary is
given access to a single instance of the primitive under the key derived in the session that
3.6. COMPOSITION OF KEY EXCHANGE WITH PROTOCOLS 41
finishes first. When the partner session finishes, the key is ignored. We therefore ensure
via the Match-property that partnered sessions do agree on the same key and that there
exist at most two sessions which agree on the same sid. Notice that the requirement
is very weak. In particular, it even allows for the same key to be output in multiple
sessions. However, the notion of suitability for a specific primitive will usually disallow
unrelated sessions to output the same key, as naturally, this leads to a security breach
for most natural primitives.
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Chapter 4
Composability of BR Key
Exchange Protocols
In this chapter, we prove that forward-secure BR-secure key exchange protocols, for
which a session matching algorithm exists, can be securely composed with arbitrary
symmetric key protocols. In practice, assume you want to run a key exchange protocol
to use the keys for a secret channel. To conclude security of the entire protocol, one would
usually analyse the protocol as a whole. Instead, with our theorem, one can now analyse
the two components seperately, and, more importantly, if one uses an existing provably
secure key exchange protocol (i.e. BR-secure), one can simply re-use the existing security
analysis without further investigation; and the same applies to secret channels.
We notice that many games such as the multi-user encryption game that we consid-
ered in Section 3.4 fall in the class of so-called single session reducible protocols, a notion
we introduce in this chapter. For protocols in this class, it suffices to analyse a single
session of the protocol and security for concurrent execution follows automatically.
Overall, in the case of a composed protocol consisting of a key exchange part and a
secret channel part, the analysis boils down to a single session analysis of the secret chan-
nel protocol and a (possibly existing) BR-analysis of the key exchange part. For clarity,
we emphasise that single session reducibility is not a requirement of our framework, but
a useful tool to shorten a complex analysis if applicable.
We now take a closer look at the public session matching we assume to exist: one
might think that this requirement is a necessary artifact for our proof to work. However,
this is (provably) not the case. In Section 4.5, we show that if a key exchange protocol is
composable with arbitrary symmetric key protocols and security is shown via a specific
kind of black-box reduction, then (a weak form of) a session matching algorithm exists.
We emphasize that the public session matching is only on the key exchange protocol,
and not on the subsequent uses of the key; hence, it does not impact the protocol with
which the key exchange is composed.
We finally note that it may look impossible to provide secure composition of key
exchange protocols with arbitrary symmetric key protocols. The seemingly intuitive
counter argument is that, if the symmetric key protocol “misbehaves” in the sense that
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it duplicates some steps of the key exchange protocol in a bad way, then the composition
would easily become insecure. As an example assume that the key exchange somehow
involves (in a secure way) a step in which a nonce is encrypted under the new session key,
and that the first step of the subsequent protocol is that a party, exceptionally receiving
such an encrypted message, would immediately disclose the session key. Then replaying
the previous message from the key exchange phase should violate the security of the
overall protocol. This line of reasoning, however, is incorrect. Key indistinguishability
of a key exchange protocol essentially says that one can replace the actual key by an
independent random key, more or less decoupling the two phases. This is even true in
presence of key leakage in the symmetric key protocol, as such leakage can be already
captured in the Bellare-Rogaway model through special key reveals the adversary can
enforce. This implies that the “misbehaving” symmetric key protocol either contradicts
the indistinguishability of the key exchange protocol, or that the duplication of steps
is harmless because the derived key is independent of the information flow in the key
exchange phase. Carrying out this argument formally requires some care, especially with
the session matching, but our theorem shows that general composition indeed holds.
This chapter deals with BR-key exchange protocols based on asymmetric long-term
keys. The case of symmetric long-term keys follows analogeously—see also Chapter 5,
where we prove a composition theorem in the setting of symmetric long-term keys.
Forward-secure BR-key exchange protocols support any type of symmetric key applica-
tion protocol, and noteworthy, even those that do not support key corruption. Clearly,
the same theorem cannot hold for non-forward secure protocols—here, a loss of the
long-term keys makes all session keys associated to the long-term key insecure. As a
consequence, the symmetric key protocol has to be secure even in a setting where adap-
tive corruption is possible. In Section 4.6, we prove that also non-forward secure key
exchange protocols can be securely composed with a large class of symmetric-key pro-
tocols that we specify, namely the class of all so-called session-restricted protocol, as
notion that is slightly stronger than single-session reducibility. We will later explain
how our second composition Theorem 3 in Chapter 5 can be combined to yield even
more general results. We will now first turn to forward-secure protocols.
4.1 On Forward Secure Protocols
Forward security is a desirable security feature that many key exchange protocols enjoy.
In a nutshell, a key exchange protocol is forward-secure, if corruption of a user does not
affect those session keys where the session has already terminated. Moreover, the same
applies when the partner of a terminated session gets corrupted. A prominent example is
a signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange—upon corruption of the longterm signature keys,
one does not learn anything about the session keys, as the session keys do not contain
any information about the secret exponent. In contrast, if the adversary obtains the
signing key while a session has not finished yet, he is able to insert his own value gb and
thus entirely learn the key of the receiver session.
A typical example for a non-forward secure protocol is key transport. Here, one
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user generates a symmetric key and encrypts it under the other receiver’s public key.
Upon corruption of the receiver, the adversary learns the secret encryption key and thus
learns all previously exchanged symmetric keys of the user. In this chapter, we prove a
composition theorem for forward-secure BR-secure protocols and arbitrary application
protocols. In Chapter 4.6, we will also treat the more involved case of non-forward
secure key exchange protocols, for which we can prove composability with a large class
of symmetric-key protocols.
Dealing with forward-secure protocols has the benefit that keys that were established
between two users cannot be rendered insecure via a Corrupt query. Looking at the key
exchange game Gke, we observe that the Reveal queries equally allow the adversary to
learn sessions keys. Yet, we work in the setting of composition. Reveal queries in the
BR-secrecy game model possible key leakage through use of the keys in and application
protocol. But as we explicitly model a composed game, the use of the keys is already
modelled by the application protocol game Gpi. The game for the application protocol
might consider it unlikely that keys entirely leak, e.g., because they are only used once
and are securely erased immediately afterwards. It is noteworthy that in the composed
game, a Reveal query to the key exchange game corresponds to a key Corrupt query in
the protocol state and vice versa. Thus, we can safely drop the Reveal queries from the
key exchange part of composed game and leave it up to the protocol part to decide on
admitting corruption or not. Our composition theorem then holds for both, application
protocols that admit Corrupt queries and those which do not.
4.1.1 Modifications of Protocol Games
As explained, we drop the Corruptpi queries as explicit requirement from the model for
protocol games and do not make use of it any longer in the description of the composed
game. We stress again that the protocol may allow this query in the set of “additional
queries”. Note that, in contrast to adaptive key corruption, the protocol game still has to
support static corruption, respectively adversarially set keys. The reason is that, when
composed with a key exchange, an honest session of the key exchange might accept while
the partner is already corrupt. We have seen that, in the case of signed Diffie-Hellman,
the adversary is able to influence and learn the key in this case. We thus require the
protocol game to admit a SetKey(U, V, κ) query (instead of the Corrupt-query). Formally,
SetKey(U, V, κ) in Game Gpi works as follows:
• The game Gpi reads a new key k off the Gk-inpi tape, generates a new identifier kid and
creates a new tuple (kid, U, V, k, corrupted) on the list LkeysG .
• The key identifier kid is returned to the adversary.
Except for this modification, all definitions of the protocol game remain identical to
those given in Section 3.3.
4.1.2 Modifications of the Composition Model
We now have to adapt the definition of the composed game, as defined in Section 3.6.
As explained, as it is up to the application protocol to admit Reveal-queries, we deny the
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Revealke query to the adversary. The Sendke Query. In the forward-secure setting, only
the Revealke and the Sendke query might affect the protocol stage of the composed game.
As there are no Revealke queries, it suffices to define the modified Sendke query in the game
Gfske;pi—we denote G
fs
ke;pi by Gke;pi throughout this chapter. On input Sendke(labelke,msg),
the game Gke;pi performs the following operations:
• Check whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, return failure message false.
• Else, run Gke(Send(labelke,msg)).
• If it returns msg′, return msg′.
• If it returns (msg′, accepted) or accepted, then the key exchange game wrote (sid∗, κ∗)
to its output tape.
• If there is label′ke with label
′
ke.sid = sid
∗ and label′ke.stexec = accepted, then issue the
query SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi.
• Else if label.stkey 6= revealed, then write key κ on the input tape of the protocol game
Gpi and query NewKeypi(U, V ) to the protocol game Gpi which returns a key identifier
kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi) is stored in list
LIdentifiers.
• Else if label.stkey = revealed, then query SetKey(label.U, label.V, κ∗) to Gpi.
• Return all answers from the subgames to the adversary.
The main difference between the Sendke-query here and the one that we defined in
Section 3.6 is that in the case where sid is new and label.stkey = revealed, we now use
the SetKeypi query instead of a NewKeypi and a Corruptpi-query.
Note that in the case where there is a label′ke ∈ LGke with label′ke.sid = sid∗, we do not
have to check whether label′.U is corrupted. If label′.U is corrupted and sid is identical,
then the sessions derived the same session key (due to the Match-property). Moreover,
the session key label′.U is secure due to forward security. Let us shortly conclude what
this means for the session identifier sid in the signed Diffie-Hellman case: the session
identifier cannot be a pairs of nonces that are exchanged in the beginning (as this would
violate Match security). Quite on the contrary, the entire value gb has to be taken
into account by the session identifier. However, the signature might be modified by the
adversary without harm and thus does not need to be a part of the session identifier.
4.2 Session Matching
For composability, we need an additional property, called session matching. Roughly,
this means that an eavesdropper on the communication between the BR-adversary and
the BR-secrecy game should be able to deduce which sessions are partnered, i.e., at
any time, the eavesdropper should be able to produce a list of pairs of all partnered
(accepted) sessions. Note that this is trivially satisfied when defining session identifiers
through matching conversations. However, when using abstract session identifiers, sid,
this need not be the case. For instance, consider a BR-secure key exchange that uses
matching conversations as the session identifier. We now transform the protocol as
follows: the participants encrypt all messages they send. The session identifiers are
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Ppartner(LGke , LABELSpartner, LABELSsingle):
For each label ∈ LABELSsingle do
//Alleged single parties don’t have partners
If label.stexec 6= accepted then return 0.
Else if there exists label′ ∈ LGke , label′ 6= label with label′.sid = label.sid then return 0.
For each (label, label′) ∈ LABELSpartner do
//Alleged partners have accepted and are really partnered
If label.stexec, label
′.stexec) 6= (accepted, accepted) then return 0.
If label.sid 6= label′.sid′ then return 0.
For each label ∈ LGke do
//Each accepted session is assigned as single or partnered
If label.stexec = accepted, label /∈ LABELSsingle and for all
(label0, label1) ∈ LABELSpartner, one has label0 6= label and label1 6= label then return 0.
Return 1.
Figure 4.1: Session matching predicate.
now defined as matching conversations on the plaintexts. First note that the resulting
key exchange protocol is as secure as the original, assuming secure encryption. But the
protocol has an interesting property: assume the encryption scheme is re-randomizable.
Then, an eavesdropper on the communication is unable to deduce which sessions between
two parties are partnered, as the BR-adversary may re-randomize all messages sent.
We therefore define an efficient session matching algorithm M which can deduce
from the communication between the BR-secrecy adversary and BR-secrecy game which
sessions are partnered. AlgorithmM is allowed to see all queries and answers exchanged
between a key exchange (game) and an adversary A; this includes all public parameters
of the system. The requirement on M is independent of the winning condition of A in
the game; algorithm M needs to always provide correct matchings.
More formally, a session matching algorithm M for the key exchange protocol is
defined as an efficient algorithm that receives all information exchanged between a key
exchange game GBR and an adversary A against GBR.
We require that each time the key exchange game sends a response to the adver-
sary A, algorithm M is able to output two sets LABELSpartner and LABELSsingle, where
LABELSpartner contains pairs (label0, label1), and LABELSsingle consists of session identi-
fiers label. We define the predicate Ppartner to specify correctness of these sets by checking
all pairs (label0, label1) are sessions which share the same session identifier, and all iden-
tifiers in the set LABELSsingle are sessions which are currently unpartnered. This is
formally described in Figure 4.1.
Definition 27 (Session matching algorithm). A
session matching algorithm M : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ for a key exchange protocol ke is an
efficient algorithm such that the following holds for any adversary A playing against GBR:
after each response of the key exchange game, the algorithm M is given an ordered list
of all queries and responses sent between A and GBR,D, along with the public parameters
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of the system. AlgorithmM then outputs sets LABELSpartner and LABELSsingle such that,
for the current list LG of the game GBR,D, the sets LABELSpartner, LABELSsingle always
satisfy the predicate Ppartner(LGke , LABELSpartner, LABELSsingle) given in Figure 4.1.
We remark that the idea of a session matching algorithm has already appeared in
different forms in the literature. As mentioned above, in the original paper [BR93] the
notion of matching conversations via the communication transcripts (and their order)
supports a straightforward session matching algorithm. In [BR95] Bellare and Rogaway
introduce a partner function which resembles our notion of a session matching algorithm,
but their function does not need to be efficiently computable. Finally, in [BPR00] the
authors require the session identifiers, defining essentially the partners, to be given to
the adversary upon acceptance of a session, again yielding a session matching algorithm
straightforwardly. As we show in Section 4.5, a weak form of session matching algorithm
is in fact necessary to ensure secure composition.
We remark that, at a superficial glance, the session matching algorithm for the key
exchange protocol seems to impose some restrictions on the communication privacy
or anonymity for the symmetric key protocol. This, however, is not true, as session
matching for key exchange does not refer to the actual usage of the derived keys in the
subsequent protocol. In particular, the symmetric key protocol and its security game may
well cover anonymity-related properties such as the key-hiding property [Fis99, AR00],
i.e., which of two keys has been used to encrypt messages.
4.3 Single-Session Reducible Games
Usually, game based notions of protocol security require one to consider multiple sessions
executed concurrently in order to draw conclusions about the security of the scheme.
Notice that when different sessions of the protocol depend only on independent, efficiently
samplable states, then it may be possible to reduce the security of the many session
scenario to that of a single session. This greatly simplifies the analysis of the protocol
and thus allows one to conclude security of the composed protocol more easily.
In symmetric key protocol games, all unknown keys are independent. Thus, in many
cases one is able to analyse only the security of a single pair of sessions and, provided
this is secure, may conclude the standard multi-session scenario is secure. For example,
consider an authenticated channel. An adversary wins if any one session accepts some
invalid (non-authenticated) message. It is clear that any adversary who is able to do
this when there are multiple, concurrently executing sessions, will be able to achieve the
same goal when there is only a single run of the protocol being executed. We note that
for key exchange protocols, individual runs are not independent due to the session keys
depending upon the shared long term asymmetric keys in some way.
The single session game is a symmetric key game where the adversary is allowed to
query at most one NewKey query and one SameKey query, i.e., the adversary is given
access to at most one pair of “honest” sessions. We denote this game by Gpi−1. Note
that any (multi-session) symmetric key game Gpi has a single session version Gpi−1. A
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symmetric key game is called single session reducible if its (multi-session) security can
be reduced to the security of the corresponding single session game.
Definition 28 (Single-Session Reducibility). A security game Gpi is single session re-
ducible if for any PPT adversary A against Gpi where AdvGpipi,A(1η) is non-negligible, then
there exists a PPT adversary B against Gpi−1 such that AdvGpi−1pi,B (1η) is non-negligible.
We stress again that single session reducibility is not a prerequisite for our compo-
sition theorem to work. This class of protocols only supports a simpler analysis. In
Chapter 4.6, we will see a necessary condition for single-session reducibility.
In Section 3.4, we show that the game of authenticated channels satisfies this condi-
tion. Hence, a single session secure authenticated channel remains secure when putting
the protocol into a multi-session setting where the symmetric key generation of the
protocol is replaced by a BR-secure key exchange protocol.
4.4 Composition Result
We now present our main results. In Theorem 1 we show that a BR-secure key exchange,
with the additional property of having an efficient session matching algorithm, securely
composes with a symmetric key protocol.
Theorem 1. Let ke be a BR-forward-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an
efficient session matching algorithm exists. Let pi be a secure protocol w.r.t. Gpi. If the
key generation algorithm of pi outputs keys with distribution D then the composition ke;pi




η) ≤ ni2 · ns ·AdvGBR,Dke,B (1η) + AdvGpipi,C(1η)
for some efficient algorithms B and C, where ni is the maximum number of participants
and ns is the maximum number of sessions, and thus ni
2 · ns is the maximal size of the
set LABELS.
The proof proceeds in two stages. First, we show that we can replace all the session
keys one-by-one with random keys, where partner sessions are keyed with the same
random value. This results in a composed game, where keys used by the symmetric
protocol are independent of the key exchange. Next, we show this is then equivalent
to the symmetric key protocol game Gpi. Intuitively this means a break against this
composition is a break against the symmetric key protocol, where keys are generated
randomly.
We provide the formal proof of Theorem 1 after stating an corollary for single ses-
sion reducible protocols which is an immediate application. Essentially, if a symmetric
key protocol is single session reducible and secure for a single session, then it securely
composes with a BR-secure key exchange protocol.
50 CHAPTER 4. COMPOSABILITY OF BR KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
Corollary 1. Let ke be a BR-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an efficient
session matching algorithm exists. Let Gpi be a single session reducible security game,
and let pi be a secure protocol w.r.t. Gpi−1. If the key generation algorithm of pi outputs
keys with distribution D then the composition ke;pi is secure w.r.t. Gke;pi.
Proof. Since pi is secure w.r.t Gpi−1, and Gpi is single session reducible we have that pi is
secure w.r.t. Gpi by definition. Therefore we can now apply Theorem 1 and the result
holds.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove Theorem 1, a hybrid argument is involved, where one by
one, the real keys used by the protocol are replaced by random keys. Each replacement
is reduced to a BR-secrecy game to show that it only triggers a negligible loss in success
probability. The session matching ensures that we can assign matching keys to partners
in these hybrid games for valid simulations.
We now turn to the definitions needed to prove the hybrid argument. Let the game
Gλ,Dke;pi be the game Gke;pi where for the first λ sessions to accept a key (where the partner
session has not yet accepted), the key from the key exchange session is replaced by a
random value for the pi stage of the composition. The random value is drawn according
to distribution D which corresponds to the output distribution of the key generation
algorithm of pi.
The game Gλ,Dke;pi runs as for the game Gke;pi with the following modifications. The
game maintains the variable λ∗, which is set to 0 initially. The behaviour of Gλ,Dke;pi, is
defined to act as game Gke;pi, on all queries except the Send query. When a Send query
is made the game performs as described in Figure 4.2.
Send(label,msg):
• If λ ≤ λ∗, then act as Gke;pi and return its output, else:
• Check whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, return failure message false.
• Else, run Gke(Send(labelke,msg)).
• If it returns msg′, return msg′.
• If it returns (msg′, accepted) or accepted, then the key exchange game wrote (sid∗, κ∗) to its
output tape.
• If there is label′ke with label
′
ke.sid = sid
∗ and label′ke.stexec = accepted, then issue the query
SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi.
• Else if there is no such label′ke and if labelke.stexec = fresh, then draw κpi ← D, increment λ∗
by 1, write κ on the input tape of the protocol game Gpi and query NewKeypi(U, V ) to the
protocol game Gpi which returns a key identifier kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and
the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi) is stored in list LIdentifiers.
• Else if label.stkey = revealed, then query SetKey(label.U, label.V, κ∗) to Gpi which returns a key
identifier kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and the triple (labelke, kidpi) is stored in list
LIdentifiers.
• Return all answers from the subgames to the adversary.
Figure 4.2: Send query for the game Gλ,Dke,pi.
By using Lemma 1, one transforms the game Gke;pi = G
0,D
ke;pi into the game G
n,D
ke;pi for
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n = ni
2 · ns, where these two games are indistinguishable to the adversary due to the
BR-security of the key exchange. As an immediate consequence of Lemma 1, we have∣∣∣∣AdvG0,Dke;pike;pi,A(1η)−AdvGn,Dke;pike;pi,A(1η)∣∣∣∣ ≤ n ·AdvGBR,Dke,B (1η).
The game Gn,Dke;pi now uses random keys which are independent from the keys derived
in the key exchange protocol, and Lemma 2 then tells us that the advantage of an
adversary against Gn,Dke;pi is equal to the advantage of an adversary against the Gpi game
for the symmetric key protocol. Since the protocol pi is secure w.r.t. Gpi, we therefore
conclude the game Gke;pi is secure.
Lemma 1. Let ke be a BR-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an efficient ses-
sion matching algorithm exists. Let pi be a symmetric key protocol whose key generation













for some efficient algorithm B = B(λ).
We note that we give λ as auxiliary input to B for simplicity. For the full hybrid
argument picking λ at random in the corresponding range actually suffices.
Proof. Given an adversary A against the game Gλ−1,Dke;pi , we construct an algorithm B
against the BR-security of ke. If A has a non-negligible difference in advantage between
the games Gλ−1,Dke;pi and G
λ,D
ke;pi, then algorithm B will have non-negligible advantage in the
BR-secrecy game of ke.
Algorithm B honestly simulates the pi stage of the composition, using the keys from
the BR-secrecy game, GBR,Dke , and all key exchange queries are forwarded to the G
BR,D
ke
game. To allow B to simulate the pi stage, B simulates the lists LGpi and LkeysGpi and the
variable λ∗. It keeps track of whether sessions have accepted or not using the partial
function ACC : LABELS→ {running, accepted, rejected}. Algorithm B maintains a list of
session keys (for accepted sessions where the key is obtained through a Reveal or Test
query) using the partial function KST : LABELS → D. Algorithm B also keeps track of
all corrupt sessions within GBR,Dke , so locally constructs and updates a restricted copy of
LkeysGke , which only contains the entries (kid, U, stkey) and a restricted copy of LGke which
only contains (label, kidU , kidV , U, V, stexec, stkey). Moreover, B maintains a restricted list
to match sessions from the key exchange game with keys from the protocol game via a
restricted list LIdentifiers which contains pair (label, kid) In descriptions of the algorithms
B, we denote these lists by LGke(B), LGkeyske (B) and L
Identifiers(B).
Algorithm B may also run the session matching algorithm M, which outputs lists
LABELSsingle and LABELSpartner as described in Section 4.2. For the session match-




A , where the sets LABELSsingle and LABELSpartner
are the outputs of the session matching algorithm as previously described.
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We now describe how B ansers A’s queries. When A makes a Sendke query, B answers
as given in Figure 4.3. All other queries made by A are for the pi stage of the composition,
and are honestly simulated by B.
Sendke(label,msg):
• B checks whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, B returns failure message false.
• Else, B queries (Send(labelke,msg)) to GBR,Dke .
• If GBR,Dke returns msg′, B return msg′.
• If GBR,Dke also returns rejected, then B sets labelke.stexec := rejected.
• Else if GBR,Dke also returns accepted, then B sets labelke.stexec := accepted. In this case, the key






• If there is a pair (label, label′) or a pair (label′, label) in LABELSpartner, then B sets
KST(label) := KST(label′), creates the tuple (label, label′.kid) in list in LIdentifiers(B) and
queries SameKey(label′.V, label′.U, label′.kid) to the simulated protocol game Gpi that returns
the key identifier kid = label.kid, which B relays to A.
• Else if label ∈ LABELSsingle and label.stkey = revealed, then B queries Revealke(label) to
GBR,Dke that returns a key κ. B sets KST(label) := κ and queries SetKey(label.U, label.V, κ)
to the simulated protocol stage, which returns a key identifier kid. B adds (label, kid) to
LIdentifiers(B) and returns kid to A.
• Else, label ∈ LABELSsingle and label.stkey = fresh. Depending on λ, B operates as follows:
• If λ < λ∗, then B draws a random key κexecD, sets KST(label) := κ, writes κ on the
key input tape Gk-inpi tape and queries NewKey(label.U, label.V ) to the simulated game Gpi,
which returns a key identifier kid. B adds (label, kid) to LIdentifiers(B) and returns kid to A.
• If λ = λ∗, then B queries Test(label) toGBR,Dke to receive a key κ. Then, B sets KST(label) :=
κ, writes κ on the key input tape Gk-inpi tape and queries NewKey(label.U, label.V ) to the
simulated game Gpi, which returns a key identifier kid. B adds (label, kid) to LIdentifiers(B)
and returns kid to A.
• If λ > λ∗, then B queries Reveal(label) to GBR,Dke to receive a key κ. Then,
B sets KST(label) := κ, writes κ on the key input tape Gk-inpi tape and queries
NewKey(label.U, label.V ) to the simulated game Gpi, which returns a key identifier kid.
B adds (label, kid) to LIdentifiers(B) and returns kid to A.
Figure 4.3: The response of algorithm B to a Send query made by A playing the Gλ−1,Dke;pi
game.
Remark: In Figure 4.3, when λ∗ > λ and there exists an entry for label in
LABELSpartner, we initialise the session key of this session with the key of its partner
session. Since ke is BR-secure, we have that the matching game GMatchke is secure, and
hence the two partnered completed sessions will share the same session key with over-
whelming probability. Hence our initialisation of session keys is correct.
Since B’s local copy of LGke contains identical information relating to the reveal state
of sessions as the one maintained by GBR,Dke , it is able to either initialise a session at the
pi stage by a NewKey query, if the session is unrevealed or by a SetKey query, if the
session is revealed. Note that B asking Reveal queries to GBR,Dke does not affect whether
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keys are considered known or not within its simulation of the pi stage. Thus the quality
of the simulation is not affected by B’s additional Reveal queries. Notice that if the Test
query made by B to GBR,Dke returns the real key then B perfectly simulates the Gλ−1,Dke;pi
game, while if a random key is returned B perfectly simulates the Gλ,Dke;pi game. The
advantage of B in game GBR,Dke corresponds to the difference in success probability of A
upon playing Gλ−1,Dke;pi or G
λ,D
ke;pi.
At some point algorithm A terminates. If A wins against the composed game, B






























∣∣∣∣AdvGλ−1,Dke;pike;pi,A (1η)−AdvGλ,Dke;pike;pi,A(1η)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1η),
where (1η) is a negligible function in the security parameter, denoting the advantage












The final step of Theorem 1 is to show the game Gn,Dke;pi, where all session keys of
the key exchange are replaced by random keys, can be reduced to the security of the
symmetric key protocol game Gpi. We now show this in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let ke be a key exchange protocol, let pi be a symmetric key protocol whose
key generation algorithm produces keys w.r.t. distribution D. Let n = ni2 · ns, where ni
is an upper bound on the number of users and ns is an upper bound on the number of





for some efficient adversary B.
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Proof. The outline of the proof is as follows: Algorithm B plays against a game Gpi and
internally simulates honestly the entire composed game Gn,Dke;pi. As the keys used in the
protocol stage are independent of the key exchange stage, B can answer A’s queries to
the key exchange stage by its simulated composed game, while forwarding A’s queries
to the protocol stage to Gpi. The outputs to A are perfectly identical to the composed
game A expects to play against.
Formally, given the adversary A against the game Gn,Dke;pi we construct algorithm B
playing the Gpi game as follows. Algorithm B internally simulates the entire key exhcnage
game as is done in the composed game. We now describe how B answers A’s queries.
If the query is to the pi stage of the composed game, B forwards this query to Gpi and
returns the response to A. If the query is for the ke stage then B uses its internal data
of Gke to simulate the actions of the composed game and create a response to return to
A. Note that for all these queries the simulation is perfect. The Send query is formally
given in Figure 4.4.
Send(label,msg):
• B checks whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, it returns failure message false.
• Else, B runs the simulated game Gke(Send(labelke,msg)).
• If Gke returns msg′, B returns msg′ to A.
• If Gke returns (msg′, accepted) or accepted, then the key exchange game wrote (sid∗, κ∗) to its
output tape.
• If there is label′ke with label
′
ke.sid = sid
∗ and label′ke.stexec = accepted, then B issues the query
SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi.
• Else if label.stkey 6= revealed, then B queries NewKeypi(U, V ) to the protocol game Gpi which
returns a key identifier kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi)
is stored in list LIdentifiers.
• Else if label.stkey = revealed, then query SetKey(label.U, label.V, κ∗) to Gpi.
• Return all answers from the subgames to the adversary.
Figure 4.4: Simulation by algorithm B in response to a Send query of A playing Gn,Dke;pi,A.
Keys used by Gpi and the keys used by the protocol stage of the composed game
are identically distributed, as in the case of a SetKey(U, V, κ) query, the key is set to κ
in both games. When a NewKey(U, V ) query is sent, both games randomly draw a key
from distribution D. If the adversary queries SameKey(V,U, kid), in both games, there
is a tuple (kid, V, U, κ, stkid) created on LkeysG . Thus, the simulation is sound.
At some point A will terminate execution and at this point B also terminates. If A
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4.5 Observations on Session Matching
In Section 4.2 we defined a session matching algorithm, and gave an example of a BR-
secure key exchange that does not support such an algorithm (based on re-randomizable
encryption). Moreover, we showed that a BR-secure key exchange is composable if there
exists a session matching algorithmM which, at any point in the game, outputs correct
lists of partnered sessions. This section is devoted to prove that the converse also holds,
i.e., if a key exchange protocol is composable in general, then a weak form of session
matching algorithm exists. In other words, if for all secure protocols pi, there is a black-
box reduction from the composed game Gke;pi to BR-security of the key exchange, then
this black-box reduction can be used to build some session matching algorithm. This
shows that a form of session matching algorithm is both necessary and sufficient to
provide general composability for BR-secure key exchange protocols.
We first specify the notion of a straightline black-box reduction, which works for any
protocol pi, and any adversary A. The reduction reduces the security of the composed
protocol (ke;pi), to the BR-security of ke. The reduction is black-box and has oracle
access to a single copy of A, i.e., it may only query the oracle A via a certain interface,
but may not set randomness for it, run several copies of A or re-set A to its initial
state, as more powerful definitions of black-box reduction sometimes allow. We first
show the reduction in our composition proof is of this type, and then move on to give
the construction of a “weak” session matching algorithm.
We stress that the derived session matching algorithm is not as powerful as the one
defined in Definition 27. Namely, one of the differences will be that the algorithm only
provides a good session matching for those adversaries A that receive additional session
key information from the key exchange game. Moreover, the weak session matching
algorithm will produce the correct result, with some non-negligible probability better
than a random guess, i.e., it is not required to always succeed. Note that the (non-weak)
session matching algorithm must produce the correct result with probability 1. Finally,
the weak session matching algorithm also makes additional Test and Reveal queries, but
only in a strictly controlled manner. In particular, we assume that they do not affect
the winning probability of an adversary that plays the BR-game GBR,Dke .
Definition 29 (Straightline Black-Box Reduction). Let A be an adversary against Gke;pi.
The reduction accesses A via oracle queries. The A oracle is given the secret bit b
of the BR-secrecy game, lists LABELSpartner, LABELSsingle, and the correct session key,
whenever a key exchange session accepts. This information flow is realized through a
special tape between oracle A and GBR,Dke which the reduction is unable to read. Let pi be
secure with respect to Gpi. We say that there exists a straightline black-box reduction
from Gke;pi to G
BR,D
ke if there exists a PPT algorithm B against GBR,Dke , such that for all








2. Algorithm B has oracle access to a single oracle A.
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3. Algorithm B honestly relays any queries A makes to the ke stage of (ke;pi) to the
game GBR,Dke ,
4. and the only other queries made by B to GBR are Test and Reveal queries.
The above notion may sound restrictive; adversary A receives information from
GBR,Dke that is unknown to B. Additionally, algorithm B is merely an evesdropper as
far as queries to GBR,Dke are concerned. However, we can observe that our reduction in
Theorem 1 is of the above type. In particular, B does not tamper with queries to the
key exchange game.
We now prove that the notion of a straightline black-box reduction implies the exis-
tence of a weak session matching algorithm.
To construct a weak session matching algorithm we now define a particular protocol
pi0 with its game Gpi0 . The protocol pi0 consists of two algorithms (kg, ξ) which act as fol-
lows: the key generation algorithm kg outputs a random key from {0, 1}η. The protocol
algorithm ξ on any type of input always returns the empty message as a response.
Besides the standard NewKey, SameKey and SetKey, Gpi0 provides one additional
query, Target(kid, κ). When the adversary has asked Target(kid, κ), the game ignores all
further queries. The predicate Ppi0 of the game Gpi0 checks whether kid corresponds to
an honest session, i.e., whether list LkeysGpi0 stores kid.stkid = honest, and whether κ is the
key corresponding to this key identifier. If so, Ppi0 outputs 1, else Ppi0 outputs 0.
If, before the Target query, Gpi0 receives any of the queries NewKey, SameKey or
SetKey, Gpi0 behaves as described in Section 3.3. Additionally, after every such query,
the game returns two lists LABELSpartner and LABELSsingle that contain pairs of keys
that are used by two users and keys that are only used by one user so far, i.e., a
different encoding of a shortened list LkeysGpi0 , that only contains tuples (kid, U, V ) instead
of (kid, U, V, κ, stkid). At some point, Gpi0 receives a pair (kid, κ) and outputs 1 if and
only if kid.stkid = honest and κ = kid.κ. Note that for random keys κ, the corresponding
protocol pi0 is secure (as a standalone protocol), since winning the game requires the
adversary to predict an unknown key, while the key is information-theoretically hidden.
Algorithm B is required to work for all adversaries satisfying the description of Def-
inition 29. By considering a particular subclass of those, we will be able to extract
information on B’s ability to provide matching sessions. Let A be an arbitrary adver-
sary against Gke;pi0 that does not receive the additional key information from GBR,D. We
now describe the following universal wrapper algorithm A0 for such adversaries.
Algorithm A0 receives the additional information and runs A as a subroutine. Algo-
rithm A0 plays against Gke,pi0 . and does not modify any of A’s queries, except the Target
query. Note that after the Target query is issued, no further queries need be made by the
adversaries. When A issues its Target(kid, κ) query then let us assume that w.l.o.g. this
is always a query for an honest session label. Now, throughout the game, A0 received
lists LABELSpartner and LABELSsingle from Gpi0 . Algorithm A0 checks whether at any time
in the game, these lists are different from those given in the additional information to
A0. If a difference occurs, then A0 does not modify A’s output Target(kid, κ) but simply
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forwards it. Else, A0 searches in its lists for the correct key κ′ and outputs Target(kid, κ′)
as its final output.
Clearly, the algorithm A0 wins against the composed game with probability 1, as the
lists always match and the key output in the Target session is always correct. However,
when the reduction B performs a simulation and cannot provide suitable matchings, this
may no longer hold. Nevertheless, as A0 has non-negligible winning advantage in the
composed game, by definition, the reduction B with oracle access to A0 also has a non-
negligible advantage in the BR-secrecy game. To assure that A0 produces useful output
for B, the adversary B needs to provide correct lists LABELSpartner and LABELSsingle in
each step. Else, B only observes an execution of a copy of A, and A does not receive
additional information about the keys. Thus, as A is just an arbitrary adversary without
additional information, there is an algorithm B, which is able to break the BR-secrecy of
ke, contrary to the assumption (namely, the algorithm B which runs A as a subroutine).
Therefore, B needs to provide an accurate matching at least in a significant number of
cases.
The last step is to analyse how often B may fail to provide a good matching or
admissible Reveal and Test queries. Analysis shows that, with high probability B provides
admissible Reveal and Test queries and it achieves the correct session matching in a
significant number of cases. Note that for the latter, the probability of a random guess
for the matching being correct is negligible; therefore, with non-negligible probability,
algorithm B produces a better result than a random guess. Thus, the constructed weak
session matching algorithm indicates that composability is not achievable without some
session matching properties of the key exchange protocol. We now turn to the analysis.
We now turn to the analysis. We say that B only makes admissible Reveal and Test
queries, if B neither reveals the partner of a tested session, nor tests the partner of
the revealed session. Recall that in either case, B loses in the BR-secrecy game. As B
is only a successful algorithm when winning in the BR-secrecy game with probability
significantly greater than 12 , it is obvious that B needs to provide admissible Test and
Reveal queries with probability significantly greater than 12 . We now argue that this
probability needs to be negligibly close to 1 by considering modified wrappers Ap.
Let p(η) be a positive, monotone function in the security parameter η, and let p(η)
be upper bounded by 1. Algorithm Ap flips a weighted coin. With probability 1− p(η),
algorithm Ap behaves as A0 and provides helpful information to B. With probability
p(η), Ap only forwards A’s output, so B does not receive any helpful information in
this case. Note that B cannot distinguish these two cases due to the BR-security of the
key exchange. Thus, B’s probability of providing admissible queries is equal to some
probability q(η) in both cases.
The reduction B’s success probability is lower bounded by (1 − p(η)) · (1 − q(η)) +
p(η) · 12(1−q(η)) = (1−q(η))(12 + 12(1−p(η))). Algorithm Ap has non-negligible winning
probability, whenever 1− p(η) is non-negligible in the security parameter η. Therefore,
in order to exceed 12 by a non-negligible amount, the term (1− q(η)) must be negligibly
close to 1. Hence, B provides admissible Test and Reveal queries in almost all cases.
We now argue that B provides matching sessions to its oracle A0 with non-negligible
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probability. Recall that B needs to provide matching sessions to A0, as else, the oracle
A0 does not pass any helpful information to B. Thus, B provides matching sessions to
A with non-negligible probability.
An analysis similar to the one for admissible queries fails, as providing non-matching
sessions does not prevent B from winning the BR-secrecy game. In particular, when
flipping a coin, B wins the game with probability 12 . If, for example, B can check whether
it provides a good session matching to its oracle, no conclusions can be made. Thus, the
matching property is only achieved in a weak flavor. Recall that B is significantly more
successful in identifying partnered sessions than a purely random guess.
4.6 On Non-Forward-Secure Protocols
We prove that a symmetric-key protocol can be safely composed with a non-forward
secure key exchange protocol as long as the symmetric-key protocol is defined via a
session-restricted protocol. Jumping ahead to Chapter 5, we note that it is actually
sufficient to be reducible to a session-restricted protocol in a key-independent way. We
first define session-restricted games and then prove the composition theorem. Note that,
throughout this section, we work with the notion of protocol games, as introduced in
Chapter 3.
4.6.1 Session-Restricted Games
We here build on the definition of single-session games. Basically, a session-restricted
game Gpi for protocol pi is a conglomeration of independent single- session games Gpi−1,
which, as we recall, only allow for a single NewKey and SameKey query. As Gpi−1 only
maintains a single key, there is no need for key identifiers kid. Thus, the list LGpi−1
only contains tuples (U, V, k, stkid) instead of tuples (U, V, k, stkid). We also drop the key
identifier kid from all queries to Gpi−1. In turn, Gpi matches each independent copy of
Gpi−1 by a key identifier kid, we denote this copy by Gpi−1(kid). Moreover, we add a
Target(kid) query to the game. This query determines which of the subgames defines the
output.
We now describe the behaviour of Gpi formally.
• On input a query NewKey(U, V ), the game Gpi initializes a new, independent copy of
Gpi−1 and a key identifier kid, that it returns to the adversary.
• On input a query SameKey(kid, U, V ), the game Gpi relays the query SameKey(U, V )
to Gpi−1.
• On input any other query Q(kid), Gpi relays Q to Gpi−1 and returns the answer. This
also applies to Corrupt queries.
• If in the end, the adversary has not made any Target query, he looses. Else, the
subgame Gpi−1(kid) whose key identifier kid was used on the Target query, returns its
output b, and Gpi returns b.
We will now prove that if a game is session-restricted, then it is also single-session
reducible.
4.6. ON NON-FORWARD-SECURE PROTOCOLS 59
Lemma 3. Let Gpi be a session-restricted game, then Gpi is also single-session reducible,
in particular, Gpi is secure if and only if Gpi−1 is secure:
AdvGpipi,A(1
η) ≤ n · AGpi−1pi,B (1η) ≤ n · AGpipi,B(1η)
for some efficient adversary B, where n is an upper bound on the NewKey queries by A.
Proof. Let Gpi−1 be the subgame that Gpi runs independent copies of. It is clear that
security in the multi-session case implies security in the single-session case with a tight
security reduction. We thus only prove the converse direction. Let A be an adversary
against Gpi. We construct an adversary B against Gpi−1 as follows. Let n be an upper
bound on the number of NewKey queries that A makes. In the beginning of the game,
B draws a random number k0 between 1 and n. Then, B simulates a run of Gpi. When
A makes its k0’s NewKey query, instead of initializing a new copy of Gpi−1 as Gpi would
do, B relays all queries to the game Gpi−1, it is playing against. B then generates a key
identifier kid for this session according to the distribution defined by Gpi−1. Any query
that comes prepended with kid, is relayed to the exterior game. All answers to other
queries are faithfully simulated. When A terminates, the adversary B terminates too.
By construction, the simulation is perfect. The advantage of B is 1n of the advantage
of A and thus non-negligible.
4.6.2 Composition Theorem
We now prove that key exchange protocols that are BR-secure, but not forward-secure
can be safely composed with session-restricted games.
Theorem 2. Let ke be a BR-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an efficient
session matching algorithm exists. Let pi be a secure protocol w.r.t. a session-restricted
game Gpi. If the key generation algorithm of pi outputs keys with distribution D then the








η) + n ·AdvGpi−1pi,C (1η) ≤ Adv
GBR,Dke
ke,B (1
η) + n ·AdvGpipi,C(1η)
for some efficient algorithms B and C, where n is an upper bound on the number of
accepting sessions of the key exchange protocol.
Proof of Theorem 2. The second inequality follows from Lemma 3. We now prove the
first inequality, namely, if there is a successful aversary A against Gke,pi, then there
is either a successful adversary B against Gnfs,BR,Dke or a successful adversary C against
Gpi−1. Here, the proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1, except for the hybrid argument
which was used to replace all keys one by one. Instead of defining a sequence of games,
we only replace one key and then reduce to a single-session version Gpi−1 of the protocol
game instead of reducing to a multi-session version, as was done for Theorem 1.
We now define the modified game Gke;pi,n where one of the keys is replaced by a ran-
dom key. We will then show an adversary B that has non-negligible winning probability
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against Gnfs,BR,Dke , if A’s winning probability changes significantly between Gke;pi,n and
Gke;pi.
Gke;pi,n keeps the same state as Gke;pi and an additional value n, where for the nth
session, the key is replaced by a random value for the pi stage of the composition. The
random value is drawn according to distribution D which corresponds to the output
distribution of the key generation algorithm of pi.
The game Gke;pi,n runs as for the game Gke;pi with the following modifications. The
game maintains the variable λ∗, which is set to 0 initially. The behaviour of Gke;pi,n, is
defined to act as game Gke;pi, on all queries except the Send query. When a Send query
is made the game performs as described in Figure 4.5.
Send(label,msg):
• If n 6= λ∗, then act as Gke;pi and return its output. If NewKey query is made, increment λ∗ by
1, else:
• Check whether labelke.stexec = running.
• If not, return failure message false.
• Else, run Gke(Send(labelke,msg)).
• If it returns msg′, return msg′.
• If it returns (msg′, accepted) or accepted, then the key exchange game wrote (sid∗, κ∗) to its
output tape.
• If there is label′ke with label
′
ke.sid = sid
∗ and label′ke.stexec = accepted, then issue the query
SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi.
• Else if there is no such label′ke and if labelke.stexec = fresh, then draw κpi ← D, increment λ∗
by 1, write κ on the input tape of the protocol game Gpi and query NewKeypi(U, V ) to the
protocol game Gpi which returns a key identifier kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and
the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi) is stored in list LIdentifiers.
• Else if label.stkey = revealed, then query SetKey(label.U, label.V, κ∗) to Gpi which returns a key
identifier kidpi that is returned to the adversary, and the triple (labelke, kidpi) is stored in list
LIdentifiers.
• Return all answers from the subgames to the adversary.
Figure 4.5: Send query for the game Gke,pi,n.
We now describe the adversary B against. To simulate the games Gke;pi and Gke;pi,n,
respectively, B will make use of the session-matching algorithm. It will simulate Gpi
faithfully and pass on the keys to Gpi by asking Reveal queries to G
BR,D
ke . For a random
accepted session k ← {1, ..., n}, the adversary B will use the Test-query instead of the
Reveal query. If the secret bit of the GBR,Dke game is 0, then B perfectly simulates Gke;pi;
if the secret bit is 0, B perfectly simulates Gke;pi,n. When A terminates, then B evaluates
whether A has won against the internally simulated game Gpi. B returns 1, if A has
won, and 0 else. If A’s success probability differs between Gke;pi and Gke;pi,n, then this
difference corresponds to B’s success probability. We omit the formal details of the
simulation, as they are analogous to Theorem 1.
We now prove that if A is successful against Gke;pi,n, then there is a successful adver-
sary C against Gpi−1. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 3, the adversary C simulates
the game Gke;pi,n except for the Gpi session key, where the key from the key exchange
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stage is replaced by a random key. For this session key, the adversary C relays all queries
of A to his game Gpi−1. With probability 1n , this is the session the Target query is asked
to, whence the advantage of C is 1n times the advantage of A against Gke;pi,n. Again, we
omit the formal details.




In the previous chapter, we have seen that key indistinguishability assures composition-
ality for key exchange protocols. As the latter are never used on their own, key indistin-
guihsability should be an important design criterion. However, in practice, explicit key
confirmation is equally desired and unfortunately harms key indistinguishability. While
a key-refresh step is in principle a remedy for this problem [BR93, BPR00] it is common
that such protocols omit such a step—however, protocols such as TLS do not not suffer
from obvious attacks. The reason for this apparent contradiction, and this is the topic
of this chapter, is, that key confirmation, albeit a theoretical problem, usually do not
give rise to security gaps.
The security definitions that we defined in Chapter 3 offer two important benefits.
Our notion is weaker than the more established ones and thus allows the analysis of a
larger class of protocols. Furthermore, and this is the topic of this chapter, they enjoy
rather general composability properties.
Specifically, for protocols whose security relies exclusively on some underlying sym-
metric primitive we show that they can be securely composed with key exchange proto-
cols provided that two main requirements hold: 1) no adversary can break the under-
lying primitive, even when the primitive uses keys obtained from executions of the key
exchange protocol in the presence of the adversary, and 2) the security of the protocol
can be reduced to that of the primitive, no matter how the keys for the primitive are
distributed. Proving that the two conditions are satisfied, and then applying our generic
theorem, should be simpler than performing a monolithic analysis of the composed pro-
tocol.
The second condition, a so-called key-independent reduction is the main ingredient
in our composition theorem that we describe in detail in the first section of this chapter.
Note that, throughout this chapter, we will make substantial use of the notion of split
adversaries, as introduced in Section 3.2.
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5.1 Key-Independent Reductions
As we weaken the condition on the protocol, we make up for it by strengthening the
definition of a reduction to what we call a key-independent reduction. Assume that a
protocol pi uses in its construction some primitive ζ. A typical (black-box) reduction is
some transformation R that transforms an adversary against pi into one against ζ, such
that if the probability that A breaks pi is non-negligible then the probability that R(A)
breaks ζ is also non-negligible. The probabilities are over the choice of keys and coins in
the system. A key-independent reduction is a strengthening of the above requirement:
such a reduction is required to work no matter what the distribution over the keys is
(the remaining coins are still selected uniformly at random). In particular, the reduction
should work even if the adversary has arbitrary information about the keys (even the
key itself!).
The example in the next Section 5.1.1 indicates that such reductions are in fact quite
common in cryptography, and are simply a minor adaptation of many existing black-box
style reductions. Nevertheless, for sake of completeness, we also show that the converse is
not true in general: there exist black-box reductions that are not key-independent. Next
we discuss our second composition theorem and clarify why key-independent reductions
are a crucial component.
We now define key-independent reductions more formally. Our focus is on the case
of some protocol pi whose security relies solely on that of some underlying symmetric
primitive ζ. We assume that the keys, which are passed as input to the protocol, are
used to only key the underlying primitive. This assumption is satisfied, for instance,
by standard authenticated and private channel protocols. Moreover, the case when a
protocol uses several primitives (e.g. both encryption and authentication as for secure
channels) can be cast as an instance of this setting.
Just as for standard reductions, a key-independent reduction uses an adversary A
against protocol pi to construct an adversary R(A) against primitive ζ. Crucially, we
require that the reduction works, independent of the distribution of keys that are input
to the protocol. Roughly speaking, for any key distribution, if adversary A breaks the
protocol pi then adversary R(A) breaks the primitive for the same distribution on the
keys. This property is difficult to formalize: primitives may use different keys in their
instantiations, whereas protocols may use the same key in two sessions so we have to
clarify what “the same distribution” means. We do this by explicitly showing how such
a reduction maps the keys used in the protocol to the keys used by the primitive.
Let B = (B1,B2) be a query-respecting adversary for the protocol game Gpi. The
adversary A constructed via the reduction internally maintains the list LkeysA , which
consists of tuples of the form (U, V, kid) that record the keys shared by pairs of users.
We need however to be more specific. For the particular type of reduction that we
consider, we demand the existence of an adversary A = (A1,A2) against Gζ , where the
A1 component of A manages the keys in a particular way. Intuitively A1 is in charge
of maintaining a mapping between the keys used in the game Gζ , which A is playing,
and the game Gpi, which A simulates for B. The mapping between the keys used in the
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simulation and the keys used in the game of A may not be straightforward as the same
key for a primitive may be used to simulate two or more sessions of the protocol. While
we fix how A1 should be constructed from B1 we do not impose any restriction on A2.
Formally, we define the adversary A1(B1) that works as an interface between B1,
which expects to communicate with Gpi, and the game Gζ , as follows:
• When B1 writes a value k onto the input tape Gk-inpi , algorithm A1 writes k on the
input tape Gk-inζ .
• Whenever B1 sends a NewKey(U, V ) query, algorithm A1 sends a NewKey() query to
the game Gζ . When the key identifier kid is returned, algorithm A1 stores the tuple
(U, V, kid) on its list LkeysA . Finally A1 forwards kid to B1.
• Whenever B1 sends a SameKey(U, V, kid) query, algorithm A1 searches LkeysA for a
tuple (V,U, kid). If there is such a tuple, then A1 adds the tuple (U, V, kid) to LkeysA
and returns kid. Otherwise, A1 returns ⊥.
• Whenever B1 issues a Corruptpi(kid) query to the protocol game Gpi, algorithm A1
sends the Corruptζ(kid) query to the primitive game. Algorithm A1 relays the answer
it obtains to B1.
• Whenever B1 passes control to B2 by outputting some state sti, algorithm A1 passes
sti together with the list LkeysA to A2.
We require that the algorithm A2 makes only black-box use of B2. In addition, we
require that whenever B2 outputs some state sti and passes control to B1, that A2 then
sends sti to A1, who then runs B1 on this state.
Note, algorithm A2 is allowed arbitrary queries to the primitive game Gζ except
NewKey queries. In particular, A2 can use the primitive oracle to answer B2’s queries.
We stress that we do not specify how A2 answers B2’s queries, we only require that such
an A2 exists. Also, notice that by the above description, if B is query-respecting for the
protocol then A is query-respecting for the primitive.
We can now define what it means to have a key-independent reduction from a protocol
to a primitive.
Definition 30 (Key-Independent Reduction). We say there is a key independent ((Gζ , δζ),
(Gpi, δpi))-reduction from the protocol to the primitive, if for all query-respecting split ad-
versaries B = (B1,B2) against the protocol game Gpi, there is a query-respecting split
adversary A = (A1,A2) against the primitive game Gζ with A1 depending on B1, as
described above, such that
Pr [Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) = 1]− δpi ≤ Pr [Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) = 1]− δζ .
In other words if ζ is δζ-secure then pi is δpi-secure, for whatever distribution on keys is
determined by B1 (and A1 constructed as above). Notice that we do not restrict the ad-
versary B in the definition to be key-benign so the reduction should work no matter what
partial information the adversary has about the keys (even the keys themselves). Note
that, if we quantify over the smaller class of key-benign adversaries B, then we obtain
the standard notion of cryptographic reductions. Again, if the games for the primitive
and the protocol are clear from the context, we may simply say (δζ , δpi)-reduction.
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5.1.1 Key-Independent Reduction – Example
Assume an overly simplified setting where a sender and a receiver share a symmetric key
which they use to establish an authenticated channel pi. The protocol they use simply
sends messages concatenated with a counter, together with a message authentication
code of this concatenation produced under the shared key. A reduction would use an
adversary against the authenticated channel to break the security of the MAC scheme
as follows. The MACs are produced with the help of the tagging oracle specific to the
MAC game. Verification by the receiver is done with the help of the corresponding
verification oracle. If the receiver accepts some message that was not sent by the sender,
then the message comes with a tag that was not produced by the sender (and hence the
tagging oracle) and constitutes a forgery for the MAC game. Notice that the reduction is
indeed independent of the distribution of the keys. If an adversary knows the key which
authenticates the channel pi, then it can trivially break the security of the channel, but
such an adversary is still turned into one which “forges” a MAC via the above reduction.
Key-independent vs. black-box reductions. While key-independent reductions
are black-box reductions, the converse is not necessarily true. To see this, consider an
arbitrary symmetric encryption scheme with a black box reduction to some underlying
primitive. Now modify the scheme so that if the encryption key is the all-0 string then
the encryption function is the identity. While the black-box reduction still works (the
probability that the key is the all-0 string is negligible) no key-independent reduction to
the underlying primitive exists.
5.2 Composition Theorem
Recall that we consider protocols pi that are built on top of a symmetric primitive ζ so
that the keys needed by ζ during executions of pi are obtained from the key exchange
protocol ke.
To show that the composition of ke with pi is secure we proceed in two stages. First,
we show that ke is suitable-for-ζ. As explained before, this means that an adversary
who tampers with the key exchange protocol does not obtain sufficient information to
break the primitive. The second required step is to exhibit a key-independent reduction
from the protocol pi to the primitive ζ. If these two conditions are satisfied, our theorem
concludes that ke can be safely used to provide keys for pi.
The following high-level overview of the proof of the theorem also sheds light on
the role that key-independent reductions play in our result. Consider how would one
prove security of the composition between ke and pi, given that there exists a reduction
R which transforms an adversary A against pi into an adversary R(A) against ζ (when
keys are generated using some key generation algorithm), and assuming that ke can be
securely composed with ζ. The only viable path is to extend R such that it takes an
adversary against ke;pi and produces one against ke; ζ, i.e. that the same reduction works
even if keys are generated using ke. If after running ke keys are indinstinguishable from
random ones (or if the execution of the ke can be simulated) the reduction can indeed
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be extended. However if the adversary manages to obtain non-trivial information about
the key (e.g., this is the case when the key is used for confirmation) a normal reduction
would not work anymore. Key-independence deals precisely with this issue: R is required
to work indepdent of what information the adversary obtains about the key, including
through its uses in ke. This intuition sits at the core of our composition result.
An important issue is how difficult is it to prove security in the sense that we define.
Proving that a key-exchange protocol is suitable for a primitive is independent of the
protocol(s) where that primitive is used, can be carried out once and then reused. Also,
proving suitability of a key-exchange protocol for a primitive should be easier than
proving suitability for a protocol simply because the models that are involved are simpler.
Furthermore, the second step should not be more difficult than a standard reduction
from the protocol to the primitive for the simple case of randomly and independently
distributed keys. An analysis based on our composition principle should therefore a) be
simpler than a monolithic analysis of the whole system (even if only for the fact that
many of the details of such an analysis are captured in the proof of our general theorem)
and b) allow for reusing steps, especially for the case when the key-exchange and the
protocol can each be implemented in more than one way. The latter is precisely the
setting offered by practical protocols where one is offered a variety of chiper suites to
select from at the beginning of the protocol.
More formally, our theorem relates the security of the composition of a key exchange
with a protocol (ke;pi) to the security of the key exchange with a primitive (ke; ζ),
assuming that the key exchange protocol is Match secure. The theorem says that once
we have proved a key exchange protocol to be suitable for a given primitive, then this
key exchange protocol can be used with any protocol whose security can be reduced (in a
key-independent way) to the security of the primitive. We first give the theorem as well
as several remarks, and then provide a brief overview of the proof, and a formal proof
in the next Section 5.3. We finally show how our model helps to overcome a well-known
problem in the security analysis of TLS.
Theorem 3. Let ζ be a primitive, pi be a protocol and ke = (kgke,Pke) be a key exchange
protocol. Assume the following conditions hold.
(1) The key exchange protocol ke is Match-secure.
(2) The key exchange protocol ke is (Gζ , δζ)-suitable-for-ζ.
(3) There exists a key-independent ((Gζ , δζ), (Gpi, δpi))-reduction from pi to ζ.
Then ke is (Gpi, δpi)- suitable-for-pi.
Remark: Our theorem relies on the Match property in Definition 24 which, as
formulated, provides strong guarantees regarding the identities of the parties that are
involved. We want to emphasize that these restrictions (i.e. the Match property) can be
relaxed. In fact the theorem relies on properties that Match security entail but which
are strictly weaker. More specifically, Match implies that at most two sessions can have
equal session identifiers (and that such sessions must have derived equal keys). These
weaker guarantee is sufficient to prove the security of the composition. Technically, they
guarantee that the adversary against pi that we construct out of adversary against ke;pi
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is a valid adversary for the game that defines the security of pi: such adversaries are
allowed to set keys for the sessions of pi, but at most two sessions are allowed to have
equal keys. In another incarnation, our theorem could relax the Match requirement (or
even completely drop it!) at the expense of strengthening the last requirement which
would need to ask the existence of a key-independent reduction from a game for pi where
the adversary has more liberty in how he sets the keys of the sessions.
Proof idea. Consider a key-benign adversary C playing the game Gke;pi. We transform
C into a non key-benign adversary C∗ still playing Gke;pi. The first part of C∗ makes the
key exchange queries, while the second part of C∗ makes all protocol queries. The next
step transforms adversary C∗ into an adversary B against the protocol game Gpi. To do
this the first part of B internally simulates the key exchange game, with the keys from
this simulation used as the session keys for the protocol game.
Provided the key exchange is Match-secure, then adversary B is query-respecting by
construction, so the key-independent reduction from pi to ζ yields an adversary A against
the primitive game Gζ . Since the construction of the first part of A is well-defined, we are
able to remove the simulation of the key exchange within the adversary, thus providing
an adversary A′ against the composed key exchange and primitive game Gke;ζ . A final
transformation turns A′ into a key-benign adversary A∗ against Gke;ζ . This contradicts
that ke is suitable-for-ζ, and so it follows that ke is suitable-for-pi.
5.3 Proof of Composition Theorem
We now prove our second composition Theorem 3.
Proof. Step 1: Conversion to non-key-benign adversary. Let C = (C1, C2) be a
key-benign adversary playing the (forward-secure) game Gke;pi of the composed protocol
(ke;pi). Remember that C2 basically plays the whole composed game, while C1 merely
generates the long-term keys used by the parties in the key exchange protocol and makes
the NewKeyke queries. Algorithm C1 then passes a key identifier to C2. As before, we
denote the subgames of Gke;pi by Gke and Gpi. We can view the adversary (C1, C2)
according to Figure 5.1.
As an intermediate step we convert the adversary C into a specific non-key-benign ad-
versary C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2) which we will subsequently turn into a query-respecting adversary
B and which will attack the protocol game instead of the composed game.
Algorithms C∗1 and C∗2 each run their local copy of C = (C1, C2). At first, C∗1 initializes
C. Now, C can take the following actions:
• Write a key to the input tape of the key exchange game.
• Issue a NewKeyke query.
• Issue a NewSessionke query.
• Issue a Sendke query.
• Issue a Corruptke query.
• Issue a Revealke query.
• Issue a NewSessionpi query.
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• Issue a Corruptpi query.
• Issue a Namepi query.
For the first six actions, C∗1 just forwards the output of C, i.e. C∗1 writes keys to the key
exchange game input tape if C intends to do so. If C sends a query to the key exchange
game, then so does C∗1 and the game’s answer is forwarded to C. If C sends a NewKeypi
query to the protocol game, C∗1 forwards the query to the game and relays the game’s
answer to C.
For the three latter actions, C∗1 sends the output of C together with the whole state
of the Turing machine C to C∗2 . Algorithm C∗2 then forwards C’s query to the game and
relays the response to C, where C runs with the state that C∗2 obtained from C∗1 . Now,
symmetrically, for any of the three latter queries, C∗2 relays messages between the game
and C. For any of the six first actions, C∗2 passes control to C∗1 by giving the whole state
of C as well as C’s output.
When C terminates, then so does C∗. As the input to C and the inputs to the game
are distributed as in the previous game, the probability that the game outputs 1 remains






























Figure 5.1: The left diagram shows the interaction between the key-benign adversary
C = (C1, C2) and the composed game Gke;pi. The right diagram shows the transformation
to the non key-benign adversary C∗, still playing against Gke;pi.
We have that
Pr [Exec( Gke;pi), C : kgke) = 1]− δpi
= Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1]− δpi.
Step 2: Folding. We will now transform the adversary C∗ playing Gke;pi into a query-
respecting adversary B playing Gpi. Basically, B2 equals C∗2 with the difference that
B2 plays directly with game Gpi, while C∗2 expects to play with the composed game
Gke;pi. Thus, whenever C∗2 issues a NewSessionpi, Corruptpi or Namepi query, B2 sends the
corresponding NewSession, Corrupt or Name query to game Gpi and relays the game’s
answer to C∗2 .
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We define E to be the “good” event that in the composed game Gke;pi for all tuples
(label, kidke, U, V, sid, accepted, κ, stkey) there exists at most one tuple (label
′, kid′ke, V ′, U ′, sid,
accepted, κ, stkey
′), and if it exists then U = U ′ and V = V ′. We next condition on the
event E to occur, and now turn to the description of B1. Algorithm B1 internally simu-
lates the key exchange game Gke and further makes all steps that the (forward secure)
composed game would have, if Gke and Gpi were composed together. Algorithm B1 inter-
nally runs C∗1 and passes queries from C∗1 to the internally simulated game Gke. Whenever
C∗1 sends a Corruptpi(kidpi) query, B1 relays this query to Gpi and passes the game’s answer
to C∗1 . We now describe B formally: B1 internally models Gke.
• If C∗1 makes any query NewKeyke, SameKeyke or NewSessionke (we write Nameke for
these) queries to the key exchange game then B1 internally simulates the key exchange
game Gke. The state of Gke is updated within B1 and the response (if applicable) is
returned to C∗1 , which then updates its state as though it received the response from
the real Gke game.
• If B1 receives control and state st from B2, B1 forwards st directly to C∗1 and execution
continues within C∗1 .
• If C∗1 outputs state st, and therefore control, then B1 passes st to B2, and B2 passes st
to C∗2 , and execution continues within C∗2 .
• If C∗1 executes kgke and writes k to the tape Gk-inke . The tape Gk-inke is simulated within
B1, so k is written to this and then used by Gke, internally within B1.
• If C∗1 outputs a Sendke(labelke,msg) query, then B1 forwards this message to the inter-
nally simulated key exchange game Gke. If the corresponding session labelke of the key
exchange does not accept a key, the answer from the internally simulated key exchange
game is relayed to C∗1 .
• If C∗1 issues a Sendke(labelke,msg) query such that the session labelke of the key ex-
change (internally simulated within B1) accepts, i.e. when session labelke receives query
Sendke(labelke,msg) and changes the value of the variable stexec to accepted in the tu-
ple (labelke, kidke, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey) stored in list LGke , then the internally sim-
ulated key exchange game writes (sid, κ) to its output tape and sends the message
accepted, which B1 relays to C∗1 . Algorithm B1 searches the list LGke for the tuple
(label′ke, kidke, V, U , sid, accepted, κ, stkey).
• If no such tuple exists, B1 writes the key κ on the input tape of the protocol game
Gpi. Since the event E occurs it follows that the key κ has not been written to the
key input tape before. Now B1 queries NewKeypi(U, V ) to the protocol game which
returns a key identifier kidpi to B1. Algorithm B1 stores the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi)
in list LIdentifiers.
• Else, if in list LGke there exists a tuple (label′ke, kidke, V , U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey), the
algorithm B1 searches the list LIdentifiers for the triple (labelke, sid, kidpi) and queries
SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi which returns kidpi to B1. Since the
event E occurs, B1 will only ever make one such SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) query.
• If C∗1 issues a Revealke(labelke), B1 simulates the key exchange and relays its answer to
C∗1 . Moreover, B1 searches the list LIdentifiers for the tuple (labelke, sid, kidpi) and queries
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Corruptpi(kidpi) to Gpi.
• If C∗1 issues a Corrupt(kidke) query, we need to distinguish between forward secure
games and non-forward secure games. In the first game, B1 simply passes the query
to the internally simulated game Gke and returns its answer to C∗1 . In the latter case,
B1 does the following for all tuples (labelke, kidke, ∗, ∗, sid, accepted, κ, stkey) in LGke :
Search LIdentifiers for all tuples (labelke, sid, kidpi) and query Corruptpi(kidpi) to Gpi and
return Gpi’s answer to C
∗
1 .
• If C∗2 issues any query Namepi to the subgame Gpi of the composed game Gke;pi B2 passes
the query Namepi to Gpi and returns the game’s answer to C∗2 .











Figure 5.2: Adversary B = (B1,B2) playing game Gpi. Algorithm B1 runs using C∗1 and
simulates the key exchange internally. Keys output by the simulated key exchange are
written to the key input tape of Gpi.
If the algorithm B1 needed to make more than one query SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) for
some triple (V,U, kid), this would correspond to a tuple (label, kidke, V, U, sid, stexec, κ,
stkey) accepting a key, which had already been accepted by tuple (label
′, kidke, V, U, sid, accepted,
κ, stkey
′); i.e. the event E did not occur. Therefore B1 will only ever make one such
SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi) query. The same argument applies to B1 never making a SameKeypi(U, V, kid),
when it has made a query, NewKeypi(U, V ), which responded with kid. Therefore adver-
sary B will be query-respecting.
If we now assume that the event E does not occur, then in the composed game, some
session has accepted a key which violates on of the properties of the Match-security
property of the key exchange. Given the composed adversary C∗ that caused such an
event, one can trivially construct an adversary D against the GMatchke game.
This leads us to the following:
Pr [Exec( Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|E]− δpi
= Pr [Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) = 1]− δpi,
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and
Pr [Exec( Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|¬E]
= Pr
[
Exec(GMatchke ,D : kgke)(1η) = 1
]
≤ (1η),
and we can see that
Pr [ Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1]
= Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1 ∩ E]
+ Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1 ∩ ¬E]
= Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|E] · Pr [E]
+ Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|¬E] · Pr [¬E]
< Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|E]
+ Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1|¬E]
= Pr [Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) = 1]
+ Pr
[
Exec(GMatchke ,D : kgke)(1η) = 1
]
.
Step 3: Reducing to the primitive. Currently we have an adversary B = (B1,B2)
playing Gpi, where B1 writes keys to the input tape Gk-inpi . By construction the algorithm
B1 makes only NewKeypi, SameKeypi and Corruptpi queries to Gpi, whilst B2 makes all
other queries to Gpi as well as Corruptpi queries. It follows that B is a query-respecting
adversary according to Section 5.1.
Hence, by assumption, we are given a key-independent (δζ , δpi)-reduction from the
protocol to the primitive. Therefore there exists an adversary A = (A1,A2) playing Gζ ,
where A1 is constructed from B1 as defined in Section 5.1. We now have that
Pr [Exec(Gpi,B∗)(1η) = 1]− δpi ≤ Pr [Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) = 1]− δζ .
Step 4: Unfolding. We now show how to unfold the adversary A = (A1,A2), so
that the key exchange is no longer simulated within the adversary. Currently, we have
that A1 is constructed using B1, and in turn, B1 is constructed using C∗1 . We now look
at how to construct A′1 for the adversary A′ = (A′1,A2) playing the composed game
Gke;ζ , where A′1 is constructed using C∗1 directly, thus eliminating B1. This construction
is illustrated within Figure 5.3.
Let us now examine how A1 executes, and we construct A′1, so that an execution
of A and A′ will be identical. Let LkeysA′ be an initially empty list of triples of the form
(U, V, kidpi).
• If C∗1 makes any query NewKeyke or NewSessionke (we write Nameke for those) queries
to the key exchange:
• A1: B1 receives Nameke and internally simulates the key exchange game Gke. The
state of Gke is updated within B1 and the response (if applicable) is returned to C∗1 ,
which then updates its state as though it received the response from the real Gke
game.
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A1 talks to the primitivegame A′1
expects to talk to the protocol game talks to the composed primitive game
Figure 5.3: Construction showing what each adversary interacts with and which adver-
saries they run as a subroutine. We note that adversary B1 of the left picture internally
simulates the key exchange, while on the right picture this key exchange has been un-
folded from the adversary so that A′1 interacts with the composed primitive game.
• A′1: A′1 receives Nameke and forwards this to the real key exchange game Gke. The
response of Gke is received by A′1 and forwarded directly to C∗1 , which updates its
state exactly as it does within A1.
• If A1 (or A′1) receives control and state st from A2:
• A1: The state st is passed directly from A1 to B1. In turn B1 forwards st directly
to C∗1 and execution continues within C∗1 .
• A′1: The state st is passed directly to C∗1 and execution continues within C∗1 .
• If C∗1 outputs state and therefore control:
• A1: Control and state is passed from C∗1 to B1. Now B1 forwards this state directly
to A1, who in turn passes control and state on to A2 and execution continues within
A2.
• A′1: Control and state is passed from C∗1 to A′1. Now A′1 passes control and state to
A2 and execution continues within A2.
• If C∗1 executes kgke and writes k to the tape Gk-inke :
• A1: The tape Gk-inke is simulated within B1, so k is written to this and then used by
Gke, internally within B1.
• A′1: A′1 takes k and writes this onto the tape Gk-inke for the real game Gke. Essentially
this is a copy operation for A′1, and we notice that A′1 does not store any information
about k.
• If C∗1 outputs a Sendke(labelke,msg) query, then A1 forwards this message to the in-
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ternally simulated key exchange game Gke, and A∗1 forwards this message to the key
exchange game Gke being a subgame of the composed primitive game Gke;ζ . If the
corresponding session labelke of the key exchange does not turn its state into accepted,
answers from the key exchange game are relayed to C∗1 (either through D1 in the case
of A1, or directly in the case of A′1).
• If C∗1 outputs a Sendke(labelke,msg) query such that the corresponding session labelke of
the key exchange turns its state into accepted, B1 simulates internally, that the game
Gke writes to its output tape G
k-out
ke , then B1 undertakes certain actions that were
modified by transforming B1 into A1. We need to show that they are now identical to
what the composed game of key exchange and primitive would have done. This can
be verified by examining the two columns in Figure 5.4
• C∗1 issues a Revealke(labelke) query.
• A1: B∗1 receives this query and passes it to the internally simulated key exchange
game Gke. B∗1 relays the game’s answer to C∗1 . Furthermore, B∗1 performs a lookup
on the list LIdentifiers to find an entry (labelke, sid, kidpi). If such an entry exists, it
intends to send the query Corruptpi(kidpi) to the protocol game Gpi. A1 passes the
query Corruptζ(kidpi) to the primitive game which returns k
′. It follows that κ = k′,
and A1 returns κ to the adversary to B∗1 that relays κ to C∗1 .
• A′1 receives this query and passes it to the key exchange game. A′1 relays the game’s
answer to C∗1 . The composed game performs a lookup on the list LIdentifiers to find
and entry (labelke, sid, kidζ). If such a tuple exists, it sends the query Corruptζ(kidζ)
to the Gζ subgame which returns k
′. It follows that κ = k′ and Gke;ζ returns κ to
the A′1 that relays it to C∗1 .
• C∗1 issues a Corruptke query. We first describe the step for the non-forward secure
proof.
• A1: The query Corruptke(kidke) is received by B1 and passed to the internally simu-
lated game Gke which returns a key k. This key is passed back to C∗1 . Furthermore,
for all sessions (labelke, kidke, ∗, ∗, sid, accepted, κ, stkey) in LGke , B1 searches the list
LIdentifiers for tuples (labelke, sid, kidpi) and intends to send the query Corruptpi(kidpi)
to the protocol game Gpi. A1 then sends Corruptζ(kidpi) to the primitive game Gζ .
The answer of the primitive game is received by A1 who returns it to B1 that relays
it to C∗1 .
• A′1 receives the query Corruptke(kidke) and passes it to the composed game that
relays it to the subgame Gke which returns a key k. A′1 passes this key to the
C∗1 . Furthermore, for all sessions (labelke, kidke, ∗, ∗, sid, accepted, κ, stkey) in LGke , the
composed game searches the list LIdentifiers for tuples (labelke, sid, kidζ) and sends the
query Corruptζ(kidζ) to the primitive game Gζ . The answer of the subgame is relayed
to the A′1 that passes it to C∗1 .
• C∗1 issues a Corruptke query. We now detail this step for the forward secure proof.
• A1: The query Corruptke(kid) is received by B1 and passed to the internally simulated
game Gke which returns a key k. This key is passed back to C∗1 .
• A′1 receives the query Corruptke(kid) and passes it to the composed game that relays
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it to the subgame Gke which returns a key k. A′1 passes this key to the C∗1 .
It follows from the above descriptions that if the random bits used by the internally
simulated game Gke and the key exchange subgame Gke of the composed game (Gke, Gζ)
are the same and the randomness used by the adversaries A and A′ in particular steps
is also equal, and if the random bits used by the game Gζ and by the subgame Gζ of
the composed game (Gke, Gζ) are equal then an execution of A or A′ will result in the
same keys being written to the Gk-inζ tape of Gζ in either case so that C∗1 in both cases
receives and returns the same state and queries (if also C∗1 is used with the same random
bits in both cases. Therefore we have
Pr [Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) = 1] = Pr
[
Exec(Gke;ζ ,A′)(1η) = 1
]
.
Diagrammatically we see A interacting with Gke;ζ in Figure 5.5.
Step 5: Conversion to key-benign adversary. The final step requires us to
convert A′ = (A′1,A2) playing Gke;ζ into a key-benign adversary A∗ = (A∗1,A∗2) playing
the composed game Gke;ζ . Remember that this means that almost all functionality of
A′ is moved into A∗2, while A∗1 will be bound to run the key generation algorithm of the
key exchange, to write long-term keys to the input tape of the key exchange game and
to pass the key identifiers to A∗2. Algorithm A∗2 decides when such an action shall take
place.
Presently we have A′1 constructed using C∗1 . Moreover C∗ was constructed based
upon C, and therefore A′1 was constructed from C; where C is the key-benign adversary
against Gke;pi.
Pictorically, our goal is illustrated in Figure 5.6. On the left side, you see the current
situation while on the right side, you see the goal of the transformation we are going to
undertake.
We now examine the interaction between C1 and C2. Adversary C is a key-benign
adversary. Hence, setting A∗1 := C1, the first part of A∗ is already well-formed. We now
need to define A∗2 in such a way that the only messages sent by A∗2 to A∗1 are of the form
NewKey(U, V ) or SameKey(U, V , kid).
We define A∗2 as follows: A∗2 equals A′ except that whenever within A′, C2 sends a
message to C1, this message is not sent to the internal copy of C1 but instead, A∗2 relays
it to A∗1 = C1 which acts as described. Its answer is returned to C2.
Now, A∗ is a key-benign adversary because the communication between A∗1 and
A∗2 equals the communication of C1 and C2. Furthermore, the inputs provided by the
adversary A∗ to the game (Gke, Gζ) are identical to those provided by A′. Thus, the
success probability does not change.
Therefore A∗ is a key-benign adversary such that
Pr [Exec( Gke;ζ ,A′)(1η) = 1
]
= Pr [Exec(Gke;ζ ,A∗ : kgke)(1η) = 1] .
Finally, given that the composition (ke; ζ) is (forward-secret) δζ-secure we have that
Pr[Exec(Gke;ζ ,A∗ : kgke)(1η) = 1]− δζ ≤ (1η).
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The above leads to
Pr [ Exec(Gke;pi, C : kgke) = 1]− δpi
= Pr [Exec(Gke;pi, C∗)(1η) = 1]− δpi
< Pr [Exec(Gpi,B)(1η) = 1]− δpi
+ Pr
[
Exec(GMatchke ,D : kgke)(1η) = 1
]
≤ Pr [Exec(Gζ ,A)(1η) = 1]− δζ
+ Pr
[








Exec(GMatchke ,D : kgke)(1η) = 1
]
= Pr [Exec(Gke;ζ ,A∗ : kgke)(1η) = 1]− δζ
+ Pr
[
Exec(GMatchke ,D : kgke)(1η) = 1
]
≤ (1η),
and hence the composition (ke;pi) is (forward-secret) δpi-secure.
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A1: If C∗1 issues a Sendke(labelke,msg)
query such that the session labelke
of the key exchange (internally
simulated within B1) accepts,
i.e. when session labelke receives
query Sendke(labelke,msg) and changes
the value stexec to accepted in the tuple
(labelke, kidke, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey)
stored in list LGke , then the key
exchange game writes (sid, κ) to its
output tape and sends the message
accepted which B1 relays to C∗1 .
A1 searches the list LGke for tuples
(label′ke, kidke, V, U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey).
If no such tuple exists, B1 intends to
write the key κ on the input tape of the
protocol game Gpi - and A1 writes κ to
the input tape of primitive game Gζ .
B1 intends to query NewKeypi(U, V ) to
the protocol game - and A1 queries
NewKeyζ() to the primitive game which
returns a key identifier kidζ that A1
passes as the expected kidpi to B1. B1
stores the triple (labelke, sid, kidζ) in list
LIdentifiers and passes kidζ to C∗1 .
Else, if in list LGke there exists a tuple
(label′, kidke, V, U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey),
B1 searches the list LIdentifiers for a
triple (label, sid, kidpi) and intends to
issue the query SameKeypi(V,U, kidpi)
to the protocol game Gpi. A1 then
searches LkeysA for a tuple (V,U, kid).
If there is such a tuple, A1 adds the
tuple (U, V, kid) to LkeysA and returns
kid to B1 which passes it to C∗1 .
A′1: If C∗1 issues a Sendke(labelke,msg)
query that is relayed by A′1 to the
composed game Gke;ζ and makes the
session labelke of the key exchange ac-
cept, i.e. session labelke receives query
Sendke(labelke,msg) query and changes
the value stexec to accepted in the tuple
(labelke, kidke, U, V, sid, stexec, κ, stkey)
stored in list LGke , then the key
exchange game writes (sid, κ) to
its output tape and sends the
message accepted which A′1 re-
lays to C∗1 . The composed game
searches the list LGke for tuples
(label′ke, kidke, V, U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey).
If no such tuple exists, the composed
game writes the key κ on the in-
put tape of the primitive game Gζ .
The composed game then sends query
NewKeyζ() to the primitive game which
returns a key identifier kidζ that A1
passes as the expected kidpi to C∗1 . The
game stores the triple (labelke, sid, kidζ)
in list LIdentifiers.
Else, if in list LGke there exists a tuple
(label′, kidke, V, U, sid, accepted, κ, stkey),
the composed game does not write key
κ to the input tape of the primitive
game. A′1 then searches LkeysA′ for a
tuple (V,U, kid). If there is such a
tuple, A′1 adds the tuple (U, V, kid) to
LkeysA′ and returns kid to C∗1 .
Figure 5.4: Transformation from A1 into A′1










































oo // ζoo A∗2 C2 // A2oo
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// ζoo
Figure 5.6: The left side shows the construction of A′ interacting with the composed
gameGke;ζ . The right side shows the construction of the key-benign adversaryA∗ playing
the Gke;ζ composed game. Notice that only key identifiers are passed from A∗1 to A∗2,
and excluding the NewKey queries, A∗2 makes all queries to the composed game Gke;ζ .
Chapter 6
On the Security of TLS
We now sketch how we use the theorem above to prove that the composition of the TLS
handshake protocol (which implements a key-exchange) with one particular instantiation
of the TLS record layer protocol (which implements a secure channel).
The record layer protocol implements a secure channel with multiple security guar-
antees among which we are mainly concerned with privacy of messages, length hiding,
and authentication of messages. The implementation essentially encrypts the payload
together with a sequence number via a Length Hiding Authenticated Encryption (LHAE)
scheme. TLS offers multiple choices for the implementation of each of the two compo-
nents.
In TLS, the last message of the handshake protocol, i.e. the FINISHED message acting
as a key confirmation, is already sent over the record layer and hence the handshake
actually uses the keys later employed by the record layer. In practice, this does not
create a problem with message authentication (e.g. the FINISHED message cannot be
replayed) due to the use of appropriately initialized sequence numbers. The sequence
number is encrypted together with the payload to prevent replay attack and out-of-order
delivery, and to allow the receiver to distinguish protocol messages from the FINISHED
message. So, although the derived keys are not indistinguishable from random ones in
the end of the TLS handshake, it appears that they can be safely used for the record
layer.
TLS falls within the setting where our composition theorem applies and its security
follows from three steps: a) the handshake satisfies the Match property, b) the key
exchange is suitable for a (variant of) LHAE encryption scheme, and c) the security of
the record layer reduces to (that variant of) the encryption scheme via a key-independent
reduction.
The benefits of this modular approach should be clear. To analyze TLS for a different
instantiation of the key exchange one needs to show that the variant of key exchange
is good for the LHAE scheme (this step is inevitable no matter what approach one
takes) and that the record layer indeed employs an LHAE scheme. Thus, our approach
allows reusing step c) across different implementations (there is no need to repeat this
step for a different implementation of the handshake part). In contrast a monolithic
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analysis would have to repeat the reduction argument for each possible instantiation
(key-exchange, record layer). Of course, one can hand-wavingly appeal to the (inevitable)
similarities between the corresponding proofs, but our rigorous approach is obviously
cleaner. Finally, for the record layer protocol one can concentrate the analysis on the
underlying encryption scheme and ignore the difficulties associated with statefulness,
sequence numbers, etc which are delt with once and for all. We do precisely that when
we rely on the result of [PRS11] which proves that one particular implementation for
the record protocol is LHAE.
6.1 Protocol description
In the TLS handshake protocol, the parties agree on application keys for the secure
channel protocol, called record layer. Firstly, they derive a so-called pre-master secret via
a key transport (KT) protocol or via a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. A transformation
of the pre-master secret then yields the so-called master secret, which, in turn, is used
to compute the application keys. Note that each party holds two application keys: one
is used for sending and one for receiving messages. Finally, the parties engage in a key
confirmation step, the FINISHED messages. As explained earlier the use of the application
keys in the FINISHED messages violates key indistinguishability and renders an analysis
in the BR-model impossible.
The protocol description in Figure 6.1 provides an overview on the TLS handshake
protocol. Depending on whether one opts for computing the pre-master secret via Diffie-
Hellman (DH) or via key transport (KT), one either skips all steps with label “(KT)” or
all steps labeled “(DH)”. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange yields a forward-secure pro-
tocol, while the key transport protocol only provides a non-forward secure key exchange.
We refrain from allowing parties and/or adversaries to decide on the fly the pre-master
secret computation mode, as this involves a rather complicated mixed models overhead.
Strictly speaking, our analysis only holds for concurrently running protocol executions
that always derive the pre-master secret in the same way and those executions in which
client authentication is performed.
Note that we abstract out the concrete header information for encryption resp. au-
thentication, as well as the type of cipher used etc. Our result applies to all implemen-
tations of the record layer, current ones or even future ones for which one can show
LHAE security. In such a case, the protocol specifies the header, but the encryption
primitive even remains secure when queried on non-well-formed headers (it might reject
those headers, though). Note that Paterson et al. [PRS11] proved the LHAE security
of the record layer encryption scheme according to the current TLS standard when the
cipher is used in CBC mode.
The use of the term “header” is sometimes ambiguous. In particular, we have to
distinguish between the string H, which is an input to the encryption scheme with
authenticated data, and the header for packages in the TLS protocol. In particular,
H = n|H1|H2, where n is a locally maintained sequence number (i.e., which is not
transmitted but each party keeps track itself), H1 is further locally maintained header
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information, and H2 is the part of the header that appears in the beginning of a TLS
record protocol package. The only property of the header that we use is that the position
of the sequence number in H1 is uniquely defined, we denote this by n|H1.
client (Alice) server (Bob)
1. rc ← {0, 1}t
rc||IDc−−−−→
2.
rs||IDs←−−−− rs ← {0, 1}t





2c. (p, q, g)← Params(1t)
b← Zq , Ys := gb
h1 ← RO(rc||rs||p||g||Ys), Ver(pks;h1) = 1 ?
(p,q,g,Ys,σs)←−−−−−−− h1 ← RO(rc||rs||p||g||Ys), σs ← Sig(sks, h1)
3.
CertCA(pkc||IDc)−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ver(pkCA,CertCA(pkc||IDc)) = 1 ?
4a. a← Zq , Yc := ga
Yc−→




7. (κc, κs) (κc, κs)
8. h2 := RO(Transcript), σc ← Sig(skc;h2)
σc−→ h2 := RO(Transcript), Ver(pkc;h2, σc) = 1 ?
9.
“ChangeCipherSpec”−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
h3 := RO(Transcript), τ1 ← Macmaster(h3), h3 := RO(Transcript)
Fc ← LHEnc(κc; `, 0|Hc1 |Hc2 , τ1)
Hc2 ,Fc−−−−→ τ1 ← LHDec(κc;Fc), Ver(master;h3, τ1) = 1 ?
“ChangeCipherSpec”←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
h4 := RO(Transcript) h4 := RO(Transcript), τ2 ← Mac(master;h4),
τ2 ← LHDec(κs;Fs), Ver(master;h4, τ2) = 1 ?
Hs2 ,Fs←−−−− Fs ← LHEnc(κs; `, 0|Hs1 |Hs2 , τ2)
Figure 6.1: TLS protocol with pre-master computation being either DH or KT. The
numbered stages refer to 1. Client Hello, 2. Server Hello, 2a. Certificate Transfer,
2b. Certificate request, 2c. Server Key Exchange (DH), 3. Certificate Transfer, 4a.
Client Key Exchange (DH), 4b. Client Key Exchange (KT), 5. Derivation of pre-master
secret, 6. Derivation of master secret, 7. Derivation of application keys, 8. Client
Authentication, 9. Finished Messages
The participants derive the pre-master secret, the master secret and the application
keys as follows: in the key transport case, the client chooses the pre-master secret
premaster and sends an encryption of it to the server. In the Diffie-Hellman case, the
parties run an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key agreement to establish the pre-master secret
premaster. In both cases, both derive the master secret via a key derivation function RO
(which we model as a random oracle below, hence the name) as
master := RO(premaster, “master secret”, rc, rs).
Afterwards, they query the random oracle as follows:
key block := RO(master, “key expansion”, rs, rc)
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They cut key block into four pieces key block1,...,key block4 of equal length and query
the random oracle to compute the following keys µc and µs for message authentication
and c, s for encryption:
• µc := RO(key block1, “client-write-MAC-secret”, rc, rs),
• µs := RO(key block2, “server-write-MAC-secret”, rc, rs),
• c := RO(key block3, “client-write-key”, rc, rs),
• s := RO(key block4, “server-write-key”, rc, rs),
They set κs := (s, µs) and κc := (c, µc) and return (κc, κs) as the application keys.
The keys output by the key exchange protocol then consist of (κc, κs). As session identi-
fiers, we define the pair (rc||IDc, rs||IDs, premaster) and show that with these, the TLS
protocol satisfies Match security.
6.2 Match security
In this section, we show the first of the three cornerstones in our analysis of the TLS
protocol.
Theorem 4 (Match Security of TLS). The TLS Handshake protocol satisfies Match
security.
Proof. If both parties derive the same sid = (rc||IDc, rs||IDs, premaster), then the first
condition of Match security is trivial. For the second condition, we observe that starting
from the parameters (rc, rs, premaster), key generation is deterministic and thus both
parties derive the same master secret and application keys whenever they have the same
sid.
We now turn to the security models that we use for the TLS primitive and the TLS
channel security.
6.3 Length-Hiding-Authenticated Encryption Models
Paterson et al. [PRS11] recently proved that the TLS record protocol meets a notion
called length-hiding authenticated encryption (LHAE). This notion says that an adver-
sary cannot distinguish, in the usual left-or-right sense, between encryptions of messages
which are not necessarily of the same length. In addition, the adversary is unable to
generate new ciphertexts for which the decryption algorithm does not return an error
message. Both properties are combined into a single game, in which the adversary gets
access to an left-or-right encryption oracle (with secret key K and bit b) which for input
(`,H,M0,M1), the length parameter `, the header data H and two messages M0,M1,
computes C0 ← LHEncK(`,H,M0), C1 ← LHEncK(`,H,M1), and returns Cb if both
C0, C1 6= ⊥, and ⊥ else. If it returns a ciphertext, it adds the pair (H,C) to the initially
empty list LEnc. The decryption oracle, when called about H,C, rejects if b = 0 or
(H,C) is in LEnc, i.e. comes from a previous query to the left-or-right oracle. Else, it
returns LHDecK(H,C).
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Definition 31 (LHAE security). We say that the LHAE-scheme (KeyGen, LHEnc, LHDec)
is 12 -secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the probability that the
game GLHAE outputs 1 is at most negligibly greater than
1
2 . This probability is taken
over all random bits of the game, of the key generation algorithm and of the adversary.
Note that unlike in our definition, the decryption oracle in Paterson et al. [PRS11]
rejects all previously returned ciphertexts C and not only previous header-ciphertext
pairs (C,H). However, they prove that TLS also satisfies this notion of ciphertext
integrity. And as both security notions use the same oracles, the results compose and
show the security of the TLS primitive in the above game.
We now define a multi-session version of the above game as the TLS primitive game.
One further modification is that pairs of the form (0|H1|H2, C) never count as successful
forgeries, although they might be “fresh”. Whenever a new key is initiated with ses-
sion identifier kid, the TLS primitive game runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen
which returns two random strings (κc, κs). Moreover, it flips two random coins b
c
kid and
bskid, one for the client and one for the sever in that session, and initiates the two lists
LEnc(kid, s) := ∅, and LEnc(kid, c) := ∅. Upon a query NewKey(U, V ), besides the actions
mentioned in Section 3.1 for the primitive game, there are several queries allowed to the
adversary given below. Let u ∈ {c, s}:
• LHEnc(kid, u, `, n|H1|H2,m0,m1):
Run Cb ← LHEncκu(`, n|H1|H2,mb) and return Cb, if Cb 6= ⊥ and ⊥ 6= C1−b ←
LHEncκu(`, n|H1|H2,m1−b). Set LEnc(kid, u) := LEnc(kid, u) ∪ {(H,Cb)}.
• LHDec(kid, u, n|H1|H2, C):
If (n|H1|H2, C) ∈ LEnc(kid, u) return ⊥, else run m ← LHDecκu(n|H1|H2, C). If
now b = 1 or n = 0, return m. Else, return ⊥.
• Target(kid, u, b):
If b = bukid and stkid is not corrupted, return 1. Else, return 0.
Definition 32 (TLS Primitive Game). We say that the TLS primitive (KeyGen, LHEnc, LHDec)
is 12 -secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the probability that the
game GTLS-Prim outputs 1 is at most negligibly greater than
1
2 . This probability is taken
over all random bits of the game, of the key generation algorithm and of the adversary.
Note that the games above do not touch the issues of replay attacks, package re-
ordering, package dropping, etc. and do thus do not provide a secure channel per se.
Similarly, the stateful version of such games, such as the one proposed in [JKSS12] which
is attributed to [PRS11], appears to be even closer to the properties one would expect
from a secure channel, but it still does not seem to capture the aforementioned properties.
Moreover, the definition in [JKSS12] seems to assume that sender and receiver share
counters, as their decryption oracle uses the counter value i from the encryption step.
While counters are a common mean to build secure channels we believe they should not
be part of the security definition.
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We nonetheless rely on their definition of stateful LHAE. Starting from the LHAE
primitive we next define an LHAE-channel game, equally as a multi-session-game. Each
session involves two users, say a client and a server, and a channel in each direction. Each
direction is indexed by the server or the client and consists of a sending and a receiving
oracle. For both, the server and the client key, u ∈ {c, s}, the game relies on a queue
Q(kid, u) with two methods, Enqueue(C) and Dequeue(), with the usual semantics that
Enqueue(C) puts an element into the data structure, and Dequeue returns an element
(or ⊥, if empty). We assume the usual first-in first-out behavior of Q. For sake of
distinction we refer to the two oracles to which the adversary in the game has access, as
the sender sender(kid, u) and the receiver receiver(kid, u), respectively.
Both oracles are initialized by a generation algorithm KeyGen with the symmetric
key κu and some fixed initial state st0. The sender oracle also holds a random secret
bit b. If called on `,m0,m1, then, assuming it is in state st






1 ) ← SendK(`,m1; stsender), and returns Cb and sets
stsender ← stsenderb , if both encryptions succeed; in this case it also calls Q(kid, u).
Enqueue(Cb). Else it merely returns ⊥. The receiver oracle, if called about some C,
first runs (m, streceiver∗ ) ← Receiveκu(C; streceiver). It then returns ⊥, unless b = 1 and
Q.Dequeue() 6= C, in which case it returns M . As a multi-session game, we also allow
a query Target(kid, u, d), where the game returns 1 if and only if b = d, and the session
kid is uncorrupted.
Definition 33 (TLS Channel). We say that the TLS Channel (KeyGen,Send,Receive)
is 12 -secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the probability that the
game outputs 1 is at most negligibly greater than 12 . This probability is taken over all
random bits of the game, of the key generation algorithm and of the adversary.
6.4 The Key Exchange is Suitable for the Primitive
In this section, we prove that the TLS Handshake is suitable the TLS primitive according
to Definition 32.
Theorem 5 (Suitability for Primitive). The TLS Handshake protocol is (GTLS-Prim,
1
2)-
suitable for the TLS primitive (KeyGen, LHEnc, LHDec) if
• the encryption scheme used in the Record Layer is LHAE-secure,
• the certification authority uses an UNF-CMA signature scheme1 ,
• the signature scheme for the pre-master-secret phase is UNF-CMA,
• the Diffie-Hellmann assumption holds resp. the key transport encryption scheme is
IND-CCA,
• the MAC scheme for the FINISHED message is UNF-CMA, and
1More abstractly, any kind of UNF-CMA certification scheme would work, but we stick to signature-
based certificates for sake of simplicity.
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• the deployed hash function is modeled via a random oracle.
Proof. We say that (label1, kidU , kidV , U, V, sid1, stexec1, κ1, stkey1) is temporarily part-
nered with (label2, kidV , kidU , V,U, sid2, stexec2, κ2, stkey2), if the transcripts of these ses-
sions contain the same pair of nonces. With overwhelming probability, at any point in
the protocol (after the hello messages), each session has at most one partner session of
this form.
The proof consists of several game hops. We define games 0 to 6 as follows.
• Game 0: The original game.
• Game 1: The parties execute step 8 of the protocol before step 5, i.e., the client
sends his certificate verify message before deriving the keys, and the server verifies
the signature, before deriving the keys. Moreover, the game aborts and returns 1,
whenever there is a random oracle collision amongst all queries asked to it by the
game and the adversary. Moreover, the game aborts with output 1, if a user chooses
the same random string for the hello message more than once.
• Game 2: Let n be an upper bound on the number of NewSession queries that A asks.
Game 1 draws a random number k between 1 and n. Let (label, kidU , kidV , U, V, sid,
stexec, (κc, κs), stkey) be the k’th session of the protocol. Throughout the execution of
the game, the game checks whether one of the following events occurs (we distinguish
between the key-exchange implemented with DH exchange or via key-transport): a)
Key Transport: The keys corresponding to kidV or kidU are corrupted and b) DH:
kidV or kidU is corrupted before session label accepts. As soon as one of these events
occurs, the game aborts and returns a uniformly distributed bit.
• U computes a key in session label which accepts, and this key is revealed in the Gke
subgame or corrupted in the Gζ subgame.
• U sends a Finished message in session label, and upon receiving this message, a
session label′ of V accepts its key, and this key is revealed in Gke or corrupted in Gζ .
• The final output of the adversary contains as key identifier a value kid′ that does
not correspond to the key which is output of session label, respectively, session label
did not accept.
• Game 3: the game aborts when one session accepts a certificate that is for a different
key than the one that belongs to the partner.
• Game 4: the game aborts, when label and label′ compute different pre-master secrets,
but label and label′ accept the key nevertheless.
• Game 5: the master secrets for session label and its partner are replaced with uniformly
random keys.
• Game 6: the application keys session label and its partner are replaced with uniformly
random keys.
It remains to transform any successful adversary A against game 6 into a successful
adversary B against the LHAE game GLHAE. For all sessions except for label and its
temporal partner label′, the adversary B simulates game 6 as described. For label and
label′, it proceeds as follows: the adversary B flips a random bit to decide, whether it
uses GLHAE for the encryption under the server’s sending key or the client’s sending key.
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For ease of presentation, say, that it chooses the server’s sending key. Then, B modifies
the server’s FINISHED message as follows: it submits (`, 0|Hs1 |Hs, τ2) to the encryption
oracle of GLHAE and returns the output as the FINISHED message. To simulate the client
when receiving this message, the adversary B accepts, if the message was transmitted
in an unmodified way, and else, submits the modified message to the decryption oracle
of GLHAE. It rejects, whenever GLHAE rejects, and else uses the decrypted value to
check whether this is a valid MAC under the master secret. For any further query of
the adversary A for the server’s sending key, B relays the respective queries and answers
between A and GLHAE. Whenever an abort occurs in game 6, B returns a random bit.
Analysis. We first analyze the game hops and then show that if A has non-negligible
advantage, then so has B.
• Game 0 to game 1: as key derivation does not trigger any output in the game, the order
of the computation does not change the game’s interaction with the adversary. The
probability of random oracle collisions is negligible, and so is the collision probability
amongst random strings of a user.
• Game 1 to game 2: Let A be an adversary playing game 1. Let p0 := 12 +p, with p > 0,
be the probability of A winning game 1. Let n be an upper bound on the number of
NewSession queries made by A. The game guesses kid correctly with probability at
least 1n , and in this case, the adversary A wins with probability at least 12 +p, because if
the adversary wins, then the session accepted and is uncorrupted. Else, the adversary














• Game 2 to Game 3: the event that one accepts a certificate for another key than the
partner’s key is negligible, as the authority’s signature scheme is unforgeable.
• Game 3 to Game 4: we have to bound the probability that they accept although they
derive different keys. As key derivation is deterministic, it suffices to show that if they
accept, they derived the same pre-master secret with overwhelming probability. In
the following, we assume that the random oracle is collision-free amongst all queries
queried by the game and the adversary, and that random nonces never occur twice.
Let us consider the Diffie-Hellman-case first. As random nonces do not occur twice
and as the random oracle is collision-free, the adversary either transfers the Diffie
Hellman parameters of the server correctly, or modifies the Diffie Hellman param-
eters to (p∗, g∗, Y ∗s ) and sends a signature over a random oracle value of the form
RO(rc||rs||p∗, g∗, Y ∗s ). However, the server never issued such a signature by unique-
ness of the nonce rs. Thus, if the adversary had non-negligible probability in creating
a valid signature over modified parameters, we could break the unforgeability of the
underlying signature scheme. Similar reasoning, applied to the Client Authentication
message and the earlier Diffie–Hellman flows, assures that the client’s parameter Yc
is correctly transmitted. Thus, if both parties accept the Verify messages then with
overwhelming probability, both parties hold the same parameters (p, g, Ys, Yc) and thus
derive the same pre-master secret.
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For the key transport case, it suffices to argue that the ciphertext C is correctly
transmitted from the client to the server. Again, the uniqueness of the nonce rc
together with collision-freeness of the random oracle, and the unforgeability of the
client’s signature scheme guarantee that, if the server accepts, then the adversary has
modified the ciphertext C only with negligible probability.
• Game 4 to Game 5: It suffices to show that the adversary does not query the random
oracle on the value of the pre-master secret of session label. If so, the value of the
master secret is statistically hidden from the adversary. Note that in this case, the
modification does not affect other sessions, even if they happen to derive the same pre-
master secret as the random oracle is queried on (premaster, “master secret′′, rc, rs) and
the pair of randomnesses never occurs twice.
Diffie-Hellman Case. If an adversary A queries the random oracle on the pre-
master secret with non-negligible probability, we can break the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) assumption (see Section 2) as follows. The adversary B against CDH
gets (p, q, g, ga, gb) from the challenger and has to output a guess for gab. The adversary
B simulates Game 4 with one modification. Let n be an upper bound on the sessions
that A invokes. Then, B guesses a random value i between 1 and n embeds the
parameters in the ith session and skips the pre-master derivation step for this session
by directly choosing a random value for the master secret. Moreover, let q be an upper
bound on A’s random oracle queries. Then, B chooses a random value k between 1
and q and returns a prefix of the kth query of A to its oracle as a guess for gab, where
the length of the prefix is the length of the pre-master secret.
For the analysis note that, before the adversaryA queries (gab, “mastersecret′′, rc, rs)
to the random oracle, the simulation is perfect. Thus, if p(λ) is the probability that A
queries the pre-master secret, i.e., queries (gab, “mastersecret′′, rc, rs), to the random
oracle, then B’s success probability in correctly determining gab is at least pqn .
Key Transport Case. An analog analysis applies to the key transport case. Here,
the security is reduced to the IND-CCA2-security of the encryption scheme. Let A
be an adversary that queries the random oracle on the pre-master secret with non-
negligible probability, let n be an upper bound on the number of users that he initiates
and s be an upper bound on the number of sessions of this user. The adversary B
simulates game 4 with one modification. It picks a random user to embeds the public
key, and a random session i of this user to embed the challenge ciphertext, i.e., the
adversary B draws two random strings premaster0 and premaster1 and send them to
its encryption oracle to receive a ciphertext C that it embeds in session i. It skips
the pre-master derivation step for this session by directly choosing a random value
for the master secret. Moreover, let q be an upper bound on A’s random oracle
queries. Then, B chooses a random value k between 1 and q and returns a prefix of
the kth query of A to its oracle as a guess for premaster, where the length of the prefix
is the length of the pre-master secret. Moreover, all other sessions of this user are
handled by using the decryption oracle - unless the same ciphertext occurs again, in
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which case the adversary B also picks the master secret for these sessions at random.
Note that these values are chosen independently, as the random oracle is queried on
(premasterb, “mastersecret
′′, rc, rs), and collisions amongst nonces do not occur. If in
any of the adversary’s queries, the value (premasterb, “mastersecret
′′, rc, rs) is queried
to the random oracle, then B returns b as its output. Else, it returns a random bit b.
For the analysis, note again that, before the adversary A queries (premasterb,
“mastersecret′′, rc, rs) to the random oracle, the simulation is perfect. Thus, if p(λ) is
the probability thatA queries the pre-master secret, i.e. (premasterb, “mastersecret′′, rc, rs),
to the random oracle, then B’s success probability in correctly determining b is at least
p
sn minus the negligible probability, that by coincidence, A queries about the (statis-
tically hidden) value premaster1−b.
• Game 5 to Game 6: As before, it suffices to show that with overwhelming probability,
the adversary does not query the random oracle on the master secret (more precisely,
about (master||“key expansion”||rs||rc)). Let A be an adversary which queries the
random oracle on the master secret with non-negligible probability. Then, we construct
an adversary B against the UNF-CMA property of the underlying Mac. Let n be an
upper bound on the number of sessions that A initiates. The adversary B simulates
game 4 with one modification. It draws a random number i between 1 and n. In the
ith session, instead of querying the random oracle on the master secret, it picks two
random values for the application keys. To compute the Mac values in the Finished
messages, the adversary B queries the Mac oracle. Let q be an upper bound on the
queries that A makes. Then, B draws a random number k between 1 and q and does
the following for A’s kth query to the random oracle. It uses a prefix of the length of
the master secret and computes a Mac of a fresh message. It submits the Mac and the
message to the unforgeability game.
Analysis Unless the adversary queries the random oracle on the master secret re-
spectively on (master, “keyexpansion”, rc, rs), the simulation is perfect. Thus, if p(λ)
is A’s probability in querying the master secret to the random oracle, then B’s success
probability is at least pqn minus the negligible correctness error of the Mac scheme.
We now prove that if A is a successful adversary against game 6, then the adversary
B that we constructed, is a successful adversary against GLHAE. If A never makes any
fresh query of the form (0|H1|H2, C) such that the decryption algorithm does not reject,
then the simulation is perfect. It thus suffices to bound this probability. Assume that
A had non-negligible probability p in making successful fresh decryption queries of the
form (0|H1|H2, C). Then, we can use A as a distinguisher against GLHAE by outputting
1, whenever GLHAE accepts such a query and by outputting 0, else. Then, we win GLHAE
with probability 12 · p+ 12 · 1.
6.5 Key-Independent Reduction
In this section, we prove that the security of the TLS Record Layer Protocol reduces
to the security of the TLS primitive. We now describe how to build the TLS channel
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algorithms (KeyGen, Send,Receive) from the TLS Primitive. As mentioned before, we
work with an abstracted version of headers etc. and thereby cover all implementations
that could be shown LHAE-secure and that use counters in the way described below.
To this end, let Header be a stateful, public algorithm that on input a message, a length
parameter ` and a sequence number n returns a header n|H1|H2 with sequence number
n and similarly for ReceivingHeader, which only returns the locally stored part n|H1 of
the header.
Algorithm KeyGen initializes the states for Header and ReceivingHeader, and initializes
two counter values cnts and cntc by 0. It then draws two random keys (κc, κs) for the
LHEnc scheme and initializes the states of boths senders and both receivers. The Send
algorithm runs the algorithm Header the message, the parameter ` and the counter
cntu to yiel n|H1|H2. Then, the Send algorithms runs LHEncκu(`, n|H1|H2,m) that
returns a ciphertext C or ⊥. If C 6= ⊥, then Send increments its counter cntu by 1 and
returns (C,H2) as the channel message. The Receive algorithm on input (C,H2) runs
ReceivingHeader to return a header n|H1. Receive then runs LHDecκu(n|H1|H2, C) that
returns a message m and an updated state. If m 6= ⊥, then cntu is incremented by 1.
When initializing the states, the KeyGen algorithm chooses an appropriate value ` and
sends the message 0 on both channels and receives the message on both channels. This
increments all counters to 1. Note that neither Header nor ReceivingHeader requires any
secret information at any point.
Theorem 6 (Protocol reduces to Primitive). There is a key-independent reduction from
the security of the TLS Record Layer as a TLS-channel to the security of the TLS
Primitive according to the TLS Primitive Game.
Proof. Let A be a successful adversary against the TLS-channel, then we construct B
as follows: for all (kid, u) with u ∈ {c, s}, the adversary B stores the public information
for the header algorithm with the counter initially set to 0. It then sends the message 0
on both channels and receives the message on both channels.
For all send queries (kid, u,m0,m1, `) that A sends, B generates the header n|H1|H2
using the public header algorithm and queries (kid, u, n|H1|H2,m0,m1, `) to the LHEnc
oracle. If the encryption oracle returns a ciphertext C, then B passes (H2, C) to A and
increments n by 1. Else, B returns ⊥ to A and does not increment the counter. For any
decryption query (kid, u, C,H2), the adversary B generates n|H1 using ReceivingHeader
and queries (kid, u, n|H1|H2, C) to the LHDec oracle. If the answer is not ⊥, it increments
the counter by 1 and returns the answer. Else, it leaves the sequence number unchanged
and returns ⊥. In the end of the game, B relates A’s Target query.
Analysis. To see that the distributions in both games are equal and thus the winning
probabilities, we only have to argue that whenever A submits a ciphertext C|H2 to the
Receive oracle such that the latter does not return⊥, then the tuple (kid, u, n|H1|H2, C) is
also “fresh” for the LHDec oracle. Firstly, n ≤ 1. Moreover, C was not output by LHEnc
as the nth query (as else, the game would have rejected it). Thus, (n|H1|H2, C) 6= (H,C)
for all previously queried (H,C). The analysis for the freshness condition applies to all
key distributions, and thus, the reduction is key-independent.




In the previous chapter, we saw that the security of the TLS Handshake protocol is based
on the Diffie-Hellman assumption respectively on the CCA2-security of an encryption
scheme that is used for key transport. As a scheme is only as secure as the underlying
problem is hard, an entire area of the foundations of cryptography targets at building
cryptographic schemes from the weakest assumptions possible. To understand the dif-
ferent nature of cryptographic assumptions, let us consider the following three candidate
assumptions:
(i) NP 6= P,
(ii) the existence of one-way functions,
(iii) the Diffie-Hellman assumption.
As the Diffie-Hellman assumption implies one-way functions, and as one-way functions
imply hard problems in NP, it would be most desirable to base a cryptographic scheme
merely on the assumption that NP does not equal P. However, there are substantial
problems in doing so, e.g., that hardness of NP is a worst-case assumption, while cryp-
tography requires average-case hardness. Given the choice between a general assumption
such as the existence of one-way functions and a more specific assumption such as the
Diffie-Hellman assumption, there are three advantages in building cryptography from
general one-way functions: firstly, the construction is more general, i.e., the deployed
one-way function can be realized via some Diffie-Hellman-type assumption, via lattice-
assumptions, codes or even new assumptions that are yet to be discovered. Secondly,
the assumption that one-way functions exist is weaker and probably even strictly weaker
than the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, the existence of one-way functions can be
considered as a cryptographic average-case analog of the NP versus P question, i.e.,
not only do we need hard NP-instances, but also, we want to sample them efficiently
together with a solution, that is, we want to generate an instance which is easy for
ourselves, but difficult for everybody else.
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Looking at one-way functions in this way, one might not be surprised that most of
cryptography, if not all of it, implies one-way functions [IL89]. Maybe more surpris-
ingly, one-way functions are not only a necessary but also a sufficient assumption for
many cryptographic tasks. The set of cryptographic primitives that are existentially
equivalent to one-way funcstions are usually refered to as “Minicrypt” [Imp95] and in-
clude, e.g., symmetric-key encryption, message authentication codes and even signature
schemes [Rom90]. Overall, the existence of one-way functions can be considered the
most foundational question in cryptography, similar to the NP versus P question in
complexity theory. Noteworthy, the non-existence of one-way functions would bury the
entire area of cryptography.
Despite the importance of the question, we still know very little about one-way
functions. In particular, after several decades of research in complexity theory, our
confidence that NP 6= P is much higher than our belief in the existence of one-way
functions. Thus, the holy grail in the area of the foundations of cryptography is to
answer the following question:
Can we base one-way functions on the mere assumption that NP 6= P?
Giving a positive answer to this question would constitute a major breakthrough in
our understanding of cryptography—giving a negative answer would be as interesting
although not as re-assuring. We mentioned that one-way functions are necessary for
all of cryptography. Yet, since the seminal work by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR90], we
know that one-way functions do not suffice for more “fancy” cryptography such as trap-
door functions, oblivious transfer and public-key encryption. This set of cryptographic
primitives is generally refered to as “Cryptomania” [Imp95], and the weakest assumption
in Cryptomania is the existence of key agreement. The non-existence of key agreement
would collapse Cryptomania to Minicrypt. Naturally, we would like to know:
Which assumptions do we need for key agreement besides one-way functions?
In this chapter, we cover the state-of-the-art in both areas of research and contribute
via two oracle separations to each of them.
7.1 On Basing One-Way Functions on NP-Hardness
Luckily for the cryptographers, most researchers believe that one-way functions exist.
Similarly, most researchers conjecture that NP does not equal P. On the downside,
our confidence that NP 6= P is considerably higher than our belief in the existence
of one-way functions. So, we would like to relate the existence of one-way functions
to the NP 6= P conjecture. Indeed, we know that if one-way functions exist, then
NP 6= P, but ehe converse is an open question; a positive and a negative answer both
seem a plausible outcome. Lattice-based cryptography and their associated worst-case
to average-case reductions repeatedly gave hope to a positive answer, i.e., a one-way
function based on an NP-hard problem. Yet, it often turns out that the security of
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such a candidate one-way function actually relies on a hard problem in NP ∩ coNP
instead of an NP-hard problem [AR05, GG98, Ajt98, HR07, AD07, Cai98]. Similarly, a
look on existing impossibility results [FF93, BT03, AGGM06, AGGM10, Wat10, Imp11]
reveals that only non-adaptive reductions have been ruled out so far, i.e., reductions that
determine their set of queries to the oracle and then ask them all at once. On the one
hand, these negative results indicate that finding a reduction is difficult. On the other
hand, they still leave ample loopholes to bypass them.
A noteworthy exception is the work by Akavia et al. [AGGM06]. Indeed, based on
the assumption that NP 6⊆ coAM, they prove that, even via adaptive reductions, we
cannot construct a regular one-way function from NP-hardness. Inspecting their proof,
a meta-reduction, even yields a stronger result, namely that regular one-way functions
already imply hard problems in AM∩coAM. They also give an easier proof of the same
statement, if additionally, one assumes that the regular function only has polynomially
many pre-images per image. Notably, Akavia et al. are the first ones in this area to rule
out adaptive reductions.
Unfortunately, in 2010, Akavia et al. [AGGM10] discovered a gap in the proof of
the first theorem which rules out non-adaptive reductions from general regular one-way
functions to NP-hardness. The gap is related to universal hash functions in lower bound
protocols that were mistakenly assumed to be drawn uniformly and independently from
related values. In light of the limitations of more involved protocols with similar goals
such as [HMX10], the gap in the proof seems to be hard to overcome. We provide a
possible explanation, namely, we show that a new proof for their theorem would need
to rely on non-relativizing techniques. Recall that their theorem would also imply that
regular one-way functions entail hard problems in AM∩ coAM. In contrast, we give
an oracle relative to which there are no hard problems in AM∩ coAM while there are
regular functions that are one-way for an infinite number of security paramters.
Towards this goal, we combine the generic oracle technique by Blum and Impagli-
azzo [BI87] with Nisan’s [Nis91] notion of block sensitivity and certificate complexity.
Our result shows that it is impossible to prove that one-way functions imply hard prob-
lems in AM∩ coAM via relativizing techniques.
7.2 On Necessary Assumptions for Key Agreement
One-way functions are a necessary assumption for Minicrypt and key agreement [IL89],
yet not sufficient [IR90] for key agreement. Similarly, key agreement is a necessary con-
dition for all of Cryptomania. Understanding Cryptomania thus requires to determine
necessary and sufficient assumptions for key agreement that are easier than, say, the se-
curity definition by Bellare and Rogaway or any of the other security models developed
in this thesis. Indeed, throughout this chapter, we will be able to work with the following
simpler definition of passively secure key agreement. One might by tempted to argue
that a weaker definition of key agreement strenthens our separation results. However, as
we know by Impgliazzo and Luby [IL89], passively secure key agreement already yields
one-way functions and thus, by Rompel [Rom90], digital signatures. Careful composition
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of signatures and passively secure key agreement then yields, indeed, a Bellare-Rogaway
secure key exchange protocol. And thus, passively secure key agreement is existentially
equivalent to key exchange protocols that are secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model, so
that separations for one of them immediately yields a separation for the other one.
Definition 34 (Secure Key Agreement). A key agreement protocol pi consists of two
efficient randomized algorithms A (Alice) and B (Bob) that receive as input the security
parameter 1n, run a protocol where they generate a transcript T and each of them outputs
a key; a run is denoted by (k, T, k′) ← 〈A(1n), B(1n)〉, where T is the transcrip, k is
Alice’s key and k′ is Bob’s key. Correctness requires that Alice’s and Bob’s key are equal
with overwhelming probability, i.e.,
(n) := Prob
[
k 6= k′|(k, T, k′)← 〈A(1n), B(1n)〉]
is a negligible function in n. A key agreement protocol is called perfectly correct, if
(n) = 0. In this case, k always equals k′ and thus, we may write (k, T )← 〈A(1n), B(1n)〉
by a slight abuse of notation.
We say that pi is secure, if for all efficient adversaries A, we have that
Prob[A(1n, T, kb) = b] ≈ 12 ,
where b is a random bit, k0 := k for (k, T, k
′) ← 〈A(1n), B(1n)〉 and k1 ← {0, 1}|k0|. A
key agreement protocol is called infinitely often secure, if there is a strictly monotone
sequence (ni)i∈N of natural numbers such that for all efficient adversaries A,
Prob[A(1ni , T, kb) = b] ≈ 12 .
As we know that this type of key agreement implies one-way functions [IL89], and as
one-way functions imply signatures [Rom90], we can turn a passively secure key agree-
ment, which is only secure against eavesdroppers, against a BR-secure key agreement
protocol by the signature-based compiler of Katz and Yung [KY07]. Thus, existentially,
it suffices to consider the simpler version of key agreement as given in Definition 34.
Although easier to assess, Definition 34 still involves randomness and interaction and is
a fairly involved statement to study.
Likewise, sufficient assumptions for key agreement such as the Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption (Definition 4) reflect the interactive structure. An interesting observation is
that most concrete assumptions such as DDH imply hard problems in NP ∩ coNP. In-
deed, substantial effort has been made to construct secure key agreement from problems
outside NP ∩ coNP, in particular in the area of lattice-based cryptography. Unfortu-
nately, most lattice-based schemes turn out to be related to hard problems inNP∩coNP
or at least in AM ∩ coAM [AR05, GG98, Ajt98, HR07, AD07, Cai98]. Our claim is
that, although no positive result is known, there are no relativizing reasons that prevent
building key agreement from assumptions outside NP ∩ coNP.
In the next subsections, we show that the Diffie-Hellman assumption implies hard
problems in NP ∩ coNP. We then give a proof that a subclass of secure key agreement
protocols implies hard problems in NP ∩ coNP and show that lattice-based schemes
are unlikely to fall into this category of protocols. Our contribution is an oracle relative
to which secure key agreement exists while NP ∩ coNP is contained in P.
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Diffie-Hellman and NP ∩ coNP Let us consider the folklore statement that the
Diffie-Hellman assumption implies a hard problem inNP∩coNP. Consider the language
of tuples (G, g, ga, gb, gab), where G is the group description. Assume that it is easy to
check whether a 5-tuple (G, g, ga, gb, gc) is a valid encoding of a group description and
four group elements, then the three exponents (a, b, c) form a witness either of the fact
that the 5-tuple is in the language or outside the language. Namely, on input the witness
(a, b, c) and the 5-tuple (G, g,A,B,C), let the NP-verifier and the coNP-verifier both
first verify whether indeed, a, b and c are valid discrete logarithms, i.e., ga = A, gb = B
and gc = C. Then, let us have the NP-verifier return 1 if and only if ab = c and let the
coNP-verifier returns 1 if and only if ab 6= c. If this language were easy, one could break
the Diffie-Hellman assumption with overwhelming probability. Thus, the Diffie-Hellman
assumption implies that there is a hard problem in NP ∩ coNP.
Key Agreement and NP∩coNP We now give a (slightly flawed) proof that a secure
key agreement protocol implies hard problems in NP∩coNP, namely the language L of
all pairs (i, T ), where T is a protocol transcript such that the ith bit of the shared secret
associated with the transcript is 1. A witness for L is the randomness used by the two
parties to generate the transcript T . Knowing their randomness, one can (efficiently)
simulate their local computation and thus derive the shared secret k. One can then
simply check whether the ith bit of k is 0 or 1. Similarly, if (i, T ) is such that the ith
bit of the key associated with the transcript T , is 0, then the randomness can serve a
witness to prove that the pair (i, T ) is not in the language L. Thus, for the language
L, we can witness membership and non-membership. Moreover, if the underlying key
agreement protocol is secure, then it should be hard to decide L. In conclusion, if key
agreement exists, then there must be hard problems in NP ∩ coNP.
There are two catches here. Firstly, L is rather a promise problem than a language
problem, as not all strings T are necessarily valid protocol transcripts—moreover, the
transcript range need not be co-range-verifiable, i.e., it might be hard to prove to some-
body that a certain string is not a valid transcript. Secondly, T only defines a single key
k if we assume perfect correctness of the key agreement protocol, i.e., the two parties
always agree on the same key. In the case of imperfect correctness, the same transcript
might be associated with several keys. We thus obtain two conditions of which either
can potentially be used to circumvent the above proof:
(i) The key agreement protocol is not perfectly correct.
(ii) The transcript function is not co-range-verifiable,
which means that it is hard to prove to somebody (in NP or even AM) that a string
T is not a possible transcript of the key exchange protocol.
Indeed, lattice-based schemes often satisfy both or at least one of these two condi-
tions. When encrypting in lattice-based schemes, one usually chooses a lattice point and
disturbs it to obtain another point in the plane. The receiver has some trapdoor to re-
cover the lattice point that is closest to this point in the plane. If one disturbs the lattice
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point only slightly then the original lattice-point is uniquely determined. However, the
more one disturbs the lattice point, the harder the problems gets, i.e., the more secure
the scheme gets. And thus, most schemes disturb the lattice point very much so that
with some small probability, one ends up closer to another lattice point than the original
one. Thereby, the encryption scheme looses its perfect correctness property—correctness
only holds with overwhelming probability now.
In turn, when aiming at perfect correctness, then one has to disturb the point only
slightly. In this case, however, there are large areas in the plane that are far away from
all lattice points and will never come up in an encryption. This is a good basis for having
an encryption scheme that is not co-range verifiable (or at least not co-range decidable),
because if every point can be in the range of the encryption scheme, then the decision
problem of decising the range is trivial. So, the question is whether deciding the range
of a lattice-based encryption scheme is in AM∩ coAM.
In principal, it should be hard to decide whether one is given a close or a distant
point. In particular, for the closest vector problem (CVP), the decision, search and
optimization problems are all equivalent and NP-hard [DKS98] for certain parameters
and thus, for these parameters, it is unlikely that vertifying co-the range of a lattice-based
encryption scheme is easy as this would imply that NP ⊆ coAM or even NP = coNP,
causing the the polynomial hierarchy to collapse.
Hence, there is reason to hope that lattice-based public-key encryption schemes are
either not perfectly correct or not co-range verifiable or, in the best case, maybe even both
and thus allow for building cryptography beyond the threshold of AM∩coAM. Indeed,
lattice problems often come with worst-case to average-case reductions to NP-hard
problems [Ajt96, Reg03, MR04, Reg05]. Unfortunately, parameter choice is a crucial
issue in the area of lattice problems. For example, the parameters γ, for which γ-
GapSVP (Gap version of the Shortest Vector Problem in lattices) is NP-hard, are not
known to yield crypto-systems. In turn, known cryptosystems based on γ-GapSVP use
parameters γ such that the corresponding problem γ-GapSVP is already in NP∩coNP
and thus unlikely to be NP-hard [GG98, AR05]. As this holds for most schemes (see
also [Ajt98, HR07, AD07, Cai98]), one might suspect inherent reasons for our failure to
escape NP ∩ coNP when constructing key agreement schemes.
In contrast, our impossibility result proves that, at least, success is not inhibited
by relativizing arguments. Our separation is based on the generic oracle technique, as
introduced by Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87]. In particular, we introduce the notion of
mergeable oracle classes and show that, relative to a generic oracle for those,
(i) NP ∩ coNP is contained in P.
In particular, we then define a specific mergeable oracle class and show that relative to
a generic oracle for this class, infinitely often secure key agreement exists, i.e., there is
an inifinite sequence of security parameters such that the key agreement is secure for
those. Putting both results together, we yield an oracle relative to which
(i) NP ∩ coNP is contained in P.
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(ii) key agreement exists that is infinitely often secure.
We now introduce generic oracles and then explain how to use them to prove our results.
7.3 Generic Oracles
Generic oracles have been introduced by Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87] to prove oracle
separations in complexity theory such as the existence of an oracle such that NP ∩
coNP ⊆ P, while NP 6= P, and, more generally, that this statement can be proved
for any level of the polynomial hierarchy, that is, there is an oracle such that for any
level n of the polynomial hierarchy, ∆n = Πn ∩Σn, while the polynomial hierarchy does
not collapse. See Chapter 2 for a review of the polynomial hierarchy and relativized
complexity classes. For formal definitions of oracles and generic oracles, see Section 7.7.
In the following, we will give a more informal description of these definitions. An oracle
O is a function from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1} (or {0, 1}∗, depending on the context), a partial
oracle w is a partial function, i.e., a function that has not been defined everywhere,
and a finite oracle is a partial oracle whose domain is finite. Two (partial) oracles are
consistent, if they agree as functions (on the intersection of their domains). A partial
oracle w is a prefix of another partial oracle v (or an oracle O), denoted w ≤ v (or
w ≤ O) if they are consistent and the domain of w is contained in the domain of v (the
latter always holds for an oracle O that is defined everywhere). A class C of oracles is a
set of oracles. A partial oracle w is in C, if there is an oracle O in the class C such that
w ≤ O.
A generic oracle O for a class of oracles C is an oracle in the class C that has the
following additional diagonalization properties, namely, for each oracle Turing Machine
T with a one-bit output, one of the following two condition holds. Either (i) TO returns
0 on input xn for infinitely many values xn, or (ii) there is a threshold Λ ∈ N and a finite
oracle prefix w ≤ O such that, w forces T to return 1 on all x with |x| > Λ. Forcing
means that all possible extensions of w have this property, formally, for all O′ ∈ C, it
holds that if w ≤ O′, then TO′(x) = 1 for all x with |x| > Λ. This property follows from
the definition of generic oracles, but, as we will see, we can also construct such an oracle
with this property directly.
Lemma 4 (Generic Oracle). Let O be a generic oracle for a class of oracles C. Then,
for all Oracle Turing machines T that halt on all inputs with all oracles and produce one
bit of output, one of the following conditions holds:
(i) There exists an infinite sequence (xi)i with |x0| < |x1| < |x2| < ... such that
TO(xi) = 0.
(ii) There is a prefix w ≤ O and a threshold Λ ∈ N such that w forces T to be 1 on
inputs x with |x| ≥ Λ, i.e., for all x with |x| ≥ Λ and all extensions w ≤ O′ ∈ C,
it holds that TO
′
(x) = 1.
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Constructing such an oracle is surprisingly simple using an infinite procedure that
defines the oracle bit-by-bit. It starts with an empty oracle w and then extends w slowly.
The procedure enumerates all Turing Machines and make sure to revisit each machine
T an infinite amout of times. When visiting T for the kth time, it either checks whether
item (ii) is already satisfied for w. If not, it extends w (within the class C) such that
Tw(xi) = 0 holds for at least k values xi with |x0| < ... < |xk|; this is possible, if
condition (ii) is not yet satisfied. Continuing this process infinitely yields an oracle O
that for all machines T , satisfies either item (i) or item (ii).
In Section 7.7, we will introduce generic oracles, as defined by Blum and Impagli-
azzo [BI87], but throughout this thesis, it will be sufficient to work with the property
stated in Lemma 4 and the fact that the above construction of a generic oracle rela-
tivizes. An oracle O that is generic for a class C relative to an oracle Π take as a base
universe all oracle Turing Machines TΠ that have a second oracle slot for the oracle O.
Formally, we yield the following.
Lemma 5 (Relativized Generic Oracles). Let Π be an oracle. Let O be an oracle that
is generic for the class of oracles C relative to Π. Then, for all Oracle Turing machines
T that have two oracle slots for O and Π and that halt on all inputs with all oracles O′
(when Π is fixed) and produce one bit of output, one of the following conditions holds:
(i) There exists an infinite sequence (xi)i with |x0| < |x1| < |x2| < ... such that
TΠ,O(xi) = 0.
(ii) There is a prefix w ≤ O and a threshold Λ ∈ N such that w forces TΠ,· to be 1 on
inputs x with |x| ≥ Λ, i.e., for all x with |x| ≥ Λ and all extensions w ≤ O′ ∈ C,
it holds that TΠ,O
′
(x) = 1.
If Π is a computable function, then (i) and (ii) also hold for a generic oracle for C.
One can construct oracles with the properties stated in Lemma 5 by using the same
construction as before, this time going through all oracle Turing Machines TΠ,. with
two oracle slots of which one is used for Π. Note that, if Π is a computable function
such as a PSPACE oracle, then Lemma 4 already implies the properties of Lemma 5,
because then, for every oracle Turing Machine TΠ,· with one open slot for O, there is
an equivalent oracle Turing machine T ′ such that for all oracles O and for all inputs
x, T ′O(x) = TΠ,O(x). For readability, we hide a oracle under the rug in the following
subsections. We will deal with relativized claims in Section 7.5.
7.3.1 Non-Existence of One-Way Permutations
We now use this property to derive statements that hold relative to a generic oracle. For
example, let C be the class of all length-preserving functions. We will see that there is a
huge class of events that have the property that they happen relative to a generic oracle
O for C only if they happen with respect to all oracles from C. For example, let G be
a potential oracle construction of a one-way permutation. Let TG be the oracle Turing
Machine that on input x, returns 1, if and only if GO
′
({0, 1}|x|) = {0, 1}|x|, that is, if G
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is a permutation on length |x|. Note that TG is computable, namely, TG goes over all
inputs of length |x| and checks, whether G is indeed a permutation on this input length.
We will see that if G is permutation with respect to a generic oracle O for C, then G
is a permutation with respect to all oracles from C. Being a permutation with respect
to all oracles from C turns out to be a strong condition, which, maybe surprisingly,
makes GO invertible. In particular, we prove that relative to a generic oracle O, one-
way permutations do not exist. In Section, we also prove the stronger statement that
NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO as well as that NPO 6⊆ PO and that infinitely often one-way
functions exist relative to O.
Using the following two statements, we will prove that one-way permutations do not
exist relative to a generic oracle O for the class C of length-preserving functions.
(i) If G implements a permutation relative to all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is an
polynomial-time Oracle Turing Machine A that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, inverts GO′
with probability 1.
(ii) If GO is a permutation relative to a generic oracle O, then there is an oracle
algorithm G′ such that G′O = GO and such that G′ implements a permutation
with respect to all oracles O′ ∈ C.
Note that (i) means that there cannot even be permutations that are one-way infinitely
many often. Putting (i) and (ii) together, we have that, relative to the generic oracle
O, there are no secure one-way permutations. Towards contradiction, assume that GO
is a one-way permutation. By (ii), we have that G′ is equivalent to G relative to O and
that G′ implements a permutation with respect to all oracles O′ ∈ C. Thus, by (i), we
have that AO inverts G′O with probability 1 and therefore also GO. Thus, assuming the
above claims, we established the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (informal) Let C be the class of all length-preserving functions. Let O
be a generic oracle for C. Then, relative to O, there are no secure one-way permutations.
It remains to prove statements (i) and (ii), where Rudich [Rud88] establishes (i). We
first use his result in a black-box way and then revisit it in Section 7.4. Let us now prove
and state statement (ii).
Claim 1. Let O be a generic oracle for the class C of all length-preserving oracles.
If GO is a polynomial-time computable permutation relative to O, then there exists a
polynomial-time computable permutation G′ such that G′O = GO and such that G′ im-
plements a permutation with respect to all oracles O′ ∈ C.
Proof. Let TG be the oracle Turing Machine that on input x, returns 1, if and only if
GO
′
({0, 1}|x|) = {0, 1}|x|, that is, if GO′ is a permutation on length |x|. Let us consider
the two conditions in Lemma 4. As GO is a permutation, condition (i) of Lemma 4 is
not satisfied, i.e., there are not infinitely many xi such that T
O
G (xi) = 0; actually, there
is not even a single such input xi. As Lemma 4 sais that one of the two conditions has
to hold, we conclude that condition (ii) of Lemma 4 is true, i.e., there is a finite prefix w
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of O that forces T to return 1 above a certain threshold Λ. We hardcode the behaviour
of GO up to length Λ into a construction G′, and we also hardcode the prefix w into G′,
namely, G′ runs G as a subroutine on values x with Λ < |x|; and whenever G makes a
query to its oracle that is in w, then G′ does not query its real oracle O′, but instead,
it returns the answer stored in w. G′ is polynomial-time, because these operations take
constant-time only. Moreoever, by construction, G′ implements a permutation relative
to any oracle O′ ∈ C and is equivalent to G relative to O.
In an analogous way, we will now prove that relative to a generic oracle O for C, all
problems NPO ∩ coNPO are contained in PO.
7.3.2 NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO
We consider the same class C of length-preserving functions with O being a generic
oracle for this class. Before, TG decided whether a candidate permutation was indeed a
permutation (on length λ). In this section, T will decide whether a candidate language
for NPO′ ∩ coNPO′ is indeed in NPO′ ∩ coNPO′ (on length λ). Namely, a candidate
langue in NPO′ ∩ coNPO′ consists of two non-deterministic oracle machines M and N .
The language LO′M is defined as the set of x such that there is a witness z such that
MO
′
(x, z) = 1, and the language LO′N is defined as the set of x such that there is a
witness z such that NO
′
(x, z) = 1. For M and N to define a language in NPO′ ∩coPO′ ,
we have to have that LO′M is the complement of LO
′
N . The algorithm T , on input x, now
tests whether this is indeed the case on length |x|, i.e., TO′ returns 1 if and only if
LO′M ∩ {0, 1}|x| = {0, 1}|x| \ (LO
′
N ∩ {0, 1}|x|),
which, from now on, we call complementary machines relative to O′ (on length λ). Note
that T is a computable function, as a machine can go (in exponential time) through all
the inputs of length |x| and all the witnesses and thereby checks whether M and N are
complementary on length λ.






are complementary for all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is a determin-
istic polynomial-time oracle Turing Machine A that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, makes
only polynomially many queries to O′ and decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
(ii) If MO and NO are complementary for the generic oracle O, then there are machines
M ′ and N ′ such that LON = LON ′ and LOM = LOM ′ and such that, for all oracles
O′ ∈ C, M ′ and N ′ are complementary relative to O′.
Putting (i) and (ii) together, we have that, relative to the generic oracle O, NPO ∩
coNPO ⊆ PO. L be a language in NPO ∩ coNPO, that is, let M and N be two
algorithms that are complementary relative to O such that L = LOM . By (ii), we have
that M ′ and N ′ are equivalent to M and N relative to O and that M ′ and N ′ are
complementary relative to all oracles O′ ∈ C. Thus, by (i), we have that AO decides
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LOM ′ and therefore also LOM = L. Hence, L is decidable in polynomial-time relative to
O. Thus, assuming the two above claims, we established the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let C be the class of all length-preserving functions. Let O be a generic
oracle for C. Then, NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO.
It remains to prove statements (i) and (ii). Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87] already
establish item (i) and for now, we will use their result as a black-box. We will prove
(ii) next, and later in Section 7.5, we will investigate how to implement their decision
algorithm A in deterministic polynomial-time.
Claim 2. Let O be a generic oracle for the class C of all length-preserving oracles. Let
M and N be such that there is a polynomial pM and pN such that
LOM := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pM (|x|) and MO(x; z) = 1}
is the complement of
LON := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pN (|x|) and MO(x; z) = 1}.
Then, there exist two polynomial-time oracle algorithms M ′ and N ′ such that LOM = LOM ′
and LON = LON ′ and such that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, the algorithms M ′ and N ′ are
complementary.
Proof. Let T be the oracle Turing Machine that on input x, returns 1, if and only if M
and N are complementary relative to O′ on input length |x|. Let us consider the two
conditions in Lemma 4. As M and N are complementary relative to O, condition (i) is
not satisfied, i.e., there are not infinitely many xi such that T
O(xi) = 0; actually, there
is not even a single such input xi. Thus, we know that condition (ii) of Lemma 4 holds,
i.e., there is a finite prefix w of O that forces T to return 1 above a certain threshold
Λ. We hardcode the behaviour of MO up to length Λ into M ′ and the behaviour of NO
up to length Λ unto N ′, and we also hardcode the prefix w into M ′ and N ′, namely,
M ′ runs M as a subroutine on witness z and values x with Λ < |x|; and whenever M ′
makes a query to its oracle that is in w, then M ′ does not query its real oracle O′, but
instead, it returns the answer stored in w. We define N ′ in the same way. M ′ and
N ′ are polynomial-time, because these operations take constant-time only. Moreoever,
by construction, M ′ and N ′ are complementary relative to any oracle O′ ∈ C, as the
prefix w forced M and N to be complementary above certain threshold and as, below
the threshold Λ, M ′ and N ′ are complementary, as MO and NO are. Moreover, relative
to O, we have that M ′O behaves like MO and N ′O behaves like NO.
The proof that NPO∩coNPO ⊆ PO is indeed very similar to the proof that relative
to the generic oracle O, no one-way permutations exists. This is due to the the fact that
one-way permutations already define a hard language in NP ∩ coNP. Namely, if G is a
permuation, then the language of all tuples (n, y) such that the nth bit of the pre-image
of y under G is 1, is a language in NP ∩ coNP. As a witness that (n, y) is in the
language, we give the pre-image x of y, check whether indeed, G(x) = y and whether
the nth bit of x is 1. As a witness that (n, y) is not in the langauge, we also use the
pre-iamge x of y.
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7.3.3 Existence of i.o. One-Way Functions
We proved that relative to a generic oracle O for C, the class NPO ∩ coNPO is con-
tained in PO and that thus, in particular, no one-way permutations exist relative to
the generic oracle O. Note that this is also true relative to a PSPACE oracle, as,
relative to a PSPACE oracle, NPPSPACE ⊆ PPSPACE and thus also NPPSPACE ∩
coNPPSPACE ⊆ PPSPACE. However, our goal is to prove that relative to some oracle
O, NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO, while simultaneously, some cryptography such as one-way
functions or key agreement exists, implying that NPO 6⊆ PO.
We will now prove that relative to a generic oracle O for C, there are efficiently
computable functions that are one-way for infinitely many security parameters (i.o. one-
way functions). Note that this implies that NPO 6⊆ PO.
Lemma 6 (Existence of i.o. One-Way Functions). Let O be a generic oracle for the
class C of length-preserving functions. Then, relative to O, i.o. one-way functions
exists, namely the function fO : x 7→ O(x) is i.o. one-way.
Proof. We have to prove that there is an increasing sequence of security parameters λi
such that for all polynomial-time oracle machines A, the probability that A inverts fO
is negligible in λi. Actually, we are going to give a sequence of security parameters
such that for all polynomial-time oracle machines A, there exists an Λ such that for all
λi > Λ, the success probability of A is smaller than (λ) := 2−
λ
2 .
We now consider an enumeration of all polynomial-time oracle inverters (Ak)k. Note
that for any constant K, the following adversary AK is also a polynomial-time oracle
machine, as its running time is the sum of the running time of the first K adversaries
plus a linear term in K · λ.
Algorithm: AK
Input: (1λ, y)
From k from 1 to K do
Run x∗i ← Ai(1λ, y)
If fO(x∗i ) = y, return x
∗.
Return 0|y|.
Let TOK be the predicate that returns 1 on x, if
Probx←{0,1}λ
[
AK(1λ, fO(x))→ x′ ∈ fO−1(y)
]
and 0, else. Now, using Lemma 4, we note that the condition (ii) is not satisfiable for TK .
Namely, let pK(λ) be the running time of AK . Then, for a random length-preserving
function, for large enough λ the success probability of AK on input length λ is lower
bounded by αpK(λ)2
−λ for some constant α.
Let w be a finite oracle, and let λ be large enough such that the partial oracle w has
not fixed any answers to queries of length λ and such that AK ’s success probability in
inverting a random function of length λ is smaller than 2−
λ
2 . Extend w to v such that
v agrees with w on w’s domain, and such that v(x) = 1|x| for all x such that
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– x is not in the domain of v, and
– |x| ≤ pK(λ), and
– |x| 6= λ.
We now average out over all functions from {0, 1}λ to {0, 1}λ and obtain a single
length-preserving function Cλ : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ such that AK ’s success probability in
inverting Cλ is smaller than 2
−λ2 . We now extend v by definition it to be equal to Cλ
in length λ. For this λ, we have T (0λ) = 0. We showed that any finite oracle w can be
extended to an oracle that violates confition (ii) of Lemma 4, whence condition (i) must
hold, i.e., there is an infinite sequence (xi)i such that T
O(xi) = 0, meaning that AK ’s
success probability to invert fO on length |xi| is smaller than 2λ2.
For each constant K ∈ N, let us denote this sequence by (xKi )i. Choose λ1 to be
equal to |x11|. For K > K ′ choose λK such that there is an element xKi in (xKi )i with
|xKi | > λK′ (which exists, as (xKi )i is infinite and increasing).
For (λK)K , we now have that for each polynomial-time adversary Ai, its success
probability in inverting fO drops below 2λK2 for K > i and thus, for each polynomial-
time adversary Ai, the success probability is negligible.
7.4 Mergeable Oracle Classes
We saw that generic oracles give us a natural way of achieving that NPO∩coNPO ⊆ P,
while NPO 6⊆ PO. However, it is not clear that relative to a generic oracle for the
class of length-preserving functions, there is a key agreement protocol that is secure for
infinitely many security parameters, from now on called i.o. key agreement protocol. In
the previous section, we had that O directly implements a function that is i.o. one-way.
We would like to choose our class C is such a way that a generic oracle O for C implements
a i.o. key agreement protocol. For Propositions 1 and 2, in item (ii), we had to prove
that given two algorithms that were complementary relative to the generic oracle O,
there were two algorithms that are equivalent relative to O but that have the additional
property that they are complementary relative to all oracles O′ in the class C. Looking
closely at the proof of item (ii) and at the proof of Proposition 2, we observe that we did
not exploit any particularities of the class C. Indeed, it holds for any class C that item (ii)
is true and that, if additionally, item (i) is true for class C, then the Proposition 2 hold,
respectively. Thus, it is tempting to replace the class C of length-preserving functions
by, say, the class of functions that implement key-agreement, that is, a function for Alice
to generate her protocol messages, a function for Bob to compute his protocol messages
as well as two key derivation functions, one for Alice and one for Bob. These functions
implement a key agreement, if they satisfy the correctness property for key agreement.
And we might want to choose to replace the classe of length-preserving functions by this
4-tuple of functions that implement key agreement.
However, we have not yet looked at the proof of item (i), and it turns out that its
proof is not independent of the class C. Namely, item (i) sais that if two algorithms M
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and N are complementary relative to all oracles O′ of C, then the language LO′M is easy to
decide relative to all oracles O′ from C. A weaker form of item (i) is that if an algorithm
G implements a permutation with respect to all oracles O′ from C, then it is easy to
invert relative to all oracles O′ from C. We will now reconsider the proofs by Rudich for
one-way permutations and by Blum and Impagliazzo for NP ∩ coNP respectively, and
we will see which property from C they rely on.
7.4.1 One-Way Permutations
Rudich proves in his thesis [Rud88] that one cannot build a one-way-permutation from
a random oracle. We here present a simplified version of his proof establishing the
following claim.
Claim 3. Let C be the class of length-preserving oracles. If MO′ and NO′ are com-
plementary for all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle
Turing Machine A that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, makes only polynomially many queries to
O′ and decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
Let G be an efficient, deterministic oracle machine such that for all oracles O′ from
the class C of length-preserving functions, the function GO′ is a permutation. Then, we
show that we can invert GO
′
with very few oracle queries. For now, we only consider
query-complexity of the inverter. We will see in Section 7.5 how to make the inverter
efficient. Assume, we want to invert GO
′
on a value y and assume for now that G only
makes a single query to its oracle. As G is a permutation for all oracles O′, we can find
an input x, a query q and a response r such that G on input x queries q and returns y,
if the oracle responds with r.1 If there is only one such x, i.e., a value that can possibly
(with the right oracle) be mapped to y, then we can invert GO
′
even without querying
the oracle, as, regardless of the oracle’s answers, there cannot be another pre-image than
x. If there are two different such values x and x′, then G must make the same query
q on both inputs, x and x′, as for if they make different queries q and q′, then there is
an oracle O′ in C that comprises the appropriate answers to both queries. In this case,
G maps both, x and x′, to the same y, in contradiction to the assumption that GO′
implements a permutation for each oracle O′.
Therefore, for all x that could potentially be mapped to the value y, the algorithm G
makes the same query q. By querying the random oracle on only q, we can thus invert G.
Carrying out this argument iteratively also yields an inverter for algorithms G that query
its oracle several times. The number of queries of this inversion algorithm is quadratic
in the number of queries asked by G. Therefore, if GO
′
implements a permutation for
all oracles O, then GO is easy to invert with polynomially many queries. Thus, we
cannot build a one-way-permutation from a random oracle. Note that our inverter is
not necessarily efficiently computable as the sampling step can only be carried out in
non-deterministic polynomial-time. Indeed, in Section 7.5, we will add an PSPACE
1Sampling such a triple (x, q, r) is a problem in (unrelativized) NP.
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oracle to our world and see that all previous statements still hold. We prefer to keep
this aspect under the rug for now.
Observe that the only place where we used C is when we argued that two evaluation
pathes (pairs of queries and answers) can be merged into one oracle that is consistent
with both pathes. We will see that this property is also needed to prove that, relative
to a generic oracle O for class C, NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO.
7.4.2 NPO ∩ coNPO
Let M and N be two nondeterministic polynomial-time oracle machines such that for all
oracles O′ from the class of length-preserving functions C, the NP-languages LO′M and




are complementary. In this case, Lemma 2.2 by Blum and
Impagliazzo [BI87] tells us that relative to all O′ ∈ C, we can decide the language LO′M
efficiently, i.e., with few oracle queries. Let us shortly summarize their approach that
established the following claim.
Claim 4. Let C be the class of all length-preserving oracles. If MO′ and NO′ are com-
plementary for all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is a deterministic polynomial-time oracle
Turing Machine A that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, makes only polynomially many queries to
O′ and decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
For now assume that M and N only make a single query to O′. Our goal is to decide




N are complementary for all
oracles from C, there must be an input x, a witness z, a query q and a response r such
that at least one of the machines on witness z and input x queries q and outputs 1, if
the oracle responds with r. If such a potential triple (z, q, r) only exists for N , then x
necessarily lies in LO′N , the complement of LO
′
M . If such a potential triple (z, q, r) only
exists for M , then x lies in LOM , the complement of LO
′
N . If there exists a triple (z, q, r)
for N and a triple (z′, q′, r′) for M , then both must ask their oracle on the same query
q as else, there would be an oracle O′ ∈ C such that x is in both languages LO′N and
LO′M in contradiction to the fact that the two machines are complementary relative to
all O′ ∈ C. Therefore, all accepting pathes (triples (z, q, r)) on M and N necessarily
ask their oracle on q. Thus, it suffices to learn the oracle’s answer on query q to decide
whether M or N has an accepting path.
Iterative application of this line of reasoning then yields a decision algorithm for
algorithms M and N that query its oracle up to n(|x|) times. As for the cryptography
examples, the query complexity of the iterated decision algorithm is (n(|x|))2. Also here,
we used that two evaluation pathes could be merged into a single oracle from the class
C.
One subtlety that we hid under the carpet so far was whether the decision algorithm
AO′ for NPO′ ∩ coNPO′ and the inverter for the one-way permutation are efficiently
implementable relative to O′. Again, the sampling of accepting pathes (z, q, r) can be
done in non-deterministic polynomial-time, and in Section 7.5, we will add a oracle to
indeed achieve an efficiently computable decision algorithm A.
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7.4.3 Mergeable Oracle Classes
The property that we used in both proofs was that two evaluation pathes can be merged
into one oracle, i.e., that we can take a couple of query-answer pairs and have an oracle
O′ ∈ C that is consistent with all of them. A mergeable oracle class captures exactly
this property.
Definition 35 (Mergeable Oracle Class). (informal) An oracle class C is called merge-
able, if for any two polynomial-size finite oracles v and w in C the following holds:
If v and w are consistent on their domain, then they are consistent in C, i.e.,
there is an oracle O′ ∈ C such that w ∪ v is a prefix of O′.
Let us consider oracle classes that are not mergeable. For example, the partial
oracles (q, y) and (q′, y) with q 6= q′ cannot be merged into one permutation oracle, as
the permutation would have a collision. Thus, the class C of permutation oracles in not
mergeable.
Moreover, the class of perfectly correct key agreement protocols is not mergeable.
Namely, if on transcript T , Alice derives key k, then Bob also has to derive key k.
However, it turns out that if we allow for a small correctness error in the key agreement
protocol, then we can define a class of oracles that is mergeable and implements a key
agreement protocol that is correct with overwhelming probability. Thus, proving that
there is an oracle relative to which i.o. key agreement is possible while NP∩coNP ⊆ P
involves the following three steps:
(1.) Let C be a mergeable oracle C and let O be a generic oracle for C. We prove that,
relative to O, NP ∩ coNP is easy, i.e., NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO.
(2.) We give a class C of (4-tuples of) oracles that satisfy the correctness requirements
for key agreement and prove that C is mergeable. show that the class of all key
agreement oracles is mergeable.
(3.) We argue that, a generic oracle O for C is i.o. secure key agreement.
The proof of (1.) mimics the proof of Lemma 2.2 by Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87] that
we sketched in Section 7.4.2. We call (1.) the main Lemma (see Lemma 7), as it is of
independent interest, as we will see later.
Lemma 7 (Main Lemma). (informal) Let C be a mergeable oracle class C, and let O be
a generic oracle for C. Then, NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO.





are complementary for all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is a deter-
ministic polynomial-time oracle Turing Machine A such that for all oracles O′ ∈ C
the algorithm AO′ , decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
(ii) If MO and NO are complementary for the generic oracle O, then there are machines
M ′ and N ′ such that LON = LON ′ and LOM = LOM ′ and such that, for all oracles O′ ∈ C,
M ′ and N ′ are complementary relative to O′.
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The proof of Claim 2 carries over to prove (ii) for arbitrary oracle classes C, in particular
for a mergeable oracle class. Moreover, the proof of Claim 4 equally carries over to prove
(i) whenever a class of oracles is mergeable. As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can
then put (i) and (ii) together and obtain the statement in Lemma 7. We start with two
machines M and N that define a language in NPO ∩ NPO. Using (ii), we can replace
M and N by two machines that are equivalent relative to O and that are complementary
with respect to all oracles from C. Using (i), we then obtain a polynomial-time oracle
algorithm that decides LOM (and thus LON ).
7.5 Relativized Claims
Rudich’s inverter in Subection 7.4.1 as well as the decision algorithm that we defined in
Section 7.4.1 are only query-efficient. We will now see that we can actually turn them
into efficient algorithms when we add a PSPACE oracle everywhere. However, we have
to make sure that all claims still hold when adding a PSPACE oracle which is the goal
of this section.
Claim 1. (relativized) Let O be a generic oracle a class C of oracles, and let be a
PSPACE oracle. If GO is a polynomial-time computable permutation relative to O,
then there exists a permutation G′ such that G′O,PSPACE = GO,PSPACE and such that
G′ is a polynomial-time computable permutation with respect to the oracles and all
oracles O′ ∈ C.
The proof of Claim 1 only exploits properties of relativized generic oracles as stated
in Lemma 5 and thus still holds; the same holds for the following stronger claim and
also for step (i) in the proof of our main lemma.
Claim 2. (relativized) Let O be a generic oracle for a class C of oracles. Let be a
oracle. Let M and N be such that there is a polynomial pM and pN such that
LO,PSPACEM := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pM (|x|) and MO,PSPACE(x; z) = 1}
is the complement of
LO,PSPACEN := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pN (|x|) and MO,PSPACE(x; z) = 1}.
Then, there exist two polynomial-time oracle algorithms M ′ and N ′ such that LO,PSPACEM =
LO,PSPACEM ′ and LO,PSPACEN = LO,PSPACEN ′ and such that for all oracles O′ ∈ C, the al-
gorithms M ′O′,PSPACE and N ′O′,PSPACE are complementary.
Moreover, we also yield the following relativized claim.
Claim 4. (relativized) Let C be a mergeable oracle class and let PSPACE be a PSPACE
oracle. Let M and N be two polynomial-time machines and let pM and pN be two poly-
nomials such that for all oracles O′ ∈ C,
LO′,PSPACEM := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pM (|x|) and MO,PSPACE(x; z) = 1}
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is the complement of
LO′,PSPACEN := {x|∃z : |z| ≤ pN (|x|) and MO,PSPACE(x; z) = 1}.
Then, there exist a polynomial-time oracle algorithm A such that for all O′ ∈ C, AO′,PSPACE
decides LO,PSPACEM ′ .
Note that the relativized version of item (i) proved in Proposition 2 follows when
taking C to be the class of length-preserving functions as the latter is mergeable. Another
corollary is that, if C is the class of length-preserving functions and if GO′,PSPACE
implements a permutation with respect to all O ∈ C, then G is easy to invert relative to
O′,PSPACE.
The proofs of Claim 4 or item (i) for Proposition 2 respectively only exploit the
mergeability of C and the polynomial query complexity of polynomial-time algorithms.
It thus also carries over in the presence if a PSPACE oracle.
Finally, putting the relativized version of Claim 4 and Claim 2 together, we obtain
our the relativized version of our Main Lemma 7 and, as a corollary, also the relativized
versions of Proposition 2 and Proposition 1 as the oracle classes that are considered in
the latter two propositions are mergeable. as a corollary.
Lemma 7 (Main Lemma). (formal) Let C be a mergeable oracle class C, and let O be a
generic oracle for C. Then, NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE.
Proposition 2. (formal) Let C be a mergeable oracle class. Let O be a generic oracle
for C. Then, relative to O and a oracle, there are no secure one-way permutations.
Proposition 1. (formal) Let C be a mergeable oracle class. Let O be a generic oracle
for C. Then, relative to O and a oracle, it holds that languages in NP ∩ coNP are
decidable in deterministic polynomial-time, formally
NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE.
Finally, also the proof for the existence of i.o. one-way functions carries over to
the relativized setting, as the proof of the unrelativized Lemma 6 considers security
against computable adversaries whose query-complexity is polynomial. Hence, the set
of adversaries remain unchanged by adding a PSPACE oracle.
Lemma 6 (Existence of i.o. One-Way Functions). (relativized) Let O be a generic oracle
for the class C of length-preserving functions. Then, relative to O and a oracle, i.o.
one-way functions exists, namely the function fO : x 7→ O(x) is i.o. one-way.
7.6 Further Complexity Measures and AMO ∩ coAMO
In this section, we review our results for AMO ∩ coAMO and discuss the complexity
measures that we use as tools in our proofs.
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A function f is regular if for all y, y′ with the same length |y| = |y′|, the pre-image
space of y and y′ is of the same size, |f−1(y)| = |f−1(y′)|. We prove the existence of
an oracle O relative to which languages in AM∩ coAM are decidable in deterministic
polynomial-time while at the same time, regular functions exist that are one-way in-
finitely many often, so-called regular i.o. one-way functions. I.e., relative to our oracle
O,
– AMO ∩ coAMO ⊆ PO and
– regular i.o. one-way functions exist.
Note that Akavia et al. [AGGM06] considered a bigger class of functions, where the
pre-image size is not the same for all y of the same length. Instead, they only asked
for the pre-image size to be verifiable given an additional witness. Note that regular
functions are a particular subclass of these and thus, our result holds a fortiori for the
class considered by Akavia et al. [AGGM06]. Moreover, note that there is a second
Theorem in Akavia et al. [AGGM06] (which does not suffer from the aforementioned
problem) that established that a regular one-way function f implies hard problems in
AM ∩ coAM, if for each y, the pre-image size |f−1(y)| is polynomially in the length
|y|. Indeed, we only consider regular functions with exponential-size domain and thus
exhibit that the second Theorem by Akavia et al. might be a tight result.
Firstly, using Main Lemma 7, we obtain an oracle O, relative to which
– NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO and
– regular i.o. one-way functions exist.
Namely, for a constant c, let Cc be the class of regular functions (oracles) O′ such that
|O′−1(y)| = 2|y|/c. This class is mergeable, as a polynomial number of values cannot
inhibit the regularity property. Thus, Lemma 7 yields that relative to a generic oracle
O for Cc, we have that NPO ∩ coNPO ⊆ PO. Moreover, as before, we will see that O
is i.o. one-way (and regular by definition). We prove this formally in Theorem 8.
Now, Theorem 10 extends this result to AM ∩ coAM, i.e., relative to a generic
oracle O for Cc, i.o. one-way functions exist while AMO ∩ coAMO ⊆ PO. Although
AM is merely a randomized version of NP, extending the result is not immediate. Let
us go back to the proof that each language LO in NPO ∩ coNPO also lies in PO and
introduce the notion of certificate complexity for oracles.
A finite prefix w of an oracle O certifies that x is in LO, if for all possible extensions
O′ of w, it holds that x is in LO. A certificate w in O certifies that x is not in LO, if for
all possible extensions O′ of w, it holds that x is not in LO. Let us see why languages
in NPO ∩ coNPO have polynomial-size certificates. Let M and N be the machines
associated with a language LO ∈ NPO∩coNPO. For each x, we either have a witness z
such that MO(z, x) = 1 or that NO(z, x) = 1. Taking the partial oracle w of all queries
and answers made along the path defined by z and x yield a certificate that x is (not) in
LO. Moreover, our Claim 4 (Lemma 2.5 in Nisan [Nis91] and Theorem 2.3 in Blum and
Impagliazzo [BI87]) can also be phrased in terms of certificate complexity. We showed
that two (polynomial-size) certificates w and w′ one for being in LO, one for being not
in LO have to intersect in a common query. Iterative application of this argument leads
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to an algorithm that decides LO using only polynomially many queries. Thus, we can
phrase Claim 4 as proving that languages with small certificate complexity are in LO.
And in particular, this applies to NPO ∩ coNP.
If we can prove that languages in AM∩coAM also have small certificate complexity,
then we also yield that languages in AMO ∩ coAMO can be decided in PO. The main
part of Section 7.10 is devoted to proving that, relative to the class Cc of regular functions,
AM∩ coAM has a small certificate complexity.
Towards this goal, we also build on another complexity measure, the so-called block-
sensitivity. Lemma 2.4 in Nisan [Nis91] states that, whenever a language has a low block
sensitivity, then it also has a low certificate complexity. Thus, we revert to proving that
languages in AM∩ coAM have low block-sensitivity.
Overall, we have three proof steps:
(1) Small oracle certificate complexity of M implies that the language LOM is easy to
decide, relative to a generic oracle. (Lemma 2.5, Nisan [Nis91]/Theorem 2.3, Blum,
Impagliazzo [BI87])
(2) Low block sensitivity of M implies small certificate complexity of M . (Lemma 2.4,
Nisan [Nis91])
(3) Languages in AM∩ coAM have low block sensitivity. (This work)
Our proof of step (3.) is inspired by Nisan’s proof that languages in BPP have low block
sensitivity.
Nisan’s notions of certificate complexity and block sensitivity both refer to the class
of all oracles while we refer to the class Cc of regular function oracles. We thus have to
adapt step (1.), (2.) and (3.) for Cc.
Let us thus consider step (2). A string x and a language LO are said to be sensitive
to a block (part) of the oracle O, if flipping these bits in the oracle changes whether x
belongs to LO. The block-sensitivity then captures an upper bound on the number of
disjoint blocks, a language is sensitive to. In other words, the block sensitivity of LOM on
(x,O) is the number of disjoint sets Si such that x ∈ LOM if and only if x /∈ L
O(Si)
M , where
O(Si) is equal to O except for queries in Si, where the output of the oracle is flipped.
2
Nisan’s proof for step (2) does not carry over immediately.
The core argument in his proof is to pick, iteratively, disjoint, minimal blocks that
the function is sensitive to. He then argues that after flipping all of the bits of one of
these blocks, the language has to be sensitive to each bit in the block, as the block was
chosen to be minimal. Therefore, he argues, each of the bits in the block has to be
contained in a potential certificate.
Implicitly, this proof uses that flipping one bit of an oracle yields a valid oracle again.
However, when O implements a regular function and one switches, say, O(x) = 0|y to
O(x) = 1|y, then the modified oracle does not implement a regular function anymore
and is thus an oracle “outside the class”. Yet, we will show that the argument applies
2Without loss of generality, we consider one-bit output oracles that encode regular functions in a
unique way.
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to flipping small groups of bits such that the mofication transforms a regular function
into regular function.
7.7 Generic Oracles and Forcing
We now recall the formal definitions of generic oracles as in [BI87] and explain how they
relate to what we already mentioned.
Definition 36 (Oracle). An oracle O is a total, deterministic function from {0, 1}∗ to
{0, 1}. A partial oracle v is a partial deterministic function from a subset of {0, 1}∗ to
{0, 1}. In particular, an oracle is also a partial oracle. A partial oracle is called a finite
oracle, if its domain is finite. Two partial oracles v and w are consistent, if they agree
as functions on the intersection of their domain. If, furthermore, the domain of v is
a subset of the domain of w, then we say that w extends v, or that v is a prefix of w,
denoted v ≤ w. A class of oracles C is a set of oracles. By abuse of notation, we write
v ∈ C for a partial oracle v, if there is a O ∈ C such that v ≤ O. We write (q, r) ∈ O, if
O(q) = r.
An appropriate encoding transforms oracles with several bits of output into oracles
with a single bit output, and vice versa. For cryptography, it is more convenient to define
oracles as functions with several bits of output, while for certain complexity-theoretic
considerations, it is preferable to think of oracles as having only a single bit of output.
Therefore, we will use both notions throughout this paper, depending on which one is
more convenient for the matter under consideration. Oracles can be imagined as infinitely
long look-up tables, which, in turn, can be considered as infinitely long bitstrings. A
finite oracle w is then a word over the alphabet {0, 1} or the alphabet {0, 1}∪{[]} which
has a special sign for undefined oracle values. Sometimes, it will be convenient to think
of an oracle w as an input to a machine rather than an oracle (where the machine only
reads parts of its input). In particular, we will manipulate the bitstring w by flipping a
certain number of bits to see whether, e.g., a certain oracle machine changes its answer
under these bit flips. Note that other inputs to the machine will usually be denoted by
x, y and z. In particular, z usually denotes a witness, if we deal with non-deterministic
machines.
We give our definitions with respect to a class C of oracles. The standard notions
of genericity or forcing are obtained when using the class of all oracles from {0, 1}∗ to
{0, 1}.
Definition 37 (Forcing). Let T , M and N be an Oracle Turing Machines (OTM) that
halt on all inputs with all oracles in a class C, we say that a finite oracle w forces M
and N to be different, if there is an x such that Mw(x) and Nw(x) are both defined and
Mw(x) 6= Nw(x). More generally, we say that w forces T to be wrong, if there is an x
such that Tw(x) is defined and such that Tw(x) = 0. We say that w C-forces T to be
true, if no extension w ∈ C forces T to be wrong.
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Define TM,N as the oracle algorithm that, on input x with oracle O runs M
O(x) and
NO(x) and returns 1 if and only if MO(x) 6= NO(x). Then, a finite oracle w forces
TM,N to be wrong if and only if w forces M and N to be different. And a finite oracle w
C-forces TM,N to be true if and only if w forces M and N to be the same. We sometimes
omit the class C when it is clear from context.
The following definition of genericity is a weak version of the one introduced by Blum
and Impagliazzo [BI87]. They called this notion 1-genericity.
Definition 38 (Generic Oracle). A set D of finite oracles is C-dense for a class of oracles
C, if every finite oracle in C has an extension to a finite oracle in D. Let C = {Di|i ∈ N}
be a countable collection of C-dense sets of finite oracles. An oracle O is (C, C)-generic,
if for every i ∈ N, there is a finite oracle w ∈ Di such that w is a finite prefix w ≤ O.
We say that O is C-generic, if it is (C, C)-generic for the following countable collection
of C-dense sets:
{DT |T OTM that halt on all inputs with all oracles in C}
where DM is defined as
DT :=
{v|v finite, v ∈ C, v forces T to be wrong.}
∪ {v|v finite, v ∈ C, v C − forces T to be true.}
Let us see why indeed, the set DT is C-dense. Let w ≤ O ∈ C be a finite oracle in
the class C. Either w C-forces T to be true, or there is an extension w ≤ v ∈ C such that
v forces T to be wrong. In the first case, w itself is in DT ; in the second case, w can be
extended to a finite oracle v in DT . Thus, DT is dense. Our generic oracles diagonalize
against relatively simple properties. Indeed, Blum and Impagliazzo [BI87] diagonalized
against all dense arithmetic sets thus also including sets of higher type. We sketched the
proof of the existence in Section 7.3, a proof can also be found in [BI87]. We now prove
that genericity implies Lemma 4. Note that Lemma 5 then follows analogously.
Lemma 4 (Generic Oracle). Let O be a generic oracle for a class of oracles C. Then,
for all Oracle Turing machines T that halt on all inputs with all oracles and produce one
bit of output, one of the following conditions holds:
(i) There exists an infinite sequence (xi)i with |x0| < |x1| < |x2| < ... such that
TO(xi) = 0.
(ii) There is a prefix w ≤ O and a threshold Λ ∈ N such that w forces T to be 1 on




Proof. Let T be an OTM that halts on all inputs with all oracles. Based on T , we now
define a countable number T1, T2, T3,... of machines that do the following: T
O
k (x) checks
whether there are k − 1 different values x′ with |x′| < |x| such that TO(x′) = 0. If so,
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TOk (x) := T
O(x). If not, then TOk (x) := 1. We now proceed by case distinction. Case
I: For each k ∈ N, there is an x such that TOk (x) = 0. Then, by definition of TOk , there
are infinitely many values x such that TO returns 0 on them and thus condition (i) is
satisfied. Case II: There is a k such that TOk is constantly 1. Let us consider the set
DTk as in the definition of generic oracles. By genericity of O, there is a finite prefix
w ⊆ O that either has the property that it forces Tk to be wrong, or it C-forces Tk to
be true. As TOk is constantly 1, the first condition cannot be satisfied. Thus, there has
to be a finite prefix w ≤ O that C-forces Tk to be true, that is, there is a prefix w such
that for all extensions w ≤ O′C, TO′ returns 0 on at most k values. Note that w does
not yet define the threshold Λ that we are looking for, as Λ might depend on O′. Let
X ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be the set of values that TO returns 0 on. Let v be the finite prefix of O
such that T v is well-defined on X. Let Λ be a natural number that is greater than the
length of the longest string in X. Let v∪w be the smallest finite prefix of O that covers
the domain of both, v and w. Then, v ∪ w forces T to return 1 on all values x with
|x| ≥ Λ as desired.
We now define what it means for an oracle machine to define an NP-language or an
AM-language for all oralces from some class. Note that this is as stronger requirement
than defining an NP-language or AM-language relative to one specific oracle.
Definition 39. We say that a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine M defines
an AM-language LO for all oracles O ∈ C, if there are fixed polynomials p, q and R
such that for all x and for all O ∈ C, it holds that either
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|)
[∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), MO(x, r; zr) = 1] ≥ 1− 2−|x|
or
Probr←{0,1}R(|x|)
[∃zr, |zr| ≤ q(|x|), MO(x, r; zr) = 1] ≤ 2−|x|,
where in all cases, M asks at most p(|x|) queries to its oracle O. The AM-language LO
consists of all those x, for which the above probability is greater than 1− 2−|x|. For any
nondeterministic polynomial-time OTM M , the NP-language LO is defined as
{x|∃z : |z| ≤ q(|x|) and MO(x; z) = 1}.
If M is not clear from context, this notation can be augmented to LOM .
7.8 The Main Technical Lemma
We now turn to defining mergeable classes and showing that relative to an oracle O
that is generic for a mergeable class, all problems in NP ∩ coNP are easy in terms
of query-complexity and thus, using relativization and adding a PSPACE oracle, we
also have that NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE. A useful notation for
merging will be v ∪w as the smallest finite oracle that extends the two consistent finite
oracles v and w.
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Definition 40 (C-Consistent Finite Oracles). Two consistent finite oracles v and w are
called C-consistent, if there is an oracle O ∈ C such that v ∪ w ≤ O.
For any partial oracle, we denote by v<n and vn the restricted oracle v for input
length smaller than n or equal to n, respectively. We similarly make use of ≤, ≥ and
<. By |v|, we denote the size of the support of v. An oracle class is mergeable, if any
polynomial-size (or even slightly exponential-size) oracles v and w that are consistent
can be merged into an oracle in C, i.e., v and w are C-consistent.
Definition 35 (Mergeable Oracle Class). An oracle class C is called mergeable, if there
is a threshold ν(n) = 2n/c for some constant c ≥ 1 such that the following holds:
Let v and w be two finite oracles in C such that w and v are consistent, w<n
and v<n are consistent in C and such that |w≥n ∪ v≥n| ≤ ν(n). Then, v and
w are consistent in C.
We now state our main Lemma.
Lemma 7. [Main Lemma] Let O be a generic oracle for a mergeable oracle class C and let
PSPACE be a PSPACE oracle. Then, NPO,PSPACE∩coNPO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE.
Proof. The proof follows the outline given in the proof of Lemma 7 in Section 7.3; we
prove the following two items.
(i) If two polynomial-time oracle Turing machines MO
′,PSPACE and NO
′,PSPACE define
a language in NPO′,PSPACE ∩ coNPO′,PSPACE for all oracles O′ ∈ C, then there is
a deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing Machine A such that for all oracles
O′ ∈ C the algorithm AO′,PSPACE decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
(ii) IfMO,PSPACE andNO,PSPACE define a language inNPO,PSPACE∩coNPO,PSPACE
for the generic oracle O then there are machines M ′ and N ′ such that LO,PSPACEN =
LO,PSPACEN ′ and LO,PSPACEM = LO,PSPACEM ′ and such that, for all oracles O′ ∈ C,
M ′O,PSPACE andN ′O,PSPACE define a language inNPO,PSPACE∩coNPO,PSPACE.
Let us see how we can derive the claim from these two items. Let (M,N) be a pair
of machines that, for the generic oracle O, defines a language LOM in NPO,PSPACE ∩
coNPO,PSPACE. Let us consider the two machines M ′ and N ′ defined by (ii). For
those two machines, (i) guarantees a deterministic polynomial-time decision algorithm
A such that AO′,PSPACE decides LO′M for all O′ ∈ C. In particular, AO,PSPACE decides
LOM ′ = LOM proving that LOM is in PO,PSPACE.
The proof of item (ii) is analogous to Claim 2, as the proof works for all classes C. In
turn, for the proof of (i), we will use the mergeability condition. Let M and N be two
machines that are complemetary with respect to all oracles O′ ∈ C, that is, MO′,PSPACE
and NO
′,PSPACE define a language in NPO′,PSPACE ∩ coNPO′,PSPACE for all O′ ∈ C.
We construct a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A that decides LOM . Let
p(|x|) be a polynomial bound on the number of queries that M and N make on (x, z) for
a witness z of suitable length. Then, there is a threshold Np(|x|) such that (p(|x|))2 +
p(|x|) ≤ ν(n) for all n ≥ Np(|x|) but not for n < Np(|x|). The function Np(|x|) is
efficiently computable.
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On input x, the algorithm A queries the oracle to obtain all values in O<Np(|x|).
These are polynomially many queries, as 2Np(|x|) ≤ (p(|x|))c. From now on, we denote
by u the prefix of O which A already queried. For a non-deterministic polynomial-time
OTM M , let the set qryM (x, z, v) denote the set of queries that M makes on input x
with witness z and oracles v,PSPACE. If v is defined on all in M queries, then the
behaviour of Mv,PSPACE(x, z) on input x with witness z is entirely specified. We thus
consider a pair (z, v) of a witness z together with a set of matching query-response-pairs
v (a finite oracle) as an evaluation path of M . We say that Mv,PSPACE has an accepting
path on x, if there is a witness z such that Mv,PSPACE(x; z) is defined and returns 1.
The algorithm A will iteratively sample accepting paths of M . As we are given a oracle,





Set u := O′≤max{Np(|x|),k} and i0 := −1.
For i from 1 to p(|x|) do:
If possible, find a witness z and an extension v ∈ C of u
such that Mv,PSPACE(x; z) accepts. Query qryM (x, z, v) to O and update u.
If finding such a path was possible, define i0 := i.
Search for a witness z such that Mu,PSPACE(x; z) is defined and accepts.
(1.) Return 1, if such a witness is found.
(2.) Return 0, if i0 < p(|x|).
Search for a witness z such that Nu,PSPACE(x; z) is defined and accepts.
(3.) Return 0, if such a witness is found.
(4.) Else, return 1.
We now analyse the correctness of the algorithm.
Case (1.) If we find an accepting path for x on Mu,PSPACE, then there is also an
accepting path on MO
′,PSPACE and thus, x is in LO′M .
Case (2.) If there is no accepting path for x on Mu,PSPACE and if i0 < p(|x|), then
there is no extension v ∈ C of u such that Mv,PSPACE has an accepting path. In
particular, the machine MO
′,PSPACE does not have an accepting path and thus, x /∈ LO′M .
Case (3.) If we find an accepting path for x on Nu,PSPACE, then there is also an
accepting path on NO
′,PSPACE and thus, x is in LO′N , the complement of LO
′
M .
Case (4.) If i = p(x), then we found p(x) accepting paths in the first loop. Assume
that there is neither an accepting path for x on Mu,PSPACE, nor on Nu. We will prove
that then, there must be an accepting path on MO
′
.
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We start with several observations. As C is a mergeable class, the queries along an
accepting path of M on x has to share a query with each accepting path of N on x,
and this query must lie in O′>Np(x), as both paths are consistent with O′≤Np(x): If the
accepting paths of M and N on x did not share a query, there would be a partial oracle
uM and a witness z such that M
uM ,PSPACE(x; z) accepts and a partial oracle uN and
a witness z′ such that NuN (x, z′) accepts as well. As disjoint the partial oracles uN
and uM are mergeable to a partial oracle uN ∪ uM ∈ C—an extension of u—we yield a
contradiction to the fact that M and N are complementary with respect to all oracle
from C.
Therefore, an accepting path on M for x covers at least one query along an accepting
path of N for x. Applying the argument iteratively yields that all queries of all accepting
paths of N have been asked within the p(|x|) paths of M that we queried. Here, we use
that, as long as |u>Np(|x|)M | is smaller than (p(|x|))2, then |u>Np(|x|)M ∪ u>Np(|x|)N | is smaller
than (p(|x|))2 + p(|x|).
Thus, if there had been an accepting path on NO
′,PSPACE, the algorithm would
have discovered it already in (3.). As this is not the case, there are no accepting
paths on NO





Runtime Analysis The query-complexity of A is polynomial. Moreover, finding ac-
cepting paths on M .,PSPACE and N .,PSPACE is a problem in NPPSPACE and thus
efficiently computable, as NPPSPACE ⊆ PPSPACE. Thus, the algorithm A runs in
deterministic polynomial-time relative to O′ and PSPACE.
For regular (one-way) functions (see Section 7.10), the previous Lemma 7 is general
enough to be applied to the class of regular one-way functions—using the lemma, we
will yield that relative to a generic oracle for this class, regular one-way functions exist,
while NP ∩ coNP collapses to NP. In contrast, for key agreement (see Section 7.9),
we have to relax the conditions for mergeable classes. In particular, we only want to
require a mergeable oracle class to allow gluing of pairs of finite oracles v and w of the
right form.
Definition 41 (Closure Operator). A closure condition is an efficiently computable map
Γ that maps all finite oracles v to an extended domain of v. A finite oracle v is closed,
if Γ(v) is equal to the domain of v. We also require from Γ to be local, i.e., each closure





The locality condition is very convenient to work with—however, relaxed locality
conditions should also be sufficient for a generalized form of Lemma 7.
Definition 42 (Mergeable Oracle Class for Closed Finite Oracles). Let C be an oracle
class and Γ be a closure condition. We say that C is Γ-mergeable, if there is a threshold
ν(n) = 2n/c for some constant c ≥ 1 such that the following holds:
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Let v and w be two Γ-closed finite oracles in C such that w and v are consistent,
w<n and v<n are consistent in C and such that |w≥n ∪ v≥n| ≤ ν(n). Then, v
and w are consistent in C.
We now define the class of closure operators and then state a generalized version of
Lemma 7 for Γ-mergeable classes.
Definition 43 (Finite Closure Operator). A closure operator Γ for a class C is called
(k, l)-finite for two constants k and l, if the following holds:
(i) Γ(v) is at most k times greater than the domain of v.
(ii) For all finite oracles v in C and all oracles O in C that extend v, we have that
Γl+1O (v) = Γ
l
O(v), i.e., applying the closure operator Γ l times iteratively to a finite
oracle v in C yields a Γ-closed finite oracle.
Here, the operator ΓO maps finite prefixes of O to greater finite prefixes of O, namely,
ΓO(v) is the oracle O restricted to the domain of Γ(v).
Lemma 8. Let C be a Γ-mergeable class, where Γ is a (k, l)-finite closure operator and
let O be a generic oracle for C. Then, NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE.
Proof. To adapt the proof of Lemma 7, we need to assure that runs of M and N create
Γ-closed finite oracles. Towards this goal, we modify the machines M and N such that
in the end of their run, they consider the finite oracle v that they created and apply the
closure operator ΓO iteratively l times. Thereby, we blow up the number of queries by
M and N to q(|x|) := lk · p(|x|), if p(|x|) was the original upper bound on their queries.
Note that one would need to argue more about the size of q(|x|), if we had not added
the locality condition to the definition of Γ. Using q(|x|) instead of p(|x|) in the proof
of Lemma 7 and closing the initial sets now yields the desired result.
7.9 On Key Agreement and Hardness of NP ∩ coNP
Towards obtaining an oracle, relative to which infinitely often secure key exchange exists
while NP ∩ coNP is easy, we now provide an oracle family for key exchange. We will
show in Lemma 10 that this oracle family is Γ-mergeable for an appropriate closure
operator Γ. By Lemma 8, this implies that NP ∩ coNP is in P, relative to a generic
oracle from this class of key exchange oracles (and a PSPACE oracle). Finally, to prove
Theorem 7, it then remains to show that relative to a generic oracle for this class (and
a PSPACE oracle), infinitely often key agreement exists, which follows from genericity
as we sketched for i.o. one-way functions in Section 7.3.3. Let us now define a class of
key exchange oracles. Note that one can encode several oracles into one by padding.
Definition 44. For a constant c, a strictly monotone, polynomially bounded transcript
length function τ(n) ≥ nc and a polynomially bounded key size function κ(n) ≥ n, we
define the class Cτ,κ of key exchange oracles. An oracle O is in Cτ,κ, if it encodes three
functions, namely a transcript function T , a key function K and a transcript range
verification function I, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
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(i) T ({0, 1}n) ⊆ {0, 1}τ(n) (mapping randomness to transcript),
(ii) K({0, 1}n × {0, 1}τ(n)) ⊆ {0, 1}κ(n) (mapping transcript, randomess to key),
(iii) I({0, 1}τ(n)) ⊆ {0, 1} (co-range checking),
(iv) I(y) = 1 if and only if y ∈ Im(T ) (assuring co-range computability),
(v) Prob[K(rA, T (rB)) 6= K(rB, T (rA))] ≤ 2−n/c (correctness w.h.p.),
where the last probability is over the strings rB and rA that are drawn uniformly at
random from {0, 1}n.
Definition 44 reflects the symmetric structure of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol, i.e., Alice draws a random string rA and sends the message T (rA); simultane-
ously, Bob draws a random string rB and sends the message T (rB). Then, Alice derives
her key as K(rA, T (rB) and Bob derives his key as K(rB, T (rA)). In particular, each
party sends a message which is independent from the message received from the other
party. Moreover, the function that computes the message from the random string is the
same for both protocol participants and so is the keying function. This fairly restricted
class of key exchange protocols, of course, implies key agreement protocols with more
than two messages as well as protocols with a less “symmetric” structure. Thus, as we
prove a negative result, our theorems holds a fortiori for more general classes of key
agreement protocols. Let us now state the main theorem of this section and show how
it follows from three lemmata.
Theorem 7. For every c ≥ 1, there is an oracle Π such that relative to oracle Π
and a PSPACE oracle, secure key agreement with a 2−n/c-correctness error exists and
such that its transcript space is verifiable, while NPΠ,PSPACE ∩ coNPΠ,PSPACE ⊆
PΠ,PSPACE.
Proof. The oracle Π will be instantiated by a generic oracle for the key exchange class
Cτ,κ. We split the proof into 3 lemmata. First, we prove that Cτ,κ is Γ-mergeable
for an appropriate closure operator Γ (Lemma 10). Then, Lemma 8 yields that, for a
generic oracle O for the class Cτ,κ, all problems in NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE are
in PO,PSPACE. To prove Theorem 7, it remains show that infinitely many often secure
key agreement exists relative to a PSPACE oracle and any oracle O that is generic for
Cτ,κ (Lemma 9).
Lemma 9. Relative to a PSPACE oracle and a generic oracle for Cτ,κ, infinitely often
secure key agreement exists.
Proof. Let O be a generic oracle for Cτ,κ, and assume towards contradiction that the key
exchange protocol given by the oracle is not infinitely often secure. Then for all infinite,
monotone sequences (ni)i, there is an adversaryA such that Prob[A(1ni , T, kb) = b]− 12 is
not negligible. The contradiction follows by a diagonalization argument and the following
observation: let (n) := 2−
n
2c . By definition of genericity, for every finite number of
adversaries A1,...,Ak with polynomial query-complexity, there is an infinite sequence
(ni)i such that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we have that |Prob[A(1ni , T, kb) = b]− 12 | ≤ (ni).
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Using that Turing Machines are countable, let nk to be the smallest security pa-
rameter such that the first k efficient adversaries have advantage less than (nk). By
construction, for all adversaries Ak, the advantage drops below (ni) for all i ≥ k and is
thus negligible.
We now define a (2, 2)-closure operator Γ and prove that Cτ,κ is Γ-mergeable. For
the description of Γ(v) on the finite oracle v = (t, k, i) ≤ (T,K, I) ∈ Cτ,κ, we distinguish
between adding elements to the domain of the transcript function t, the domain of key
function k and the domain of the image testing function i by using the notation Γt(v),
Γk(v) and Γi(v).
Definition 45. Let v = (t, k, i) ∈ Cτ,κ. Then, Γ is defined through the following two
closure rules:
(r, y) ∈ k ⇒ r ∈ Γt(v)
(r, y) ∈ t⇒ y ∈ Γi(v).
Intuitively, the closure operator Γ achieves that whenever an algorithm queries the
key function on randomness r, then it also queries the transcript function t on ran-
domnesss r. Moreover, if a transcript was output by the transcript function, then the
image-testing function i acknowledges this fact. We prove that Cτ,κ is Γ-mergeable.
Lemma 10. Cτ,κ is Γ-mergeable for the threshold ν(n) := 2−n/c.
Proof. Let (k0, t0, i0) and (k1, t1, i1) be two closed, consistent finite oracles that are C-
consistent up to length n and such that |(k0, t0, i0)≥n∪ (k1, t1, i1)≥n| is smaller than 2
n
2c .
We have to show that (k, t, i) := (k0, t0, i0)∪ (k1, t1, i1) lies in C. Note that by locality of
Γ, the finite oracle (k, t, i) is already Γ-closed. Therefore, it suffices to show that for any
Γ-closed finite oracle (k, t, i) with |(k, t, i)≥n| ≤ 2− n2c that satisfies condition (i), (ii), (iii)
and i(y) = 1, if y ∈ Im(t), there is an extension (k′, t′, i′) that also satisfies (iv) and (v).
We construct this extension in the following paragraph. The conditions on the oracles
(and Γ) are only defined per every input length and thus, we only have to consider the
extension within an input length. In the following paragraph, we consider n and observe
that the claim holds even more for input lengths greater than n.
Let T be the set of transcripts that occur in the domain of i=n, the domain of k=n
and the image of t=n. By definition of the size of (k, t, i) and of τ(n), we have that there
is a transcript y of length τ(n) that is not in T . On the domain of (k, t, i), we define
(k′, t′, i′) to be equal to (k, t, i). Let Y0 be all the transcripts such that i(y) is defined to
be 1, although y is not in the image of t. These are at most 2
n
2c and thus, we can choose
at most 2
n
2c values r that have not been assigned a value under t yet and map them onto
Y0. We define k(r, y) := 0
κ(n) for all y ∈ Y0. An r is called “old”, if, so far, t′ has been
defined on r, and “new”, if not. We choose an element y that is not in T ∪ Y0 and such
that i(y) is not defined to be 0. Such a value exists by construction, as we have assigned
at most 2 · 2 n2c transcripts and there are 2nc transcript values.
120 CHAPTER 7. COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC ASSUMPTIONS
For all new r, we define t(r) := y and k(r, y′) := 0κ(n) for all y′ as well as k(r′, y) :=
0κ(n) for all r′. The probability for a random r of being “old” is 2 · 2− 12c and the
probability for a random r of being “new” is 1 − 2 · 2− 12c . If out of rA, rB at least one
is new, say rA, then k
′(rB, t(rA)) equals 0κ(n), which is equal to k′(rA, t(rB)). If both,
rA and rB are old, then there might be an error, but the probability that both random
values are old is (2 ·2− 12c )2, which is smaller than 2−n/c. Thus, condition (v) is satisfied.
For condition (iv), we now define i(y) to be 1 if and only if y ∈ Im(t) and thereby also
satisfy condition (iv). On all other values, the oracle (k′, t′, i′) can be defined arbitrarily,
for example the function k′ on pairs (r, y) where i(y) = 0.
7.10 On One-Way Functions from NP-hardness
In this section, we provide an oracle, relative to which AM∩ coAM equals P, while a
regular function exists that is infinitely often one-way. This gives strong evidence that if
one were to prove that regular one-way functions imply hard problems in AM∩coAM,
then one would need to revert to non-relativizing techniques. One might interpret our
result as an explanation for the difficulties in bridging the gap in the proof of Akavia et
al. [AGGM06, AGGM10] that intends to show that regular one-way function (and even
a larger class of one-way functions) implies hard problems in AM∩ coAM.
Towards this goal, we define the class of regular function oracles with exponential
pre-image space.
Definition 46 (Regular Function Oracle Classes). An oracle class C is called a regular
function oracle class, if there is a constant c such that
C = {O|O({0, 1}n) ⊆ {0, 1}n/c, |O−1(y)| = 2|y|/c}.
We denote this class by Cc. A function O ∈ Cc is called c-regular.
We will prove that, relative to a generic oracle for this class, AM∩coAM is contained
in P. An analogous version of Lemma 9 then yields that the generic oracle implements
a regular function family that is infinitely many often one-way.
To prove this theorem, we first show that an analog version of Theorem 7 holds,
namely that for languages L that lie in NP ∩ coNP relative to a generic oracle for a
mergeable class, one can determine efficiently and deterministically a small portion of
the oracle that determines whether a specific input x lies in L or not.
We will then extend this approach to languages in AM∩ coAM. We will first show
how to use Nisan’s notion of block sensitivity [Nis91] to prove that relative to a generic
oracle (for the class of all oracles), AM∩ coAM is contained in P. We will then adapt
this proof to a generic oracle for the class Cc.
Note that the regular function family, as we define it, has exponentially many pre-
images for every image value. This is necessary for our proof to work—however, this is
not an artifact of our proof. Interestingly, one result in Akavia et al.[AGGM06] shows
that indeed, regular one-way functions with polynomially many pre-images imply hard
problems in AM∩ coAM and even NP ∩ coNP.
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7.10.1 NP ∩ coNP and Regular One-Way Functions
Theorem 8. For a generic oracle O for Cc, the class NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE
is contained in PO,PSPACE and O implements a regular function, that is infinitely many
often one-way.
Proof. As for Theorem 7, we have to prove that Cc is mergeable. Then, Lemma 7 yields
that, relative to a generic oracle for Cc, NP ∩ coNP is contained in P. Finally, we have
to prove that relative to a generic oracle for Cc, the c-regular function defined by the
oracle is infinitely often one-way. This proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 9, and
we omit it. Let us now see why Cc is mergeable.
As the conditions on O to be in Cc are only length-wise, it suffices to check that
length-wise, C is mergeable. If for the oracle w, we fix the answers to 2n/c input values
of length n, then we can still extend w to an oracle O that is c-regular as no image
value has been assigned more than 2n/c pre-images. Thus, if v≤n is in C, then for any
oracle v≥n with |v≥n| ≤ 2n/c it holds that v≤n ∪ v≥n ∈ C. Therefore, Cc is mergeable for
threshold ν(n) = 2n/c.
7.10.2 Certificate Complexity and Block Sensitivity
The block sensitivity of a function measures how sensitive the function is to modifications
of a certain number of bits of the oracle—recall that we consider an oracle as an infinite
sequence of bits. Similarly, the certificate complexity measures the number of bits of the
oracle we have to know to be able to determine the correct function value.
The following definitions are adapted from Nisan [Nis91], who defines these notion to
meaure the decision tree complexity of boolean functions. When considering the oracle
as an input to a function, we yield the same definitions as Nisan. However, for simplicity,
we directly state our definitions for oracles.
Definition 47 (Certificate Complexity). Let M be an oracle machine that defines an
AM-language LO for all oracles O. The certificate complexity C(x,O) of a pair (x,O)
is the length of the smallest finite prefix w of O such that for all extensions O′ ≥ w, one
has x ∈ LO if and only if x ∈ LO′. The certificate complexity C(x) is the maximum of
C(x,O) over all O.3 The certificate complexity C of M is the smallest function from
N to N such that for all x, C(x) ≤ C(|x|). For b ∈ {0, 1}, the b-certificate complexity
Cb(x) of x is the maximum of C(x,O) over all O, for which χLO(x) = b. If the set of
these O is empty, we define Cb(x) := 0. The b-certificate complexity of M is the smallest
function Cb : N→ N such that for all x, Cb(x) ≤ Cb(|x|).
If later, we consider certificate complexity with respect to two oracle PSPACE, O,
then as before, we regard PSPACE as fixed, i.e., the certificate complexity is only over
O. The same holds for the following notion of block sensitivity.
Definition 48 (Block Sensitivity). Let M be an oracle machine that defines an AM-
language LO for all oracles O. Let S be a finite set of queries and let O(S) be the oracle
3which is well-defined as the number of queries by M is bounded.
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that answers according to O, if a query is not in S, and flips the answer of O, if the query
is in S. We say that a pair (x,O) is sensitive to S, if x ∈ LO if and only if x /∈ LO(S).
The block sensitivity sb(x,O) of a pair (x,O) is the maximal number of disjoint sets
S1,...,Sk such that (x,O) is sensitive to each of them. The block sensitivity sb(x) is the
minimum of sb(x,O) over all oracles O. The block sensitivity sb is the greatest function
from N to N such that for all x, sb(x) ≥ sb(|x|). For b ∈ {0, 1}, the b-block sensitivity
sbb(x) of x is the minimum of sb(x,O) over all those O, for which χLO(x) = b. If the
set of these O is empty, we define sbb(x) := 0.The b-block sensitivity of M is the greatest
function sbb : N→ N such that for all x, sbb(x) ≥ sbb(|x|).
Sometimes, we consider different machines M and N in the same discussion. In this
case, we augment the the above notations by an index M or N .
7.10.3 AM∩ coAM and Generic Oracles
If no class is specified, we consider the class of all one-bit output oracles. In this section,
we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let O be a generic oracle (for the class of all oracles), then AMO,PSPACE∩
coAMO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE, while NPO,PSPACE 6⊆ PO,PSPACE.
Proof. We already know that NPO,PSPACE 6⊆ PO,PSPACE, our goal in this section is to
prove that AMO,PSPACE ∩ coAMO,PSPACE ⊆ PO,PSPACE. Again, our proof is split
into proving the following two claims.
(i) If two polynomial-time oracle Turing machines MO
′,PSPACE and NO
′,PSPACE define
a language in AMO′,PSPACE ∩ coAMO′,PSPACE for all oracles O′, then there is a
deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing Machine A such that for all oracles O′
the algorithm AO′,PSPACE decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
(ii) IfMO,PSPACE andNO,PSPACE define a language inAMO,PSPACE∩coAMO,PSPACE
for the generic oracle O then there are machines M ′ and N ′ such that LO,PSPACEN =
LO,PSPACEN ′ and LO,PSPACEM = LO,PSPACEM ′ and such that, for all oracles O′ ∈ C,
M ′O,PSPACE andN ′O,PSPACE define a language inAMO,PSPACE∩coAMO,PSPACE.
As for the Main Lemma 7, from these two claims, we can derive that for the generic
oracle O, the class AMO,PSPACE∩coAMO,PSPACE is contained in PO,PSPACE. Given
two machines M and N that define a language in AMO,PSPACE ∩ coAMO,PSPACE,
we use (ii) to transform them into M ′ and N ′, for which (i) yield that their respective
languages are easy to decide.
Item (i) will be proved in Lemma 13, we prove item (ii) now. The proof is analogous
to the proof of Claim 2. Let M and N two machines that define an language LOM in
AM∩ coAM relative to the generic oracle O and the PSPACE oracle. Let T be the
oracle Turing Machine that on input x, returns 1, if and only if the AM-languages LO′M
and LO′N are complementary relative to O′ on input length |x|. Let us consider the two
conditions in Lemma 4. As M and N are complementary relative to O, condition (i) is
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not satisfied, i.e., there are not infinitely many xi such that T
O(xi) = 0; actually, there
is not even a single such input xi. Thus, we know that condition (ii) of Lemma 4 holds,
i.e., there is a finite prefix w of O that forces T to return 1 above a certain threshold
Λ. We hardcode the behaviour of MO up to length Λ into M ′ and the behaviour of NO
up to length Λ unto N ′, and we also hardcode the prefix w into M ′ and N ′, namely,
M ′ runs M as a subroutine on witness z and values x with Λ < |x|; and whenever M ′
makes a query to its oracle that is in w, then M ′ does not query its real oracle O′, but
instead, it returns the answer stored in w. We define N ′ in the same way. M ′ and N ′
are polynomial-time, because these operations take constant-time only. Moreoever, by
construction, the AM-languages LO′M ′ and LO
′
N ′ are complementary relative to any oracle
O′, as the prefix w forced M and N to be complementary above certain threshold and as,
below the threshold Λ, M ′ and N ′ are complementary, as MO and NO are. Moreover,
relative to O, we have that M ′O behaves like MO and N ′O behaves like NO.
Lemma 11. Let M be an oracle machine that defines an AM-language LO for all
oracles O, then the block sensitivity sb1 of the 1-instances is smaller than q, the number
of queries made by M .
Again, we require Lemma 11 in its relativized version.
Lemma 11. (relativized) Let M be an oracle machine that defines an AM-language
LO,PSPACE for all oracles O, then the block sensitivity sb1 of the 1-instances is smaller
than q, the number of queries made by M .
The proof for both version of Lemma 11 are analogous. We now prove the unrela-
tivized version of Lemma 11.
Proof. Assume that there is an oracle O and an input x such that χLO(x) = 1 and
sb(O, x) > q(|x|). Then, by definition, there are k := q(|x|) + 1 disjoint sets Si such that
(x,O) are sensitive to all of them. For each r, let zr be a witness such that for a 1−2−n-
fraction of the r-values, we have MO(x, r, zr) = 1. Assume that there is a polynomial
fraction of r such that MO(x, r, zr) does not make any query on Si. Then, there is a
polynomial fraction of r such that MO(Si)(x, r, zr) = M
O(x, r, zr) = 1 in contradiction to
the AM requirement for 0-instances. Thus, with probability 1−2−|x| over r, the machine
MO(x, r, zr) makes a query in Si. As this holds for all Si, an averaging argument yields
that with probability 1− k · 2−|x| over r, the machine MO(x, r, zr) makes a query on all
of the Si. As there are k = q(|x|) + 1 disjoint sets Si, the machine MO(x, r, zr) makes at
least q(|x|)+1 queries for these r, a contradiction to the bound q(|x|) on the queries.
Providing an efficient decision algorithm A for a language means to give an upper
bound on the deterministic computation complexity of the language. We will now give
an upper bounds on another complexity measure, namely the block sensitivity and will
then show in Lemma 13 how to transform this bound into a bound in the deterministic
computation time.
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Lemma 12. Let M and N be oracle machines that define AM-languages LOM and LON
for all oracles O and that are complementary for all oracles O, i.e., LO = LOM = LON ,
then the block sensitivity sb is smaller than q, where q is a common upper bound in the
number of queries.
Lemma 12. (relativized) Let M and N be oracle machines that define AM-languages
LO,PSPACEM and LO,PSPACEN for all oracles O and that are complementary for all oracles
O, i.e., LO = LOM = LON , then the block sensitivity sb is smaller than q, where q is a
common upper bound in the number of queries.
Again, the proofs of the relativized version and the unrelativized version are analo-
gous. We state the proof for the unrelativized Lemma 12.
Proof. As M and N are complementary for all oracles O, we have that if N on instance
(x,O) is sensitive to a set S, then also M is sensitive to S on (x,O). In particular, if a
1-instance (x,O) of N has block sensitivity k, then the corresponding 0-instance (x,O)
of M also has block sensitivity k. Therefore, by Lemma 11, the block sensitivity sbM0 is
also bounded by q and thus, sbM is overall bounded by q.
Now, that we have an upper bound on the complexity measure of block sensitivity,
the proof of the following lemma shows us how to relate the latter into an upper bound
in the computation time, which concludes the proof of Theorem 9.
Lemma 13. If two polynomial-time oracle Turing machines MO
′,PSPACE and NO
′,PSPACE
define a language in AMO′,PSPACE∩coAMO′,PSPACE for all oracles O′, then there is a
deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing Machine A such that for all oracles O′ the
algorithm AO′,PSPACE decides LO′M (and thus also LO
′
N ).
Proof. Our goal is to determine the deterministic computation time of LO′M . Nisan (see
Lemma 2.4. in [Nis91]) and Blum and Impagliazzo (see Lemma 2.2 in [BI87]) prove that,
relative to a PSPACE oracle, the deterministic computation time of a language is at
most (polynomial in) the quare of its certificate complexity. So far, we only bounded
the block sensitivity of the language LO′M . Nisan (see Lemma 2.4 in [Nis91]) proves that
the square of the block sensitivity of a language upper bounds its certificate complexity,
i.e., CM ≤ (sbM )2. Thus, putting both inequalities together, LO′M can be decided using
(CM )
2 ≤ (sbM )4 ≤ q4 queries to O′, where q is an upper bound on the number of queries
used by M ; and LO′M can be decided in time less than polynomial in q4.
7.10.4 AM∩ coAM and Generic Regular Function Oracles
In Theorem 9, we proved that for a generic oracle O for the class of all oracles, it
holds that AMO,PSPACE ∩ coAMO,PSPACE is contained in ⊆ PO,PSPACE. In turn,
Theorem 8 establishes that for a generic oracle O for the class of regular functions Cc, the
class NPO,PSPACE ∩ coNPO,PSPACE is a subset of PO,PSPACE. Moreover, we proved
that O is an regular i.o. one-way function. We now take the best of both worlds showing
that if O is the latter oracle, then it also holds that AMO,PSPACE ∩ coAMO,PSPACE
is contained in PO,PSPACE.
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Theorem 10. Let O be a generic oracle O for Cc, then the class AMO,PSPACE ∩
coAMO,PSPACE is contained in PO,PSPACE and O implements a regular i.o. one-way
function.
We already established that O implements a regular i.o. one-way function. Let us
show that also, AMO,PSPACE∩coAMO,PSPACE is contained in PO,PSPACE. Moreover,
the proofs of Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 carry over to the case of a generic oracle for the
class of regular function oracles Cc. Moreover, Lemma 7 and Theorem 8 tell us that for
mergeable oracle classes such as Cc, the square of the certificate complexity is an upper
bound on the deterministic computation time. The hardest part to show that Nisan’s
Lemma 2.4 [Nis91] can be adapted from the class of all oracles to the class of regular
oracles. In particular, we need to adapt the notions of certificate complexity and block
sensitivity for restricted oracle classes.
Definition 49 (Certificate Complexity Relative to a Class). Let M be an oracle machine
that defines an AM-language LO for all oracles O ∈ C. The certificate complexity
C(x,O) of a pair (x,O) is the length of the smallest finite prefix w of O such that for
all extensions O′ ≥ w in C, one has x ∈ LO if and only if x ∈ LO′. The certificate
complexity C(x) is the maximum of C(x,O) over all O ∈ C4. The certificate complexity
C of M is the smallest function from N to N such that for all x, C(x) ≤ C(|x|). For
b ∈ {0, 1}, the b-certificate complexity Cb(x) of x is the maximum of C(x,O) over all
O ∈ C, for which χLO(x) = b. If the set of these O is empty, we define Cb(x) := 0. The
b-certificate complexity of M is the smallest function Cb : N → N such that for all x,
Cb(x) ≤ Cb(|x|).
Definition 50 (Block Sensitivity Relative to a Class). Let C be an oracle class. Let M
be an oracle machine that defines an AM-language LO for all oracles O ∈ C. Let S be
a finite set of queries and let O(S) be the oracle that answers according to O, if a query
is not in S, and flips the answer of O, if the query is in S. We say that a pair (x,O) is
sensitive to S, if x ∈ LO if and only if x /∈ LO(S). The block sensitivity sb(x,O) of a pair
(x,O) is the maximal number of disjoint sets S1,...,Sk such that OSi ∈ C and (x,O) is
sensitive to each of them. The block sensitivity sb(x) is the minimum of sb(x,O) over all
oracles O ∈ C. The block sensitivity sb is the greatest function from N to N such that for
all x, sb(x) ≥ sb(|x|). For b ∈ {0, 1}, the b-block sensitivity sbb(x) of x is the minimum
of sb(x,O) over all those O ∈ C, for which χLO(x) = b. If the set of these O is empty,
we define sbb(x) := 0.The b-block sensitivity of M is the greatest function sbb : N → N
such that for all x, sbb(x) ≥ sbb(|x|).
Lemma 14. Let C be a regular function oracle class. Then, for each oracle machine M ,
it holds that the block sensitivity sb of M relative to the oracle class C (and a PSPACE
oracle), is greater than 13p(n)
√
C(n), where C is the certificate complexity of M relative
to C (and a PSPACE oracle) and p is an upper bound on the running time of M .
4This number is well-defined as the number of queries by M is bounded.
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Proof. Let x be a string and O ∈ C be an oracle such that (x,O) achieves the certificate
complexity. Let S1 be a minimal set such that O(S1) is in C and such that M is sensitive
to S1. Here, minimality is defined with respect to the multi-bit-output regular function
encoded by O, i.e., we want that as few as possible of the function values are modified.
We continute to pick S2 or more generally Si as a minimal set disjoint from all
previous sets such that O(Si) is in C and such that M is sensitive to Si, until after
picking St, we cannot find any other disjoint set that satisfies the condition.
The union of all Si is a certificate for (x,O), as else, there would be another disjoint




Then, we can derive the following two bounds:
(i) bs(x) ≥ 13p maxi |Si|
(ii) bs(x,O) ≥ t
The latter bound follows from the fact that a certificate for (x,O) has to contain at
least one element from each Si. We will see that the first bound follows from the
“symmetric” structure of the Si, namely O(Si) has to be a regular function again—if
one flips the response r of one query to r′, there are too many pre-images for r′ and
too few pre-images for r. As O(Si) is a regular functions, other queries have to even out
the difference. From now on, we consider O as a multi-bit output oracle and the sets Si
as sets of query-response, namely all those pairs (q, r) of the regular function O, which
have to be modified to obtain O(Si).
If (q0, r0) is in O and (q0, r1) is in Si, then some element has to make up for the loss
of a pre-image of r0, as the functions are regular. Simultaneously, some element (q1, r1)
in O has to make up for the increase of pre-images of r0 in Si, that is, there is a q1
such that (q1, r1) in O while (q1, r2) is in Si. We can thus generate such a sequence of
pairs (qk, rk+1) in Si. But as all modifications have to even out to preseve regularity, it
follows that there has to be an n such that (qn, r0) is in Si. Thus, these elements form
a cycle. We can repeat this process and thus split Si into several cycles C1,...,Cl. Note
that (x,O(Si)) is sensitive to each cycle in Si, as else, Si would not have been minimal.
We will now split up each Cj into disjoint pairs or triples to each of which Si is sensitive.
Let (qk, rk+1) denote the cycle Cj . Then, (x,O(Si)) is sensitive to {(q0, r2), (q1, r1)} and
to {(q2, r4), (q3, r3)} etc.—if it were not, the choice of Si would not have been minimal
with respect to the number of queries whose answers had to be modified. Thus, each
cycle Ci defines b|Ci|/2c many disjoint pairs that (x,O(Si)) is sensitive to. In the worst
case, all Ci contain exactly 3 pairs, and then, there are #Si/3 pairs that (x,O(Si)) is
sensitive to, where #Si denotes the number of pairs (q, r) defined by Si. Therefore,
bs(x) ≥ bs(x,O(Si)) ≥ 13#Si ≥ |Si|3p ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that not more than q bits can be associated
with the same query.
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From (i) and (ii), we can now derive a lower bound on bs. If t is greater than
√
C,
then (ii) yields that bs(x) ≥ bs(x,O) ≥ t. If t is smaller than √C, then at least one of
the Si has to be greater than
√
C. By (i), we obtain that bs(x) ≥ 13p
√
C.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Open Problems
We initiate the study of purely game-based composition theorems for key agreement
and hope that our framework might inspire further research on game-based composition.
Our results establish that forward-secure BR-secure key exchange protocols are generally
composable with symmetric-key protocols, and general BR-secure key exchange protocols
are composable with all single-session-reducible symmetric-key protocols. For our proofs
to work, we assumed a public session matching algorithms and we showed that conversely,
if a general composition theorem holds for a key exchange protocol, then the key exchange
protocol admits a weak public session matching. It remains to determine the exact
relationship, and it would be interesting to establish a formal connection to the results
on sesssion matching established in [GR13].
While the first two theorems target BR-secure protocols such as [DF10], many pop-
ular protocols escape the BR-framework due to the implementation of explicit key con-
firmation, namely, key exchange protocols use a future encryption key already for en-
cryption during the key exchange phase. While key confirmation destroys key indistin-
guishability, intuitively, it should not harm the security of a protocol.
We thus devise a more flexible security definition that captures this intution. In-
terestingly, we can show that our notion in closed under reductions, namely under key-
independent reductions, a notion that we put forth. Thereby, even in this model, we
provide a strategy to perform a modular analysis of key agreement protocols with a
subsequent channel protocol. As an application, we prove the security of a simplified
version of TLS.
Closure under reductions and composition of games are two important principles
that we hope are of independent interest. In particular, we “glue” games together which
seems a natural approach to consider joint attack models. Maybe, even for those, closure
under reductions can be proven.
Moreover, it would be interesting to carry out a standard model analysis of TLS in our
model, and moreover, other practical key exchange protocols that use key confirmation
can now be analysed in our model.
Another interesting extension is a model and composition result for one-sided au-
thentication. In particular, it seems worthy to analyse TLS in this model, as TLS is
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mostly used with one-sided authentication only, as clients tend not to have certificates.
In the area of complexity-theoretic assumptions, we establish an oracle result that
indicates that NP∩coNP is not a necessary assumption for secure key agreement, if the
key agreement protocol does not achieve perfect correctness—more precisely, that such
a result cannot be established using relativizing techniques. It would be interesting to
see, whether a similar result can be shown for perfectly correct key agreement protocols
whose transcript space is not co-range verifiable. Moreover, one might be able to extend
this result to AM∩ coAM. The most important goal would be, of course, to construct
a candidate key agreement scheme that does not rely on hard problems in AM∩coAM.
The aforementioned extension of our impossibility result seem a worthwhile direction to
understand which loopholes to exploit. Another interesting approach would be to exploit
interaction, as suggested by Rudich [Rud88]. To date, no such aproach are known.
Bibliography
[AB09] Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak. Computational Complexity - A Modern
Approach. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[AD07] Miklo´s Ajtai and Cynthia Dwork. The first and fourth public-key cryp-
tosystems with worst-case/average-case equivalence. Electronic Colloquium
on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 14(097), 2007.
[AGGM06] Adi Akavia, Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Dana Moshkovitz. On
basing one-way functions on NP-hardness. In Jon M. Kleinberg, editor, 38th
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 701–710, Seattle,
Washington, USA, May 21–23, 2006. ACM Press.
[AGGM10] Adi Akavia, Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Dana Moshkovitz. Er-
ratum for: on basing one-way functions on np-hardness. In STOC, pages
795–796. ACM, 2010.
[Ajt96] Miklo´s Ajtai. Generating hard instances of lattice problems (extended ab-
stract). In 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
99–108, Philadephia, Pennsylvania, USA, May 22–24, 1996. ACM Press.
[Ajt98] Miklo´s Ajtai. The shortest vector problem in L2 is NP-hard for randomized
reductions (extended abstract). In 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, pages 10–19, Dallas, Texas, USA, May 23–26, 1998. ACM
Press.
[AR00] Mart´ın Abadi and Phillip Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography
(the computational soundness of formal encryption). In IFIP TCS, volume
1872 of LNCS, pages 3–22. Springer, 2000.
[AR05] Dorit Aharonov and Oded Regev. Lattice problems in np cap conp. J.
ACM, 52(5):749–765, 2005.
[Bar01] Boaz Barak. How to go beyond the black-box simulation barrier. In 42nd
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 106–115,




[BBF13] Paul Baecher, Christina Brzuska, and Marc Fischlin. Notions of black-box
reductions, revisited. http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/101, 2013.
[BBM00] Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Silvio Micali. Public-key encryp-
tion in a multi-user setting: Security proofs and improvements. In Bart
Preneel, editor, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2000, volume 1807
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 259–274, Bruges, Belgium,
May 14–18, 2000. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[BBP04] Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Adriana Palacio. An uninstan-
tiable random-oracle-model scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem. In
Christian Cachin and Jan Camenisch, editors, Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2004, volume 3027 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 171–188, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 2–6, 2004. Springer, Berlin,
Germany.
[BCFW09] Alexandra Boldyreva, David Cash, Marc Fischlin, and Bogdan Warinschi.
Foundations of non-malleable hash and one-way functions. In Mitsuru Mat-
sui, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009, volume 5912 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 524–541, Tokyo, Japan, Decem-
ber 6–10, 2009. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[BDF12] Christina Brzuska, O¨zgu¨r Dagdelen, and Marc Fischlin. TLS, PACE,
and EAC: A cryptographic view on modern key exchange protocols. In
Sicherheit 2012, volume 195 of Lecture Notes in Informatics, pages 71–82.
Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (GI), 2012.
[BDFK12] Jens Bender, O¨zgu¨r Dagdelen, Marc Fischlin, and Dennis Ku¨gler. The
PACE|AA protocol for machine readable travel documents, and its secu-
rity. In Financial Cryptography, volume 7397 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 344–358. Springer, 2012.
[BFS+12] Christina Brzuska, Marc Fischlin, Nigel P. Smart, Bogdan Warinschi, and
Stephen C. Williams. Less is more: Relaxed yet composable security notions
for key exchange. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2012:242, 2012.
[BFS+13] Christina Brzuska, Marc Fischlin, Nigel P. Smart, Bogdan Warinschi, and
Stephen C. Williams. Less is more: Relaxed yet composable security notions
for key exchange. Int. J. Inf. Sec., ??:??–??, 2013.
[BFWW11] Christina Brzuska, Marc Fischlin, Bogdan Warinschi, and Stephen C.
Williams. Composability of Bellare-Rogaway key exchange protocols. In
ACM CCS 11: 18th Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, pages 51–62. ACM Press, 2011.
[BH13] Kfir Barhum and Thomas Holenstein. A cookbook for black-box separations
and a recipe for uowhfs. In TCC, pages 662–679, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
[BI87] Manuel Blum and Russell Impagliazzo. Generic oracles and oracle classes
(extended abstract). In FOCS, pages 118–126. IEEE Computer Society,
1987.
[BLR] Boaz Barak, Yehuda Lindell, and Tal Rabin. Protocol ini-
tialization for the framework of universal composability. eprint:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/006.
[BM03] Colin Boyd and Anish Mathuria. Protocols for Authentication and Key
Establishment. Springer, 2003.
[BN00] Mihir Bellare and Chanathip Namprempre. Authenticated encryption: Re-
lations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm. In
Tatsuaki Okamoto, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2000,
volume 1976 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 531–545, Kyoto,
Japan, December 3–7, 2000. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[BPR00] Mihir Bellare, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway. Authenticated key
exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In Bart Preneel, editor, Ad-
vances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2000, volume 1807 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 139–155, Bruges, Belgium, May 14–18, 2000.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[BPW03] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner. A composable
cryptographic library with nested operations. In Sushil Jajodia, Vijayalak-
shmi Atluri, and Trent Jaeger, editors, ACM CCS 03: 10th Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 220–230, Washington D.C.,
USA, October 27–30, 2003. ACM Press.
[BPW07] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner. The reactive sim-
ulatability (rsim) framework for asynchronous systems. Information and
Computation, 205(12):1685–1720, 2007.
[BR93] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribu-
tion. In Douglas R. Stinson, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’93,
volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 232–249, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, August 22–26, 1993. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[BR95] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Provably secure session key distribu-
tion: The three party case. In 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 57–66, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, May 29 – June 1, 1995.
ACM Press.
[BT03] Andrej Bogdanov and Luca Trevisan. On worst-case to average-case re-
ductions for NP problems. In 44th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, pages 308–317, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, Octo-
ber 11–14, 2003. IEEE Computer Society Press.
134 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[BV98] Dan Boneh and Ramarathnam Venkatesan. Breaking RSA may not be
equivalent to factoring. In Kaisa Nyberg, editor, Advances in Cryptology
– EUROCRYPT’98, volume 1403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 59–71, Espoo, Finland, May 31 – June 4, 1998. Springer, Berlin,
Germany.
[BWJM97] Simon Blake-Wilson, Don Johnson, and Alfred Menezes. Key agreement
protocols and their security analysis. In IMA International Conference on
Cryptography and Coding, pages 30–45. Springer, 1997.
[Cai98] Jin-Yi Cai. A relation of primal-dual lattices and the complexity of shortest
lattice vector problem. Theoretical Computer Science, 207:105–116, 1998.
[Can01] Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for crypto-
graphic protocols. In 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pages 136–145, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, October 14–17, 2001.
IEEE Computer Society Press.
[CF01] Ran Canetti and Marc Fischlin. Universally composable commitments. In
Joe Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 19–40, Santa Barbara, CA,
USA, August 19–23, 2001. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[CHL02] Yan-Cheng Chang, Chun-Yun Hsiao, and Chi-Jen Lu. On the impossibilities
of basing one-way permutations on central cryptographic primitives. In Yu-
liang Zheng, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2002, volume
2501 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 110–124, Queenstown,
New Zealand, December 1–5, 2002. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[CK01] Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk. Analysis of key-exchange protocols and
their use for building secure channels. In Birgit Pfitzmann, editor, Ad-
vances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2001, volume 2045 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 453–474, Innsbruck, Austria, May 6–10, 2001.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[CK02] Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk. Universally composable notions of key ex-
change and secure channels. In Lars R. Knudsen, editor, Advances in Cryp-
tology – EUROCRYPT 2002, volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 337–351, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, April 28 – May 2,
2002. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[Cor02] Jean-Se´bastien Coron. Optimal security proofs for PSS and other signature
schemes. In Lars R. Knudsen, editor, Advances in Cryptology – EURO-
CRYPT 2002, volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
272–287, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, April 28 – May 2, 2002. Springer,
Berlin, Germany.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
[DA06] T. Dierks and C. Allen. The TLS protocol version 1.2. In RFC 4346, 2006.
[DDM+05] Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, and
Mathieu Turuani. Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a proto-
col security logic (invited lecture). In Lu´ıs Caires, Giuseppe F. Italiano,
Lu´ıs Monteiro, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Moti Yung, editors, ICALP 2005:
32nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
volume 3580 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 16–29, Lisbon,
Portugal, July 11–15, 2005. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[DDMW06] Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, and Bogdan Warinschi.
Computationally sound compositional logic for key exchange protocols. In
CSFW, pages 321–334. IEEE Computer Society, 2006.
[DF10] O¨zgu¨r Dagdelen and Marc Fischlin. Security analysis of the extended access
control protocol for machine readable travel documents. In Mike Burmester,
Gene Tsudik, Spyros S. Magliveras, and Ivana Ilic, editors, ISC 2010: 13th
International Conference on Information Security, volume 6531 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 54–68, Boca Raton, FL, USA, Octo-
ber 25–28, 2010. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[DH76] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[DHT12] Yevgeniy Dodis, Iftach Haitner, and Aris Tentes. On the instantiability
of hash-and-sign rsa signatures. In TCC, volume 7194 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 112–132. Springer, 2012.
[DKS98] Irit Dinur, Guy Kindler, and Shmuel Safra. Approximating-CVP to within
almost-polynomial factors is NP-hard. In 39th Annual Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, pages 99–111, Palo Alto, California, USA,
November 8–11, 1998. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[DOP05] Yevgeniy Dodis, Roberto Oliveira, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. On the generic
insecurity of the full domain hash. In Victor Shoup, editor, Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005, volume 3621 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 449–466, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14–18, 2005.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[FF93] Joan Feigenbaum and Lance Fortnow. Random-self-reducibility of complete
sets. SIAM J. Comput., 22(5):994–1005, 1993.
[FF13] Marc Fischlin and Nils Fleischhacker. Limitations of the meta-reduction
technique: The case of schnorr signatures. In Eurocrypt 2013, to appear,
2013.
136 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Fis99] Marc Fischlin. Pseudorandom function tribe ensembles based on one-way
permutations: Improvements and applications. In Jacques Stern, editor,
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT’99, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 432–445, Prague, Czech Republic, May 2–6,
1999. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[FLR+10] Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Thomas Ristenpart, Thomas Shrimpton,
Martijn Stam, and Stefano Tessaro. Random oracles with(out) pro-
grammability. In Masayuki Abe, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASI-
ACRYPT 2010, volume 6477 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
303–320, Singapore, December 5–9, 2010. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[FS10] Marc Fischlin and Dominique Schro¨der. On the impossibility of three-move
blind signature schemes. In Henri Gilbert, editor, Advances in Cryptology
– EUROCRYPT 2010, volume 6110 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 197–215, French Riviera, May 30 – June 3, 2010. Springer, Berlin,
Germany.
[GG98] Oded Goldreich and Shafi Goldwasser. On the limits of non-approximability
of lattice problems. In 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting, pages 1–9, Dallas, Texas, USA, May 23–26, 1998. ACM Press.
[GM82] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption and how to
play mental poker keeping secret all partial information. In STOC, pages
365–377. ACM, 1982.
[Gol01] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools, volume 1. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001.
[Gol04] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Applications, vol-
ume 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004.
[Gol08] Oded Goldreich. Computational complexity - a conceptual perspective. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008.
[GR13] Wesley George and Charles Rackoff. Rethinking definitions of security for
session key agreement. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2013:139, 2013.
[GW11] Craig Gentry and Daniel Wichs. Separating succinct non-interactive ar-
guments from all falsifiable assumptions. In STOC, pages 99–108. ACM,
2011.
[HH09] Iftach Haitner and Thomas Holenstein. On the (im)possibility of key de-
pendent encryption. In Omer Reingold, editor, TCC 2009: 6th Theory of
Cryptography Conference, volume 5444 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 202–219. Springer, Berlin, Germany, March 15–17, 2009.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
[HHRS07] Iftach Haitner, Jonathan J. Hoch, Omer Reingold, and Gil Segev. Finding
collisions in interactive protocols - a tight lower bound on the round com-
plexity of statistically-hiding commitments. In 48th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 669–679, Providence, USA, Octo-
ber 20–23, 2007. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[HMX10] Iftach Haitner, Mohammad Mahmoody, and David Xiao. A new sampling
protocol and applications to basing cryptographic primitives on the hard-
ness of np. In IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pages 76–87.
IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[HOZ13] Iftach Haitner, Eran Omri, and Hila Zarosim. Limits on the usefulness of
random oracles. In TCC, pages 437–456, 2013.
[HR07] Ishay Haviv and Oded Regev. Tensor-based hardness of the shortest vector
problem to within almost polynomial factors. In David S. Johnson and
Uriel Feige, editors, 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 469–477, San Diego, California, USA, June 11–13, 2007. ACM Press.
[HRS09] Iftach Haitner, Alon Rosen, and Ronen Shaltiel. On the (im)possibility
of Arthur-Merlin witness hiding protocols. In Omer Reingold, editor,
TCC 2009: 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, volume 5444 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 220–237. Springer, Berlin, Germany,
March 15–17, 2009.
[IL89] Russell Impagliazzo and Michael Luby. One-way functions are essential for
complexity-based cryptography. In 30th Annual Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science, pages 230–235, Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina, October 30 – November 1, 1989. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[Imp95] Russell Impagliazzo. A personal view of average-case complexity. In Struc-
ture in Complexity Theory Conference, pages 134–147, 1995.
[Imp11] Russell Impagliazzo. Relativized separations of worst-case and average-case
complexities for np. In IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity,
pages 104–114, 2011.
[IR90] Russell Impagliazzo and Steven Rudich. Limits on the provable conse-
quences of one-way permutations. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO’88, volume 403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 8–26, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 21–25, 1990. Springer,
Berlin, Germany.
[JKSS12] Tibor Jager, Florian Kohlar, Sven Scha¨ge, and Jo¨rg Schwenk. On the se-
curity of TLS-DHE in the standard model. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 273–293, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, August 2012. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
138 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[KK12] Saqib A. Kakvi and Eike Kiltz. Optimal security proofs for full domain hash,
revisited. In EUROCRYPT, volume 7237 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 537–553. Springer, 2012.
[KP09] Eike Kiltz and Krzysztof Pietrzak. On the security of padding-based encryp-
tion schemes - or - why we cannot prove OAEP secure in the standard model.
In Antoine Joux, editor, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2009, vol-
ume 5479 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 389–406, Cologne,
Germany, April 26–30, 2009. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[Kra01] Hugo Krawczyk. The order of encryption and authentication for protecting
communications (or: How secure is SSL?). In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances
in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 310–331, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19–23, 2001.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[KT11] Ralf Ku¨sters and Max Tuengerthal. Composition theorems without pre-
established session identifiers. In Yan Chen, George Danezis, and Vitaly
Shmatikov, editors, CCS, pages 41–50. ACM, 2011.
[Ku¨s06] Ralf Ku¨sters. Simulation-based security with inexhaustible interactive tur-
ing machines. In CSFW, pages 309–320. IEEE Computer Society, 2006.
[KY07] Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung. Scalable protocols for authenticated group
key exchange. Journal of Cryptology, 20(1):85–113, January 2007.
[LLM06] Brian LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, and Anton Mityagin. Stronger security of
authenticated key exchange. eprint: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/073,
2006.
[LOZ12] Yehuda Lindell, Eran Omri, and Hila Zarosim. Completeness for symmet-
ric two-party functionalities - revisited. In ASIACRYPT, volume 7658 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 116–133. Springer, 2012.
[MP12] Mohammad Mahmoody and Rafael Pass. The curious case of non-
interactive commitments - on the power of black-box vs. non-black-box use
of primitives. In CRYPTO, volume 7417 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 701–718. Springer, 2012.
[MR04] Daniele Micciancio and Oded Regev. Worst-case to average-case reductions
based on Gaussian measures. In 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, pages 372–381, Rome, Italy, October 17–19, 2004. IEEE
Computer Society Press.
[MSW10] Paul Morrissey, Nigel P. Smart, and Bogdan Warinschi. The TLS handshake
protocol: A modular analysis. Journal of Cryptology, 23(2):187–223, April
2010.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
[MT10] Ueli Maurer and Bjo¨rn Tackmann. On the soundness of authenticate-then-
encrypt: formalizing the malleability of symmetric encryption. In Ehab Al-
Shaer, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Vitaly Shmatikov, editors, ACM CCS
10: 17th Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages
505–515, Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 4–8, 2010. ACM Press.
[Nis91] Noam Nisan. Crew prams and decision trees. SIAM J. Comput., 20(6):999–
1007, 1991.
[Pas11] Rafael Pass. Limits of provable security from standard assumptions. In
STOC, pages 109–118. ACM, 2011.
[PRS11] Kenneth G. Paterson, Thomas Ristenpart, and Thomas Shrimpton. Tag
size does matter: Attacks and proofs for the TLS record protocol. In
Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang, editors, ASIACRYPT, volume 7073
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 372–389. Springer, 2011.
[PTV11] Rafael Pass, Wei-Lung Dustin Tseng, and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasub-
ramaniam. Towards non-black-box lower bounds in cryptography. In Yuval
Ishai, editor, TCC, volume 6597 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 579–596. Springer, 2011.
[PV06] Pascal Paillier and Jorge L. Villar. Trading one-wayness against chosen-
ciphertext security in factoring-based encryption. In Xuejia Lai and Kefei
Chen, editors, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2006, volume 4284
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 252–266, Shanghai, China,
December 3–7, 2006. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[Reg03] Oded Regev. New lattice based cryptographic constructions. In 35th An-
nual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 407–416, San Diego,
California, USA, June 9–11, 2003. ACM Press.
[Reg05] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and
cryptography. In Harold N. Gabow and Ronald Fagin, editors, 37th An-
nual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 84–93, Baltimore,
Maryland, USA, May 22–24, 2005. ACM Press.
[Rom90] John Rompel. One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure
signatures. In 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 387–394, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, May 14–16, 1990. ACM Press.
[RTV04] Omer Reingold, Luca Trevisan, and Salil P. Vadhan. Notions of reducibil-
ity between cryptographic primitives. In Moni Naor, editor, TCC 2004: 1st
Theory of Cryptography Conference, volume 2951 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 1–20, Cambridge, MA, USA, February 19–21, 2004.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
140 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Rud88] Steven Rudich. Limits on the provable consequences of one-way-functions.
In Thesis, 1988.
[Rud92] Steven Rudich. The use of interaction in public cryptosystems (extended ab-
stract). In Joan Feigenbaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’91,
volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 242–251, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, August 11–15, 1992. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
[Seu12] Yannick Seurin. On the exact security of schnorr-type signatures in the
random oracle model. In EUROCRYPT, volume 7237 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 554–571. Springer, 2012.
[Sho99a] Victor Shoup. On formal models for secure key exchange. In IBM Research
Report RZ 3120, 1999.
[Sho99b] Victor Shoup. On formal models for secure key exchange. eprint:
http://eprint.iacr.org/1999/012, 1999.
[Wat10] Thomas Watson. Relativized worlds without worst-case to average-case
reductions for np. In APPROX-RANDOM, volume 6302 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 752–765. Springer, 2010.
[Wil11a] Stephen C. Williams. Analysis of the ssh key exchange protocol. In IMA Int.
Conf., volume 7089 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 356–374.
Springer, 2011.
[Wil11b] Stephen C. Williams. On the security of key exchange protocols. In Thesis,
2011.
